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Abstract 
This thesis aims at showing that Sartre's project in Being and Nothingness is a 
phenomenological anthropology. His project begins with an implicit adoption of the 
phenomenological methods of Husserl and Heidegger, and these methodological 
elements have jointly guided his phenomenological-ontological (or eidetic-ontological) 
perspective. It is from this perspective that he explicates the eidetic and ontological 
structure of the human subject named "human reality”，and shows that value is 
introduced into the world through the being of this existent. It reveals that Sartre's 
project in Being and Nothingness is motivated by an anthropological-ethical concern. 
The phenomenological-ontological perspective permits Sartre to differentiate 
between various modes of being of existents from the dimension of Nothingness: the 
being-for-itself (e.g., the human reality) is the existent that is characterized by its 
spontaneous nihilation, and the being-in-itself (e.g., an inert object or an instrument) is 
the existent that is distinguished by its passive status of "being nihilated". This 
examination further discloses that the being-for-itself is always existing in the triple 
ekstases of Facticity, Transcendence and Temporality. It shows that the being-for-itself 
is always a present existent which projects its futural possibilities within the limits of its 
situation and past choices, and it entails that "value" is indeed a part of the eidetic and 
ontological structure of the human reality. All these observations can find their 
phenomenal validities in the existential psychoanalysis of bad faith (and sincerity). The 
analyses exhibit that every instance of bad faith must presuppose the aforementioned 
three human ekstases, and illusive understandings will be resulted when a human reality 
disintegrates and slides in between his/her human ekstases. These descriptive 
examinations eventually reveal that human reality can exist in its authenticity only if 
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Introduction 
A phenomenological study of Being and 
Nothingness 
§ 1 Explanation of the title of thesis 
Before proceeding to the main text of this thesis, it is necessary to explain a little 
bit about its title. As we can see, this thesis is dedicated to explore the 
"phenomenological anthropology" that is found in Sartre's Being and Nothingness. 
Even though Sartre has never called his project "phenomenological anthropology", 
the term has, however, accurately depicted the essence of his project. First of all, the 
word “phenomenological” designates the methodology which Sartre has adopted in 
his project; it indicates that Sartre is performing his investigation from a 
phenomenological standpoint that is taken over from Husserl's and Heidegger's 
phenomenology (The specific elements and implications of this adoption will be 
examined in the first chapter of this thesis). Second, the word "anthropology" 
specifies the subject matter or Sache of Sartre's investigation; it shows that Sartre is 
conducting a phenomenological study on human being. We should be careful that we 
are just understanding and using the term "anthropology" by sticking to its Greek 
origin: the prefix av0pco7ro(； {anthropos) refers to the generic term of “human being"1, 
while the suffix -Xoyla (-logia) refers to the discourse, examination or study of the 
aforementioned subject matter. The etymological root of the term reveals that what we 
meant by “anthropology” 一 or anthropos-logia — here is a philosophical study of the 
existent (and the existence of) “human being". It is necessary to note that this term is 
purely an expression about the subject matter of Sartre's research, and the term itself 
1 Liddell, Henr y George, A Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996)，p.141. 
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does not carry any methodological implications or presuppositions. Thus, what we 
mean by "anthropology" in the title neither refers to the particular social science 
which has its object of study the so-called primitive societies (this is the usual 
acceptation of the term "anthropology")； nor does it designate the ontical inquiry that 
aims to look at the essentia, object-like essence or factual attributes of human being 
(These two senses of "anthropology" can be excluded once we have clarified the 
phenomenological standpoint in Sartre's investigation, and it implies that the 
“anthropology’’ which Sartre has done in Being and Nothingness is completely 
different from the ones that are criticized and rejected by Husserl and Heidegger). 
And by considering the two terms together, we should be able to know that what we 
mean by "phenomenological anthropology" is a descriptive investigation that tries to 
disclose the eidetic and onto logical structure of a unique existent which, in its being, 
projects its own value — and this unique existent is exactly us, the human being. 
§2 The historical background: Sartre the existentialist and 
phenomenologist 
It is fairly near the truth to say that Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) is one of the 
most prominent and original philosophers in the last century. As a philosopher, Sartre 
has been recognized both by the public and the specialists as an existentialist. There 
are various factors that give rise to such an understanding. For example, Sartre is 
probably the first person who thematically brings up the term "existentialism", and his 
public lecture Existentialism is a Humanism is always considered as one of the 
defining texts of existentialism. Moreover, existentialism has greatly influenced the 




consolidated such an existentialist image of him in the realm of the public and 
academia. 
Nevertheless, this popular understanding of Sartre is not solely a result of 
accidental or contingent causes. There are more fundamental reasons, related to 
Sartre's thoughts, which support their understanding. First of all, it is easy to find out 
a very central theme in Sartre's philosophy — that is, the phenomenon of "human life". 
Both of his opus magnum, Being and Nothingness3 (1943) and Critique of Dialectical 
Reason (1960), have carried out detailed analyses of the personal, interpersonal and 
societal dimensions of human life. Furthermore, we can find out another common 
characteristic in a number of his early researches. In these researches, Sartre tries to 
analyze and describe human life from an "existential" dimension or perspective. He 
depicts different facets of human life from a vivid and first person perspective, and he 
wants to show, in this "existential" way, that man is a being which exists in its own 
choice and situation, its freedom and anxiety. These themes, together with this 
"existential" way of examination, are commonly understood as the existentialism. 
As we can see, it is reasonable to say that Sartre's philosophy contains a certain 
amount of existentialist elements. But is this the only element and facet of his 
philosophizing? Are there any other philosophical elements which are equally — or 
even more — worthwhile to be examined? In the recent decade, a number of scholars 
redeem another philosophical moment from Sartre's philosophy. This moment, which 
is often neglected or overlooked, is the phenomenological moment. At the beginning 
of her book, Warnock points out that the phenomenological method is a necessary 
component of any existentialist philosophy.4 It implies that we should be able to find 
the phenomenological foundation of these ingredients. Before looking at the studies of 
3 Sartre, Jean -Paul, Being and Nothingness: a Phenomenological Essay on Ontology, translated by 
Hazel E. Barnes (New York, N.Y.: Washington Square Press, 1992); abbreviated as 忍TV henceforth. 
4 Mary Warnock, Existentialism (London; New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 3-4. 
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other Sartrean scholars, let us have a glance at the relation between phenomenology 
and Sartre's philosophy. 
It maybe a surprise for a number of our readers to know the following fact: Sartre 
has admitted that he had been a "Husserlian" for a long time.5 His essay on the 
concept of "intentionality" reveals his substantial understanding in Husserl's 
phenomenology.6 Apart f rom this, he has also explicitly adopted a phenomenological 
position in a number of his early researches. We can have a glimpse of this from the 
subtitles of these essays: The Transcendence of the Ego (1936-37) has the subtitle “an 
outline of a phenomenological description The imaginary (1940) has the subtitle “a 
phenomenological psychology of imagination ”； and the subtitle for BN is “an essay 
on phenomenological ontology". These evidences show that phenomenology has 
n 
played a very important role in his philosophy. Scholars like Christina Howells, 
Hazel E. Barnes and Joseph Catalano have paid much attention to this aspect of 
Sartre's researches. As Howells says, Sartre's phenomenological psychology is not an 
‘‘incoherent hybrid". Rather, phenomenological method is used to examine "the 
meaning of emotional behaviour" of human lives, and to restore them with ‘‘the 
• • Q 
concrete specificity of its individual manifestation." Barnes, the translator of BN, 
also considered the task in BN 從 a "phenomenological description".9 It means that it 
is impossible to understand his analysis of "nothingness" or "consciousness" 
completely if we are not aware of his phenomenological position. Catalano, who has 
5 L AU Kwok-ying finds that Sartre has made such a claim in Carnets de la drole de guerre. See 劉國 
英：〈超越論的自我論之批判與意識的非自我論理解——年青薩特的貢獻〉，《同濟大學學報• 
社會科學版》，第五期’2005，頁13，註腳1 ° 
6 Jean -Paul Sartre, "A fundamental idea in the phenomenology of Husserl: Intentionality" in Journal of 
the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 1, No. 2 (May 1970), pp. 4-5. 
7 Mary Warnock, Existentialism (London; New York: Oxford University Press, 1970)，pp. 95-96. 
8 Christ ina Howells, Sartre: The Necessity of Freedom (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 
p. 9. 
9 Barnes sa ys "Consciousness and nothingness are dependent on being, but they are not being. Sartre's 
ontology is a phenomenological description of this no-thing, which is consciousness, to the being on 
which it depends." See Hazel E. Barnes, "Sartre's Ontology: The Revealing and Making of Being" in 
The Cambridge Companion to Sartre (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 13. 
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written an in-depth commentary on BN1[), sharply pointed out that "[ujnlike Sartre's 
literary works and popular expositions of existentialism, Being and Nothingness is 
addressed to a specific philosophical community, and consequently, with no 
knowledge of phenomenology, even the student of philosophy finds this work 
somehow mystifying".11 He also notices that BN is primarily not a book on 
existentialism, but ‘‘an ontology, that is, as a fundamental description of being itself', 
and this is the reason why "even professional philosophers not trained in 
phenomenology find the Introduction, as well as other sections of Sartre's work, very 
12 
difficult."1" The rese arches of these scholars point to one-and-the-same thing: we 
should not overlook the phenomenological elements in Sartre's philosophy, because 
we can never reveal the complete picture and genuine meaning of Sartre's philosophy 
if we do not take his phenomenological background and position into consideration. 
Put it differently, phenomenology is not simply an element which repeatedly appears 
in Sartre's philosophy; it should rather be treated as a necessary pre-requisite for his 
existential analysis, because it is through the phenomenological method that he can 
approach and examine his themes in an "existential" way. Upon this consideration, 
any understanding which neglects this aspect of his philosophy would be one-sided or 
even superficial. 
§3 S tructure of the present research 
(i) S cope of research: Be ins: and Nothingness 
It will be impossible to review all of Sartre's philosophical publications within 
the length of this thesis. However, it is still worthwhile to pick out one of his major 
10 Catalano, Joseph S., A Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1974). 
11 Ibid. , p. xv. 
12 Catalano, Joseph S., A Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1974), p. 19. 
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works and conduct an in-depth examination. Our present research will focus on the 
°PUS magnum in his early stages of philosophical life - Being and Nothingness (1943). 
There are a number of reasons which support this choice. 
First of all, the integral and compact structure of BN cm facilitate the researches 
in this thesis. We shall find that the philosophical work of Sartre is often accused of 
being obscure and unorganized.13 This is probably an untenable accusation, but it also 
reflects the difficulties people encounter when they try to present Sartre's thoughts in 
a systematic way. Among his early publications, BN is the one which has the most 
integral and compact structure. This character of BN would certainly help us to 
capture and present his thoughts in a more organized way. 
Second, a study of BN can show us the essential characters of Sartre's early 
philosophy. As we know, BN is always considered as the most important and 
representative work of the first twenty years of his philosophical life. This 
understanding should be an appropriate one. In the book, we can find most of the 
central themes of his early philosophy. We can also find the origins of some crucial 
problems of his latter work in BN.]4 But what makes BN so important is that, Sartre 
has provided a very detailed and comprehensive elaboration of these themes. It is why 
BN can be treated as the most mature expression of the early stage of his philosophical 
life. A study of this book would certainly give us a general but substantial 
understanding of these essential aspects of this stage of Sartre's philosophy. 
Finally, a review of BN will clearly show us other aspects and elements of 
Sartre's early philosophy. For the public or even some scholars, BN 么 considered 
13 For exa mple, Natanson claims that "it is necessary to forewarn the reader that both the style and the 
content of Sartre's main work offer a serious problem in any attempt to present lucidly his ideas and 
intentions or to translate his language into intelligible English. It is impossible to convey to anyone 
who has not read L 'Etre et le Neant the involved and often tangled line of Sartre's argument and the 
horrifying quality of the prose which is intended to convey the author's ideas." (p. 19) He also quoted a 
few lines which support his assertion from the researches of Foulquie and Ayer. See Natanson, Maurice, 
A Critique of Jean-Paul Sartre's Ontology (New York: Haskell House Publishers, 1972), pp. 19-20. 
14 BN, translator's introduction, p. x. 
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mainly as the theoretical and philosophical foundation of existentialism. However, the 
relation between 浙 and existentialism is much looser than they expect. It is 
important to note that Sartre deals with the problems in a very different way in BN 
when compared to Existentialism is a Humanism. In BN, he has never suggested any 
ways of living or sets of human values.15 What he does is to describe and demonstrate 
the essential features of human lives. It implies that perhaps it is inappropriate to 
consider BN primarily as a book of existentialism. This further suggests that it is 
unsuitable to consider Sartre merely as an existentialist. A phenomenological reading 
of 57V would help us to retrieve these significant but neglected aspects of Sartre's 
philosophy.16 
(ii) Methodology 
This thesis is going to examine BN from a phenomenological perspective. 
Here, "phenomenology" refers to the disciplinary field of philosophy that is 
founded by the German philosopher Edmund Husserl in 1900-1901, and latter 
followed by — his successor in Freiburg - Martin Heidegger. Generally speaking, 
phenomenology is the study of "phenomenon". It examines how the meaning of things 
is manifested to or experienced by us in a first person point of view. As a disciplinary 
field of philosophy, it is characterized by its own sets of philosophical methods or 
procedures. These include, for instance, the phenomenological &noxr\ of Husserl, or 
15 In Existentialism is a Humanism, Sartre says that "Thus, the first effect of existentialism is to make 
every man conscious of what he is, and to make him solely responsible for his own existence. And 
when we say that man is responsible for himself, we do no mean that he is responsible only for his own 
individuality, but that he is responsible for all men.’’(p.23). Here, Sartre is suggesting, or even 
provoking, that man should live a life that is responsible for his own choices and deeds. Thus, we can 
say that Sartre's analysis in Existentialism is a Humanism is not a descriptive but a prescriptive one. 
See Sartre, Jean-Paul, Existentialism is a Humanism, translated by Carol Macomber (New Haven & 
London: Yale University Press, 2007), p. 23. 
16 丁his is t he case only for the Sartrean studies in the English and Chinese world. In the recent 15 years, 
there have been numerous researches and discussions, published in French, that try to revise the 
philosophy of Sartre from a phenomenological perspective. Nevertheless, due to the limitation of the 
language ability of the author, the examination in this thesis is incapable of referring to these materials. 
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the ontological difference raised by Heidegger. Phenomenology also has its own 
objects of study that correspond to its unique methods. For example, it examines the 
eidetic structure of consciousness and experience, or the ontological structure of 
entities. Thus, phenomenology is a discipline which is totally different from the 
empirical sciences. I will provide a more elaborated account of phenomenology in the 
latter parts of this thesis.17 
(iii) Themes and structure of the research 
This thesis is composed of two major parts. The first part, consisting of two 
chapters, is a preliminary study of the basic stance adopted by Sartre in BN. The 
second part, consisting of three chapters, examines the phenomenological analysis of 
human being or human reality in BN. Let us examine these parts in details. 
(a) BN as a phenomenological project 
The first two chapters study the basic stance adopted by Sartre in BN. These 
include the preliminary studies of his methodology and research motives respectively. 
In particular, the distinguishing features of his phenomenological approach and the 
unique motives that underlie his investigation are elucidated. 
The first chapter discusses the phenomenological method and position adopted 
by Sartre in BN. The discussion reveals that his method of "phenomenological 
ontology" is a hybrid of Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenology. It follows that his 
17 in fact, the Idealist ic element of Hegel also plays an important role in BN. For example, Sartre has 
analyzed the "dialectical concept of nothingness", and has adopted the important concepts of 
being-for-itself and being-in-itself from Hegel's philosophy. However, the relation between 57V and 
Hegel's philosophy has been retrieved and studied by a number of scholars since a long time ago. For 
example, Klaus Hartmann has provided us with an excellent analysis of BN from the perspective of 
Hegelian logic and dialectics. Upon these considerations, our thesis here will not go into the Hegelian 
elements in BN. Hartmann, Klaus, Sartre's Ontology: A Study of Being and Nothingness in the Light of 
Hegel's Logic (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1966). 
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project in BN is heavily indebted to the two phenomenologists, and this project is a 
genuinely phenomenological one. 
The second chapter argues that BN is a project of philosophical anthropology. In 
Sartre's view, the research of Husserl and Heidegger is driven by an epistemological 
and ontological motive respectively. By contrast, his investigation in BN is motivated 
by an anthropological-ethical concern. It is a phenomenological examination which 
aims to reveal the eidetic and ontological structure of human being or “human reality", 
especially the way man projects his own value. Here, the relation between Sartre's 
phenomenology and what he means by "ethical" will be critically discussed. 
(b) Phenomenolo gical anthropology in BN 
The discussions in the subsequent chapters focus on Sartre's analysis of human 
reality. The central aim of these discussions is to retrieve the meaning of his 
"ontology" and "existential psychoanalysis" from a phenomenological point of view. 
Special attention will be paid to the difference between his analysis of human 
existence and similar philosophical inquiries conducted by other philosophers. 
The third chapter looks at the crucial distinction between being-for-itself and 
being-in-itself. As we will see, this distinction is made according to the eidetic 
structures and the modes of being of the existents. It implies that these concepts can 
be thoroughly understood only from a phenomenological point of view. The relation 
between being-for-itself and nothingness is also examined. We will see that the latter 
concept has nothing to do with nihilism, but is solely an ontological description of the 
mode of being of human reality. 
The fourth chapter discusses the unique mode of being of human reality at a 
greater length. The analysis of BN shows that the being of human reality is consisted 
of the ekstases of Facticity, Transcendence and Temporality. However, Sartre has 
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given a picture which is radically different from Heidegger's “analysis of Dasein". 
Sartre is trying to depict the underlying structure that constitutes the human act of 
value projection. It indicates that Sartre is conducting a phenomenological 
investigation of human reality as an existent that projects value. The analyses here 
will show us that what we commonly mean by "value" is not an object — neither an 
intentional object nor a substantial existent within the world — that is independent of 
our consciousness or being. "Value" is indeed a part of the eidetic and ontological 
structure of the human reality; it is always introduced or projected into the world 
through the being of us, the For-itself. 
The fifth chapter examines the "existential psychoanalysis" of bad faith 
performed in BN, In the past, many scholars think that the analysis of bad faith is a 
moral psychology which depicts the evasive character of human being in his or her 
choice-making; and this analysis is made to persuade that human being should always 
take up his or her own responsibilities. Only few of them notice that it is rather an 
extensive part of the phenomenological-ontological analysis of human reality. The 
examination in this chapter shows that bad faith is derived from the eidetic and 
ontological structure of human reality. It arises when human being tries to disintegrate 
and slide in between the three ekstases of his or her being. The chapter ends by 
exploring the meaning of "authenticity" in BN. It reveals that Sartre's analysis is 
neither a moral psychology nor a proposal of ethical principles, but a 
phenomenological 8丌0劝 of the human act of "value projection". 
A concluding chapter will be given after we have gone through the 
aforementioned topics. It begins with a brief summary of the findings in the preceding 
chapters, and provides us with an overall understanding on the unique contributions of 
Sartre's phenomenological project in BN. It ends with some reflections over the 
limitation of this thesis and the possibilities for any further investigations. 
17 
Chapter 1 
Sartre's phenomenological method 
§ 1.1 Sartre's project: a “phenomenological ontology”18 
1.1.1 The difficulties for a phenomenological re-interpretation of BN 
In his article "Sartre's Last Word on Ethics in Phenomenological Perspective", 
Herbert Spiegelberg told us that he is attracted and motivated to read BN for the 
following reason: 
To be sure, my guiding interest at the time was in what Sartre in his subtitle 
had called “phenomenological ontology". But what aroused my interest 
even more were the allusions to an ethics which Sartre promised on the very 
last pages of the book and spelled out in October 1945 under the title 
"Existentialism is a Humanism". •.19 
Spiegelberg has shapely pointed out the importance of the subtitle of BN. The 
above paragraph suggests that "phenomenological ontology" is a new method or 
perspective for a phenomenological inquiry that leads towards the "ethical" themes of 
the early Sartre. It indicates that the research in BN is done from a phenomenological 
position, and we would never be able to give a suitable appraisal of the book -
especially its "ethical" theme — if we neglect its orientation as a “phenomenological 
ontology". However, it is not an easy task to show that Sartre has adopted a 
phenomenological position in BN. Someone may think that the difficulty we meet 
here is caused mainly by the existentialist preconception of the general public reading. 
18 Barnes translated t he subtitle of BN as "a phenomenological essay on ontology", but this translation 
is not an accurate one. According to the French text, the name of the book should be L 'Etre et le neant: 
essai d'ontologie phenomenologique. It shows that the word ""phenomenologique" should be the 
adjective of "ontologie" rather than uessaf\ and it implies that “d'ontologie phenomenologique” is a 
single technical term denoting the unique themes and methods of this very uessaf \ In order to 
emphasize this relation, it is better to rephrase its subtitle into "an essay of phenomenological 
ontology". 
19 Herbert Spiegelberg, "Sartre's Last Word on Ethics in Phenomenological Perspective", in Research 
in Phenomenology, Volume XI, p. 101. 
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It is certain that this preconception has increased the difficult of our current task; but it 
is equally important to note that its effect is relatively minor and peripheral. The 
problems we met here are more fundamental ones: they are related to the nature and 
essence of "phenomenology". 
The first problem concerns with the definition of phenomenology. Any well-read 
reader of phenomenology would notice that the idea of phenomenology is always 
evolving and developing. For example, Husserl and Heidegger are having different 
understanding towards the idea of phenomenology. We can also find that their 
understanding towards this idea is progressively changing throughout their work. All 
these reveal that phenomenology is, in the first place, not a matter of terminologies or 
themes, but that of investigation perspective and research method. In other words, 
phenomenology is a discipline which is primarily defined by its methods of inquiry. 
This unique feature of phenomenology implies that we can never exhibit the 
phenomenological position of Sartre simply by enumerating the "phenomenological" 
terms, concepts or themes that are found in his book; we can demonstrate it only by 
studying his itinerary and method of inquiry. 
The second problem is related to the procedure of demonstration that is usually 
adopted by a phenomenological project. In the work of Husserl and Heidegger, we 
can always find their explication of "phenomenological method". The two 
phenomenologists always elaborate their methods and stances of research, and 
introduce series of specific operations which guide the readers to their themes of 
research. In Ideas Pertaining to Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
20 
Philosophy: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology , for example, Husserl 
has given a detailed description of the natural attitude, and accounted for the way to 
20 Husserl, Ed mund, Ideas Pertaining to Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: 
General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, translated by Fred Kersten (The Hague; Boston: M. 
Nijhoff: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1982); abbreviated as Ideas I henceforth. 
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‘‘suspend” or to ‘‘parenthesize’，this attitude. The latter process is what he called the 
phenomenological moxr\. Heidegger has also made a similar explication of methods 
• 21 
in Being and Time“ . He begins his analysis by distinguishing the ontical and 
ontological level, and this is followed with an etymological revision of the meaning of 
} ^ 丫 i d (paivojieva.22 These are what Heidegger called the ontological difference23 
and the preliminary conception of phenomenology14. However，unlike the two 
phenomenologists, Sartre does not provide any explication of research methods - e.g., 
his own understanding of phenomenological method - in BN. It means that we have to 
reconstruct his basic stance of research if we want to demonstrate his 
phenomenological position, and this can be done only through a comprehensive 
reading of BN.25 
21 Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, trans, by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (New York: 
Harper, 1962); abbreviated as BT in the thesis. The numbers following the abbreviation refer to the 
corresponding paginations. 
22 BT 27 -39 
23 B T 4 
24 BT 27-39 
25 Maurice Natan son also points out, in A Critique of Jean-Paul Sartre's Ontology, that Sartre has 
never provided any explicit account of his method - particularly, the phenomenological method - in BN. 
However, Natanson does not try to extract or re-construct Sartre's phenomenological position from a 
Husserlian or Heideggerian point of view; rather, he frequently accuses Sartre of omitting such an 
account in BN. As Natanson says, "Now Sartre, despite the fact that he speaks of his inquiry as 
'phenomenological', nowhere asserts that he is a 'phenomenologist' following Husserl's method in 
detail." (p. 69), and "[o]ur basic criticism of this analysis of Being is that, whatever its merits or 
insights, it is not a phenomenological analysis." (p. 70). The sentences here show that Natanson 
considers the absence of an account on methodology as a fatal weakness of BN, and this eventually 
"results in internal confusions, basic ambiguities, and ultimate contradictions, and, as we hope to show, 
philosophical failure to resolve his initial problem." (p. 74). Herbert Spiegelberg also doubts the 
validity of the existential phenomenology of Sartre. As he says, in a "Husserl's phenomenology and 
Existentialism", "[h]ow far, then, can today's existentialism be considered phenomenologically sound? 
Here, I am afraid, I have to make grave reservations... I do not want to deny that the phenomenological 
existentialists have made suggestive and at times even striking contributions to the findings of 
phenomenological insight. But most of these have to be gone over more cautiously and more 
critically."(P- 184), and "[i]t would indeed be a betrayal of the spirit of Husserl's philosophizing if 
phenomenology should sell its birthright for a mess of existentialist pottage."(P- 188). For the 
comments by Natanson, see Natanson, Maurice, A Critique of Jean-Paul Sartre's Ontology (New York: 
Haskell House Publishers, 1972), pp. 9-74, 103-106; for the comments by Spiegelberg, see Spiegelberg, 
Herbert, "Husserl's Phenomenology and Existentialism", in The Development and Meaning of 
Twentieth-Century Existentialism, edited by William L. McBride (New York: Garland Pub., 1997), pp. 
176-188. 
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1.1.2 Sartre's concept of phenomenon 
Sartre begins the Introduction of BN by inquiring the relation between existents 
and phenomenon. Why does Sartre start his project with such an inquiry? He has not 
provided us with a detailed explanation for such an arrangement. He just says, in the 
latter pages, that everything must appear or manifest before we can describe or talk 
1 2 6 • 
about them. T he inquiry into the meaning of phenomenon will thus become the 
preliminary analysis for any further investigations. However, there underlies a more 
fundamental reason for such a choice of subject matter: this inquiry would 
demonstrate that he has adopted the phenomenological stance of Husserl and 
Heidegger. As Sartre says: 
Thus we arrive at the idea of the phenomenon such as we can find, for 
example, in the 'phenomenology' of Husserl or of Heidegger - the 
• 97 
phenomenon or the relative-absolute. 
Sartre explicitly claims that he is adopting a phenomenological conception of 
phenomenon. These words cannot serve as the evidence to prove or demonstrate his 
phenomenological position, but at least they provide us with the following hint: the 
method and position he adopts in BN his "phenomenological ontology") is 
probably originated from the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger. 
To find out the answer, we must review the Introduction of BN more thoroughly. 
Sartre points out, at the beginning of his book, that more and more disciplines have 
• • 0 ft understood or reduced existents into ‘‘series of appearances which manifest it.’ In 
other words, these disciplines are common in the fact that they have considered 
existent as phenomenon. However, we should know that there are numerous possible 
26 BN，p. 7. 
27 BN,p. 4. 
28 攝，p. 3. 
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ways to understand existents as “phenomenon” or “series of appearances". So what is 
the difference between Sartre's conception of phenomenon and that of other 
disciplines? Sartre tries to elaborate this by comparing the differences between his 
conception of phenomenon and the Kantian one. In his critical philosophy, Kant 
understands phenomenon as the Erscheinung of the noumenal realities. From this 
point of view, only the noumenal reality is the real being of an existent, while 
phenomenon is merely the surface appearance or “symptom " that refers to the 
noumenal reality. However, due to human finitude, noumenal realities can never 
become the object of our cognition, and we can only reach the Erscheinung or the 
surface appearances of the existent. That is why Sartre thinks that Kant has considered 
phenomenon as a ‘‘pure negative": Erscheinung is just a derivative, illusive and 
erroneous manifestation of the noumenal realities.29 
Sartre clearly rejects this Kantian understanding of phenomenon as Erscheinung. 
In Sartre's point of view, phenomenon is not the superficial manifestations that 
conceal or refer to the hidden realities of existents, and there is no such thing as the 
noumenal reality behind the phenomenon. Phenomenon is ‘‘absolutely indicative of 
OA # 鲁 # # 會 
itself' , and it refers to nothing other than itself. This conception of phenomenon 
only requires that it must appear in relation to whom they appear to. It means that 
Sartre has considered every existent as phenomenon, and "phenomenon" here means 
no more than the manifestation of total series of appearances that are revealed to 
‘‘somebody，，: 
The appearance refers to the total series of appearances and not to a hidden 
reality which would drain to itself all the being of the existents.31 
29 BN, p. 3. 
30 •，p. 4. 
3] BN, p. 4. 
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For the being of an existent is exactly what it appears?1 
Thus we arrive at the idea of the phenomenon such as we can find, for 
example, in the 'phenomenology' of Husserl or of Heidegger - the 
phenomenon or the relative-absolute. Relative the phenomenon remains, for 
“to appear" supposes in essence somebody to whom to appear.33 
The Sartrean conception of phenomenon is different from the Kantian one in the 
following two ways. First of all, in Sartre's perspective, an existent is no more than a 
phenomenon, and it has already manifested the totality of itself - including its profiles, 
meaning and essence - in a total series of appearances34. It implies that the existence 
of an existent is now equivalent to the manifestation of appearances: to say that “an 
existent exists” is the same as saying that “an existent manifests itself as a total series 
of appearances”. Moreover, Sartre abandons the thoughts that there are any hidden 
realities behind the appearances of an existent. If an existent is no more than a 
phenomenon or a series of appearances, then it follows that anything which exists 
must manifest itself as a phenomenon or a total series of appearances, and it will be 
impossible for anything (like the noumenal reality) to exist without manifesting itself. 
It implies that phenomenon or appearance should never be treated as the "exterior" 
mask that veils the "interior" reality, or the "superficial covering which hides from 
o r # 
sight the true nature of the object" . A phenomenon is always the "true" and 
"complete" existence of an existent, and there exists nothing "behind" this 
manifestation of appearances. Through the above elaborations, Sartre eliminates the 
traditional dualism of "interior" and "exterior", and also the Kantian understanding of 
phenomenon. 
It seems that there is no connection between the above understanding of 
32 召TV, p. 4. 
33 题，p . 4. 
34 BN, p. 5. 
35 BN, p. 3. 
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"phenomenon" and phenomenology. But we would immediately see that Sartre has 
implicitly adopted a phenomenological position if we compare his conception of 
phenomenon to that of Husserl and Heidegger. First of all, the understanding of 
“existents as phenomenon” can be derived only upon the phenomenological 6兀oxl, 
which is introduced by Husserl in Ideas I.36 As we know, the process of 
phenomenological inoyj\ is a suspension of the natural attitude?1 It does not mean 
that we are going to deny or eliminate the vivid content of our lived experience. Such 
suspension only means that existents are now understood as intentional objects that 
emerge in consciousness, and what remains, upon the phenomenological 8兀0柏，are 
the existents as experienced or as perceived — i.e., the percipi38. It indicates that, 
within the realm of £兀0义力，existents are no longer understood as factual realities that 
exist independent of us. They are always the intentional correlates or the intentional 
objects of consciousness�in another word, existents always exist as that which are for 
consciousness. By considering the vivid content of our lived experiences as the 
36 P henomenological 合兀05^  is the act of doubting which suspends or parenthesizes the general positing 
of the natural attitude. In this act of doubting, the factual existence of the world is neither assumed nor 
denied. The phenomenological inojr\ is rather "a certain refraining from judgment” {Ideas I, p. 59) that 
neutralize the effect of the general positing of natural attitude. In this circumstance, all sciences that are 
originated from or related to the natural attitude can no longer be accepted as foundation or explanation 
after the phenomenological 8710^ -^ This compels us to change our attitude into a non-naturalistic and 
further into a phenomenological one, so that we can reach the absolute essence of lived experience (and 
consciousness) in the field of pure consciousness. 
37 The concept of "natural attitude" is raised in §27-32 of Ideas I. In fact, the term "natural attitude" 
refers to the general positing of the factual existence of the world, and is the very fundamental 
supposition that encompasses every moments of our natural consciousness or immediate intuition of 
the world. This general positing is consisted of a few basic presuppositions. (1) We always perceive the 
world as "endlessly" extending in time and space; (2) through our sensuous perception, we always find 
corporeal physical things which are simply there for me; (3) things are considered as self-sustaining -
or in other word, factual — actualities, which means that they are still present even when they are not 
found in my field of perception; (4) my field of actual perception is always surrounded by an obscure 
horizon of other indeterminate factual actualities; (5) I, and other human beings, posit a surrounding 
world which factually exists, and this is the world which we commonly belongs to. All these 
presuppositions refers to the general proposition of natural attitude: 
"As what confronts me, I continually find the one spatiotemporal actuality to which I belong like 
all other human beings who are to be found in it and who are related to it as I am. I find the 
"actuality"... as a factually existent actuality and also accept it as it presents itself to me as factually 
existing. No doubt about or rejection of data belonging to the natural world alters in any respect the 
general positing which characterizes the natural attitude.” {Ideas I, pp. 56-57) 
38 BN，p. 9. The term percipi comes from the Latin verb “percipio, -ere, -i, um”. The verb “percipio, 
-ere, -/', um” can be translated as "perceive" in English. Percipi is the passive present infinitive of this 
verb. Thus, percipi can be translated in "to be perceived" in English. 
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relative-absolute that are revealed to “somebody”，existents are now seen as 
phenomenon or pure experiences that are for consciousness. 
Sartre's understanding of phenomenon is also indebted to the phenomenology of 
Heidegger. In BT, Heidegger has revised the meaning of phenomenon and 
phenomenology by examining its Greek etymological origin.39 In fact, his revision 
here is directed against the Kantian understanding of appearance (Erscheinung)40, and 
this is where the Sartrean conception of phenomenon - that a phenomenon or 
appearances is “absolutely indicative of itself' — originated. As Heidegger says, we 
should not treat a phenomenon as the surface announcement of some hidden reality or 
something which does not show itself41, because a phenomenon is exactly “that which 
shows itself in itself, the manifest."42 On the one ha nd, these discussions show that 
Heidegger considers phenomenon as that which shows the complete content of itself, 
and it does not refer to any other noumenal reality. On the other hand, it reveals us 
what Heidegger concerns is: how can something be encountered in such a way that it 
can "show itself in itself'.43 His revision and elucid ation here indicates that 
phenomenology is not characterized by its object of research; it is rather a science 
which concerns the way of approaching its objects44. 
We are clear about the reason why Sartre considers existents as phenomenon or 
appearance. To be sure, it is not a simple embrace of a theory that is welcomed by his 
contemporaries. His inquiry into the understanding of "existent as phenomenon" has 
39 BT 28-31. 
40 BT 30 
41 BT 29 
42 BT 28 
43 "If in taking the concept of'phenomenon' this way, we leave indefinite which entities we consider 
as 'phenomena', and leave it open whether what shows itself is an entity or rather some characteristic 
which an entity may have in its Being, then we have merely arrived at the formal conception of 
'phenomenon'." See BT3 1. 
44 "To have a science ' o f phenomenon means to grasp its objects in such a way that everything about 
them which is up for discussion must be treated by exhibiting it directly and demonstrating it directly. 
The expression 'descriptive phenomenology', which is at bottom tautological, has the same meaning." 
See 35. 
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revealed his deliberative adoption of phenomenological position. It includes an 
explicit assimilation of the conception of the phenomenon from Husserl and 
Heidegger, and more importantly, an implicit adoption of their phenomenological 
methods or attitudes (or else he would not be able to consider existents in the 
phenomenological way). By analyzing Sartre's preliminary conception of 
phenomenon, we find that he is basically taking up a phenomenological position in 
BN. 
We should agree that Sartre has assimilated the phenomenology of Husserl and 
Heidegger. But as we know, the two phenomenologists are always evolving and 
renewing their understanding of the idea of phenomenology, and there can be great 
discrepancies between their different periods or stages of researches. It implies that, 
even if we agree that Sartre is embracing a phenomenological stance, still we have to 
figure out the specific phenomenological elements he takes over from his 
predecessors. In order to understand the phenomenological method and stance of his 
project more completely, we must exhibit the particular phenomenological elements 
that are found in BN. 
§1.2 The Husserlian moment: intentional and eidetic analysis 
We have found that Sartre considers a phenomenon as the manifestation of a total 
series of appearances that are revealed to somebody. This account is capable to reveal 
that Sartre is basically adopting a phenomenological stance in BN, but still it is 
insufficient to reveal the particular phenomenological elements he has assimilated. We 
must further inquire into the specific way in which a phenomenon manifests itself, 
and explicate the whole structure of revealing and being revealed. The inquiry here 
will consist of two leading questions. Firstly, how does a phenomenon manifest itself 
as a totalized series of related appearances, but not an aggregation of discrete and 
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unrelated ones? Second, who is that somebody that is presupposed by every 
manifestation of phenomenon? By answering these questions, we could see that Sartre 
has assimilated, in the first place, the intentional-eidetic analysis that originates in 
the Logical Investigations and 她as1 / of Husserl. 
1.2.1 A bschattuns: and essence 
In our preliminary review of Sartre's conception of phenomenon, we find that he 
no longer considers the appearances of an existent as the Erscheinung in the Kantian 
sense, but as that which are completely indicative of themselves. It implies that every 
existent would reveal its complete content in the manifestation of appearances. 
However, what exactly is shown in the "manifestation of appearances”？ And how 
does a phenomenon reveal its content? 
An existent or a phenomenon always shows us through its Abschattung4�. Here, 
the term Abschattung (plural: Abschattungen) refers to the particular and concrete 
adumbration, profile or facet which an existent shows us46. We can understand the 
meaning of this term more easily by recalling our experiences of dealing with 
corporeal existents. A corporeal existent always manifests itself to us through different 
profiles or facets — let us say, its front or rear side. These profiles or facets that we 
grasped are exactly the Abschattungen of this existent, and we can say that an 
Abschattung (or the adumbration of an existent) is an appearance. It is important to 
note that the Abschattungen of an existent are always disclosed to us in a unique way: 
Yet the existent in fact can not be reduced to a finite series of manifestations 
since each one of them is a relation to a subject constantly changing. 
Although an object may disclose itself only through a single Abschattung, 
the sole fact of there being a subject implies the possibility of multiplying 
45 BN,p.5. 
46 Ideas I’ pp. 86-89, 95-98. 
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the points of view on that Abschattung. This suffices to multiply to infinity 
the Abschattung under consideration.47 
The above observation discloses two essential features of the Abschattung. 
Firstly, the appearance of every existent is consisted of an infinite number of 
Abschattungen. We can easily imagine that an existent can be approached by 
numerous possible people, from various perspectives and along different periods of 
time. It implies besides its exhausted Abschattungen — e.g., those that are already 
shown and currently showing — an existent also possesses an infinite number of 
possible and unexhausted Abschattungen. Secondly, an existent would never show us 
all its Abschattungen in one single moment. An existent only shows us one of its 
Abschattungen at each single moment. It indicates that the relation between us and the 
existent is always aperspectival one - e.g., we must approach and grasp it from a 
particular point of view. These two features or ways of manifestation of the existent 
are what Husserl called perspectival givenness48 
However, we should notice that an existent always reveals itself as something 
more than an aggregate of discrete Abschattungen. As we see, it always discloses 
itself as the total and well connected series of appearances. It implies that an existent 
will also show its Abschattungen to us in a totalizing or unified way. As Sartre says: 
The appearance does not hide the essence, it reveals it; it is the essence. The 
essence of an existent is no longer a property sunk in the cavity of this 
existent; it is the manifest law which presides over the succession of its 
appearances, it is the principle of the series.... [EJssence, as the principle of 
the series, is definitely only the concatenation of appearances; that is, itself 
49 an appearance. 
The phenomenal being manifests itself; it manifests its essence as well as its 
47 BN, p. 5. 
48 Ideas I, pp. 86-89, 95-98. 
49 BN 
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existence, and it is nothing but the well connected series of its 
manifestations.50 
Besides its Abschattungen, an existent also shows us its essence or ideal unity. 
This essence or ideal unity of an existent is also an appearance, as it is also that which 
is shown to us. Here, we can see what does the term “essence” mean: it is the synthetic 
ideal unity that unifies the Abschattungen (which are manifested at different moments 
of time) into one and the same series of appearances. We should bear in mind that this 
ideal unity of the existent is not something obtained discursively. It is neither a 
conclusive observation generated through the process of induction, nor a subjective 
category that is imposed onto the Abschattungen by our power of cognition. Quite the 
contrary, this ideal unity is shown to us simultaneously with the Abschattungen of the 
existent. An Abschattung will never show itself as discrete debris; it will always show 
itself as that which is unified under the same synthetic ideal unity or belongs to the 
same existent. It implies that the essence and the identity of an existent is always 
shown alongside every of its Abschattungen, and it is always intuitively grasped by us. 
This intuition of the essence or ideal unity is what Husserl called the Wesenschau or 
eidetic intuition51. 
Here, we should look at the meaning of "givenness" more closely. It is obvious 
that this concept is not one obtained within the natural attitude, but is understandable 
only in the phenomenological attitude — e.g., when we are asking about how an 
existent manifests itself. It indicates that it is neither an explanation about the causal 
relation between existents, nor an answering to the metaphysical or theological 
question of the “first cause". This can be shown when Sartre refutes what he means by 
50 BN, p. 5. 
51 As H usserl says, “The essence (Eidos) is a new sort of object. Just as the datum of individual or 
experiencing intuition is an individual object, so the datum of eidetic intuition is a pure essence... 
Seeing an essence is also precisely intuition, just as an eidetic object is precisely an object. “ (p. 9) See 
Ideas I, pp. 8-12. 
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"creationism" - i.e., the view that the existents are brought into being by the 
subjective will of God (or any other supreme existent): 
To say that consciousness is consciousness of something is to say that it 
must produce itself as a revealed-revelation of a being which is not it and 
which gives itself as already existing when consciousness reveal it.52 
A clear view of the phenomenon of being has often been obscured by a 
very common prejudice which we shall call “creationism”... But a creation 
ex nihilo can not explain the coming to pass of being; for if being is 
conceived in a subjectivity, even a divine subjectivity, it remains a mode of 
intra-subjective being.53 
Here Sartre is asking a phenomenological question about the eidetic structure of 
our experience. It entails that he is questioning about the way an existent reveals or 
manifests itself; he is not looking for the casual relation between the "factual" 
realities - these are exactly what interest "creationism". According to James Edie, it is 
clear that Sartre is fully acquainted of Husserl's phenomenology of perception. 
Therefore, Sartre would totally agree that, for an object of consciousness, "more is 
'given' as the object than is immediately ‘presented' in any one intuition..."54 In fact, 
an existent is primarily characterized by a sort of “exteriority”. This does not mean 
that Sartre has admitted the existence of a factual reality; it only implies that, existents 
are always revealed as something which is not created by the consciousness or 
subjective will of somebody. Consciousness just perceives or reveals them; it does not 
create them. 
We should now agree that an existent is no more than the manifestation of a 
unified or totalized series of Abschattungen. It is obvious that this understanding of 
52 BN, p. 24. 
53 BN, pp. 26-27. 
54 James Edie, "The Question of the Transcendental Ego: Sartre's Critique of Husserl", in The 
Question of Hermeneutics: Essays in Honor of Joseph J. Kockelmans, ed. Timothy J. Stapleton 
(Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer Academic, 1994)，p. 132. 
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"existent as phenomenon" is not a metaphysical or theological explanation which 
accounts for the first cause of the world.55 Also, his inquiry in BN is not looking for 
the factual realities that are hidden behind the phenomenon, as every part of an 
existent - including its Abschattungen and essence — has already been shown in its 
manifestation of appearances. What Sartre aims to do is to describe the universal and 
essential way which an existent or a phenomenon shows itself to us. 
1,2.2 The percipere: consciousness as the directedness of intentions 
The previous study has shown that both the Abschattungen and essence of an 
existent are appearances. It is for sure that every existent (as a phenomenon) would 
show its complete content in its revelation or manifestation. However, as we 
mentioned before, a phenomenon is a “relative-absolute’，.56 It means that a 
phenomenon is always the percipi that is being disclosed or perceived, and the 
appearances of an existent are always relative or relational to “somebody to whom to 
appear”57. If this is the case, then to whom does a phenomenon appear? Let us look at 
the following lines: 
What determines the being of the appearance is the fact that it appears. And 
since we have restricted reality to the phenomenon, we can say of the 
phenomenon that it is as it appears. .. .This is simply a way of choosing 
、 58 
new words to clothe the old “Esse est percipi” of Berkeley. 
All consciousness, as Husserl has shown, is consciousness o/something. 
This means that there is no consciousness which is not a positing of a 
transcendent object, or if you prefer, that consciousness has no “content”... 
All that there is of intention in my actual consciousness is directed towards 
55 浙，pp. 26-27. 
56 BN, p. 4. 
57 题，p. 4. 
58 BN，p. 9. 
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the outside... 59 
Consciousness has nothing substantial, it is pure "appearance" in the sense 
that it exists only to the degree to which it appears.60 
This “somebody，’ is what Sartre calls consciousness orpercipere^ . There are two 
essential features of consciousness that we must take note of. First of all, 
consciousness is a perpetually flowing stream of experience, and it is the very process 
of positing or revealing its objects. This is just as Barnes says, “[i]ts existence is only 
the activity of revealing" . It is important to note that this understanding of 
consciousness is originated in the analysis of Husserl. He says, in the Ideas I, that 
what he means by consciousness is merely “the stream of lived experiences” 63 This 
feature of consciousness implies that we should not consider it as something 
substantial, e.g., the substratum or noumenal reality. This is also what Sartre means 
when he reminds us that the first procedure of philosophy is to “expel things from 
consciousness".64 (In fact, it is a little bit misleading to call consciousness or 
percipere "somebody" at this early stage. The non-substantial character of 
consciousness will be further discussed in chapter three of this thesis). Second, 
consciousness is always consciousness of something. As we can see, consciousness is 
defined as the process which reveals and relates intentionally to objects that are other 
than itself. Such a character indicates that, just as the phenomenon, consciousness is 
59 BN 11. 
60 BN, p. 17. 
61 BN, p. 9. The term percipere comes from the Latin verb “percipio, -ere, -i, um”. The verb ilpercipio, 
-ere, -i, um” can be translated as "perceive" in English, Percipere is the active present infinitive of 
this verb. Thus, percipere can be translated in "to perceive" in English. Sartre used this term to 
designate the process of "to perceive". Here, Sartre used this Latin term instead of French, so that he 
can emphasize the philosophical meaning of the activity, and prevent his reader from understanding the 
activity from its common daily usage. 
62 Hazel E. Barnes, "Sartre's Ontology: The Revealing and Making of Being", in The Cambridge 
Companion to Sartre, ed. Christian Howells (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), p. 14. 
63 Ideas I, p. 68. 
6 4 浙，p. 11. 
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also relative or relational65. It does not mean that the existence of consciousness is 
dependent on other factual reality (e.g., God or other sort of “first cause"). It only 
implies that consciousness must exist in relation to that which is being posited or 
revealed- i.e., an existent, a phenomenon or an intentional object. This feature of 
consciousness is what Husserl called the intentionality66. This unique feature of 
consciousness signifies that consciousness and phenomenon are the two poles of the 
same relation or structure. Consciousness is always the process or act of intention 
which reveals a phenomenon, and a phenomenon is always the series of appearances 
or the intentional object being revealed by consciousness. It is this reciprocal structure 
of reveal and to be revealed, percipere and percipi, which makes every manifestation 
of appearances possible; and in this sense we can say that consciousness and 
phenomenon exist in a reciprocally relational way. 
We should now agree that Sartre has adopted a non-idealistic version of Husserl's 
phenomenology in BN. We see that Sartre begins his investigation with a refusal of 
the natural attitude. From this point of view, existents are no longer treated as 
noumenal realities, but are "reduced" - phenomenologically - to the manifestation of 
series of appearances. He then proceeds to an analysis of the universal and essential 
way in which a phenomenon manifests itself. This analysis shows that a phenomenon 
always manifests itself as a totalized series of Abschattungen, and its manifestation 
always implies the process of consciousness. All these observations indicate that 
Sartre is asking about the universal and essential way which a phenomenon manifests 
itself - or in another word, the intentional or eidetic structure of phenomenon and 
consciousness. The way he approaches these themes also reveals his implicit 
65 Husserl clearl y states that, "All mental processes having these essential properties in common are 
also called ' intentive mental processes, (acts in the broadest sense in Logische Untersuchungen); in so 
far as they are consciousness of something, they are said to be 'intentively referred' to this something." 
(p. 73). See Ideas I, pp. 73-78. 




acceptance of the phenomenological 87i;oxf|. By now we can conclude that, Sartre is 
adopting a phenomenological position in BN, and it is inspired by the intentional and 
eidetic analyses of Husserl. 
§ 1.3 The Heideggerian moment: the question of the meaning of Being 
We can see that Sartre has assimilated both the themes and methods from 
Husserl's phenomenology. However, we should notice that Heidegger's 
phenomenology is playing an equally important role in BN. Our previous analysis has 
disclosed that Sartre has appropriated a Heideggerian understanding of phenomenon — 
e.g., to consider phenomenon not as the Erscheinung of noumenal reality, but as ‘‘that 
which shows itself in itself'. Nevertheless, it is still inadequate to show us what or 
which specific phenomenological element has Sartre appropriated from Heidegger. To 
answer this question, we must examine the crucial distinction between phenomenon of 
cn 暑 • # 書 
being and being of phenomenon in BN. This examination would reveal that they are 
descriptions about the modes of being of existents, and it is a distinction that is 
originated in Heidegger's question of the meaning of Being and ontological inquiry. 
1.3.1 The question of the meaning of Be ins： Heidegger's ontological difference 
We shall begin by looking at the meaning of the term “being” in BN, In some 
occasions, the term "being" simply designates an existent or entity. It means that the 
term is used as a noun that refers generally to that which is present. However, in other 
contexts, especially in the discussion about phenomenon of being and being of 
phenomenon, the term “being” is used in a radically different sense. For example: 
The first being which we meet in our ontological inquiry is the being of the 
61 BN, pp. 7-9. 
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appearance.68 
The object does not possess being, and its existence is not a participation in 
being, nor any other kind of relation. It is69 
In these cases, the term ‘‘being’’ or "to be" is used as a verb which designates the 
existence of existent. The difference between the meanings of the term ‘‘being’’ (as a 
noun and as a verb) is far more than a trivial and verbal discrepancy. The difference in 
usages reveals that Sartre is clearly aware of the difference between that which is 
present and the being of that which is present. It shows that Sartre possesses the 
horizon to inquire into the mode of being of the existent, and he has inherited the 
central element of Heidegger's phenomenology as expressed in BT, 
As we know, Heidegger wants to find out the way to encounter an entity such 
that it can "show itself in itself'. This can be seen when he characterizes 
phenomenology as a science which concerns the way of approaching its subject 
matter. But is there any connection between this understanding of phenomenology 
and the question of the meaning of Being? Why does he think that the inquiry into the 
Seinsfrage would be the foundational task for other investigations? These questions 
can be answered only by clarifying the relation between Being and entities. Heidegger 
points out that an entity must exist before it can be apprehended or approached as an 
entity. In another words, an entity must be before it can ‘‘show itself in itself'". The 
relation here implies that Being is the essential constitution (Wesenverfassung) for 
every entity71, and all positive sciences (or even philosophy) will remain naive and 
opaque if they do not notice this foundational character of Being. However, the 
68 服，p. 7. 
69 BN, p. 8. 
10 BT 31,35. 
71 BT %:ftn. 
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philosophical inquiries in the past have failed to grasp the ontological differences?1 
They did not realize that "Being" should not be conceived as an entity, nor does it 
acquire any characteristics which an entity has.73 For example, traditional logic and 
ontology have wrongly mixed up and identified the Being of entity with the entity 
itself. These inquiries have presupposed the meaning of Being as that which is 
self-evident, and they are merely involved in asking about the essences and facts of 
entities.1A All such inquiries that are interested primarily in the essences and facts of 
entities are what Heidegger calls ontical inquiry. In opposition, it will be necessary to 
carry out an investigation which aims to explicate the meaning of Being. This would 
provide the foundation for the positive sciences and traditional ontology by clarifying 
the ontological status of their subject matters. This inquiry, which concerns primarily 
with the meaning of Being and plays the role as the foundational task of all other 
ontical inquiries, is what he calls ontological inquiry J5 
We can find similar observations in the book of BN, Sartre tries to illustrate the 
subject matter of his inquiry before he examines the differences between phenomenon 
of being and being ofphenomenon. In his illustration, we can find that Sartre has 
taken over the ontological difference and some of the fundamental elements of the 
Seinsfrage. As he says, 
In a particular object one can always distinguish qualities like color, odor, 
etc. And proceeding from these, one can always determine an essence which 
they imply, as a sign implies its meaning.... But being is neither one of the 
objects qualities, capable of being apprehended among others, nor a 
meaning of the object.... Being is simply the condition of all revelation. It is 
being-for-revealing {etre-pour-devoiler) and not revealed being {etre 
72 BT 8-11 
73 BT 4 
^ BT 3-4, 11 
15 BT 8-11, and the footnote of 召r 11. 
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devoile).16 
For the being of an existent is exactly what it appears.77 
The above paragraphs tell us that "being" is neither the Abschattung nor the 
essence that is manifested in the appearances of an existent. It signifies that the term 
neither refers to substantial entities, nor the attributes and essences of entities. This 
indicates that Sartre is not asking about what a phenomenon shows, and he is not 
conducting an ontical inquiry. What Sartre means by "being" here is that which makes 
every manifestation of phenomenon or existent possible, and it is the pre-condition 
which logically precedes every manifestation or revelation. Thus, the term "being" is 
not a noun which refers to substantial existent, but it is a verb which denotes the 
existence of existent. Here we can see that Sartre is fully aware of the ontological 
differences emphasized by Heidegger, as he can clearly distinguish the existence of an 
existent from the existent itself. We can also see that Sartre understands the 
fundamental priority of the Seinsfrage, as he has never considered the concept of 
being as self-evident (or else he will not ask about the meaning of being in the above 
paragraph and in BN), and agrees that being is the pre-condition of all existents. All 
these show that what Sartre attempts to ask is the way how a phenomenon can “show 
itself in itself', and it means that he has assimilated the perspective and stance of 
ontological inquiry from Heidegger. 
1.3,2 Phenomenon of beins and being of phenomenon 
The above discussions have shown that Sartre's project in BN is an ontological 
project: he enquires into the being of existents, and this investigation is inspired by the 
thinking of ontological difference and Seinsfrage of Heidegger. However, we have not 
76 57V, p. 8. 
77 召TV, p. 4. 
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yet arrived at the centre part of the ontological inquiry in BN. We should still 
remember that the above discussion of being is merely a preliminary illustration. It is 
a preparatory task for examining the distinction between phenomenon of being and 
being of phenomenon. What do these concepts refer to? Let us look at the following 
paragraph: 
The appearance is not supported by any existent different from itself; it has 
its own being. The first being which we meet in our ontological inquiry is 
the being of the appearance... The phenomenon is what manifests itself, and 
being manifests itself to all in some way, since we can speak of it and since 
we have a certain comprehension of it. Thus there must be for it a 
phenomenon of being, an appearance of being, capable of description as 
such.78 
The above paragraph shows that Sartre has retrieved two possible meanings of 
“being”. First of all, an existent must always be an existent which exist. In this case, 
.. I 
"being" refers to the essential constitution of existent, and it is considered as that 
which makes the manifestation of phenomenon possible. This "being", which is the 
pre-condition of all manifestation of existent, is what Sartre calls the being of 
phenomenon. Put it differently, Sartre is here referring to the existence of a 
phenomenon or an existent. Nevertheless, this is not the only possible meaning of 
“being”. We should observe that we, the conscious "somebody", can always thematize 
and grasp the being of existent as a phenomenon. In this case, "being" no longer plays 
the role as the essential constitution or pre-condition of all manifestation, and it has 
now become a phenomenon which is revealed for somebody. This ‘‘being’，，which is 
revealed as a phenomenon, is what Sartre calls the phenomenon of being. In another 
word, it refers to the manifestation or the revelation of the uexistence of a 
phenomenon or an existent，，. 
n BN 7. 
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We should be more familiar with the meanings of the two concepts now. 
However, it is hard to see the reason and necessity for drawing such a distinction, and 
it seems that it is somehow trivial to distinguish these two senses of "being". Why is it 
necessary for Sartre to distinguish these two possible meanings of being? Let us look 
at the following paragraph: 
We can do this more easily if we will consider that the whole of the 
preceding remarks has been directly inspired by the revealing intuition of 
the phenomenon of being. By not considering being as the condition of 
revelation but rather being as an appearance which can be determined in 
concepts, we have understood first of all that knowledge cannot by itself 
give an account of being; that is, the being of phenomenon cannot be 
reduced to the phenomenon of being. 
It is important to note that the concepts of phenomenon of being and being of 
phenomenon refer to two different subject matters. On the one hand, the phenomenon 
of being is a process of revelation done by an existent — or somebody - which reveals 
its objects. It signifies that there is a region of existent which, in its being, reveals the 
being of its own and its object. On the other hand, the being of phenomenon is the 
essential constitution of the phenomenon (or existent) that is revealed by somebody. It 
implies that there is another region of existent which’ in its being, is revealed by other 
existent. The distinction between phenomenon of being and being of phenomenon 
reveals that there are two modes of being that are radically different from each other, 
and they correspond to two different regions of existents respectively. It is these two 
modes of being or regions of existent that constitute the whole manifestation of 
appearances (This will be further elaborated in Chapter 3). If we want to disclose the 
meaning of being and the manifestation of appearances in a thorough way, then we 
must distinguish the two modes of being lucidly, and explicate the relation between 
79 BN, p. 9. 
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them. In fact, we can find a similar distinction in BT. Heidegger points out that Dasein 
is an entity which is radically different from the other. As an entity, “[t]he 'essence 'of 
Dasein lies in its existence’., and this signifies that Dasein is an entity which exists 
in a mode of Being that is totally different from other entities. It shows that Heidegger 
is distinguishing Dasein and entities within-the-world {Innerweltliches Seiendes) 
according to their modes of Being. These evidences reveal that Sartre's distinction of 
phenomenon of being and being of phenomenon has its origin from the ontological 
inquiry of Heidegger. 
The analysis in this chapter should be adequate to show that Sartre's project of 
inquiry in BN is a phenomenological one. He has not only adopted the themes or 
concepts from Husserl and Heidegger, but also the phenomenological methods (or 
perspectives) from them. He has assimilated Husserl's phenomenological £兀0纳，and 
it makes him capable to understand the intentionality of consciousness. He has also 
taken over Heidegger's Seinsfrage, and this allows him to focus at the being of 
existents. It is exactly why Sartre calls his project a “phenomenological ontology" — it 
is a method which is composed of the Husserlian p hen omen o logical elements and the 
Heideggerian ontological elements. But we should not be satisfied with our analysis 
here. We should note that there exist crucial differences between the phenomenologies 
of Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre. These differences reside mainly in their objectives 
or motives of researches. To retrieve the essential features of Sartre's phenomenology, 
80 We should be careful about Heidegger's wordings here. Heidegger clearly uses the term "essence" 
(Weseri) in a way different from its traditional sense {essentia). Traditionally, essentia refers to the 
defining attributes of an existent. It is an expression about the "what" or the fact of an existent, and it is 
a description of the ontical aspect of this very existent. On the other hand, "essence" as Wesen refers to 
the defining character of the unique entity of Dasein. It is an expression of the way how this entity 
exists, and it is obvious that it is describing the ontological aspect of this unique existent. This is what 
Heidegger means when he says, "[s]o when we designate this entity with the term 'Dasein', we are 
expressing not its 'what' (as if it were a table, house or tree) but its Being."(57" 42). It is in this sense 
that Heidegger redefines the term "essence" according to his own usage. For further details, see BT42. 
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we must move on to compare the differences between the motives and implications of 
the three philosophers. 
41 
Chapter 2 
A phenomenological anthropology 
§2.1 A new motive for phenomenological research 
2.1.1 A follower of the old path? 
The analysis in the last chapter has clearly shown that Sartre is conducting a 
phenomenological investigation in BN. It is obvious that he has made use of numerous 
phenomenological themes and concepts when elaborating his own thoughts. However, 
what is more important is that, he has adopted a phenomenological stance or 
perspective starting from the beginning of his investigation. On the one hand, Sartre 
has adopted the method of phenomenological tnoxf\ from Husserl. This adoption 
allows him to question about the universal and essential way which a phenomenon 
shows itself, and it eventually reveals him the intentional structure of pure 
consciousness. On the other hand, Sartre assimilates the ontological difference and the 
Seinsfrage from Heidegger. These elements have provided him with the vision to 
inquire into the being of existents. At this moment, we should agree that Sartre is 
definitely conducting a phenomenological investigation in BN, and this investigation 
is founded on the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger. 
We should now be familiar with the origin of Sartre's phenomenology. However, 
are there any significant differences between his investigation and that of his 
predecessors? It appears that there is no big difference between their projects, and we 
have not yet discovered any new elements in Sartre's project from our previous 
observation. This seems to suggest that Sartre is merely repeating or duplicating the 
phenomenological project of his predecessors. Does it imply that, instead of being an 
original thinker, Sartre is merely a faithful disciple of Husserl and Heidegger? Does it 
mean that the investigation in BN is just reiterating the thoughts of the past 
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philosophers, and there is nothing new in this book? 
It is undeniable that Sartre, Husserl and Heidegger are adopting similar stances, 
themes and even procedures in their respective investigations. However, it is 
important to note that their investigations have totally different starting and finishing 
points. This implies that their investigations are underlain by different motivations, 
and they are leading towards different observations or results. We must be careful that, 
although Sartre has assimilated a lot of elements from the phenomenology of Husserl 
and Heidegger, he has not shared the same research motivations with the two 
phenomenologists. In fact, Sartre possesses his own philosophical concern, and it is 
this unique concern that motivates him to carry out the project of BN. This would 
immediately become noticeable if we compare his project in BN with the 
investigations of Husserl and Heidegger. 
Before carrying out this comparison, we should be aware of the objective, 
difficulties and limitations of this analysis. As I have pointed out, Husserl and 
Heidegger are always showing changes in the understanding of "phenomenology". It 
signifies that the motives, methods and themes of their research are constantly 
changing and evolving in a progressive manner, and it will be impossible (and 
inappropriate) to ascribe their philosophical projects to one single motive. It does not 
mean that we are not justified to carry out the aforementioned comparison; 
nevertheless, it is necessary for us to clarify the scope and objective of this 
comparison before we do so. First of all, our following examination of Husserl and 
， 81 Heidegger will focus mainly on the former s Logical Investigations and Ideas I’ and 
the latter ’s BT. The reason for this is simple: these are the major writings of 
81 
Hus serl, Edmund, Logical Investigations (Two Volumes), translated by J. N. Findlay (London: 
Routledge and Paul, 1970); abbreviated as LI in the thesis. 43 
phenomenology that are accessible to Sartre when he is writing BN, and they are 
where Sartre establishes his comprehension towards phenomenology and his 
phenomenological predecessors. Secondly, the primary task of the comparison here is 
to find out how Sartre understands his phenomenological predecessors. It does not 
imply that we are going to interpret Husserl and Heidegger in an arbitrary or 
unfaithful way; the upcoming examination would certainly be conducted upon the 
textual evidences that are found in the books of the three phenomenologists. What I 
want to emphasize is merely that, what we are interested in here is how Sartre 
understands the differences between his own project and those of his predecessors. 
Thus, our primary task here is not to obtain an uncontroversial and entirely "accurate" 
. 
interpretation of Husserl and Heidegger. Put in differently, our primary task here is to 
assess the research motivations and implications of Husserl and Heidegger from 
Sartre ’s point of view. 
. 
I 
2.1.2 Husserl and his quest for foundational science 
Let us start our comparison by looking at the project of Husserl. We have already 
known that Husserl wants to elucidate the structure of pure consciousness through his 
intentional analysis. However, we are still not sure about the significance of his 
project. What is the reason that pushes him to conduct this project? And what is the 
underlying motive and implication of his intentional analysis? We can find the hints to 
answer these questions in his LI\ 
We now raise an important question as to the 'conditions of the possibility 
of science in general'. Since the essential aim of scientific knowledge can 
only be achieved through theory... we replace our question by a question as 
to the conditions of the possibility of theory in general. A theory as such 
consists of truths, and its form of connection is a deductive one. To answer 
our question is therefore also to answer the more general question as to the 
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conditions of the possibility of truth in general, and again of deductive unity 
in general.82 
The paragraph shows that what Husserl concerns, in the LI, is the conditions of 
possibility of the validity, unity and truth of sciences. We can also find that he is 
concerning about something similar in the Ideas /: 
...[AJlthough every eidetic science is necessarily independent of every 
science of matters of fact, the reverse holds, on the other hand, for the latter 
sciences. There is no science of matters offact which, were it fully 
developed as a science, could be pure of eidetic cognitions and therefore 
could be independent of the formal or the material eidetic sciences.^ 
It is necessary for us to elaborate the motivation and objective of Husserl's 
investigations. First of all, the above quotations have never disclosed any degree of 
despite, opposition or doubt towards the truth and contribution of natural sciences. In 
fact, Husserl always shows great admiration and approval towards the achievements 
of the natural sciences. His questioning of ‘‘conditions of possibilities,, also reveals 
that his investigation is conducted upon the admittance or acceptance of the validity of 
different scientific disciplines. Moreover, he is not showing the least intention to 
prove that philosophy (or his philosophy) is the “first science" where all other truths 
(including that of the natural sciences) have to be deduced from. These evidences tell 
us that Husserl is not attempting to refute the truth or redefine the task of natural 
sciences through his investigation. What is he going to explore or demonstrate in his 
investigations then? 
Indeed, what Husserl wants to find out is the necessary conditions that ground 
the ideal unity of sciences in general; in another word, he is trying to figure out the 
82LI, p. 232. 
83 Ideas I, p. 17. 
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ideal interconnections between different scientific disciplines. However, what is the 
relation between these questions and his phenomenological investigations? We should 
still remember that his investigations - no matter the intentional analysis or the eidetic 
science of pure consciousness - have demonstrated the eidetic structure of experience 
which underlies every of our acts of intentions. And it is quite obvious that every 
scientific experience (e.g., the empirical data that are collected in experiments, as well 
as the construction of theoretical explanations) is one of the many types of human 
experiences. It follows that this eidetic structure of experience or consciousness would 
be the conditions ofpossibility for every act of scientific observation, and the study of 
the intentional or eidetic structure would become the foundational science for all 
other disciplines of science. It is probable that this is not the only motivations and 
objectives that underlie Husserl's investigation, but at least we can be sure that this 
would be one of the major motives and objectives of his project. This feature of 
Husserl's phenomenology is well recognized and always emphasized by Sartre. For 
example, Sartre says: 
. . . [T]he philosopher in quest of thought must question the established 
sciences in order to derive it from them as the condition of their possibility. 
We, on the other hand, have apprehended a being which is not subject to 
knowledge and which founds knowledge, a thought which is definitely not 
given as a representation or a signification of expressed thoughts, but which 
is directly apprehended such as it is ... We find ourselves at present on the 
ground of the phenomenology of Husserl although Husserl himself has not 
always been faithful to his first intuition. 
We can see that Sartre understands the project of Husserl as a quest of the 
condition of possibility of the "established sciences", and this project would in turn 
‘‘founds knowledge". It will be debatable to classify Husserl's project as an 
84 BN, p. 18. 
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epistemological one, but certainly it will be appropriate to comprehend his 
phenomenological investigation as a quest of a foundational science.^5 This is a 
research motive which is not found in BN. In Sartre's investigation, we can see that he 
is has not conducted any questioning about the validity or truth of sciences. He is also 
not interested in whether his phenomenological project would become an eidetic and 
foundational science that grounds all other scientific disciplines. These are the clues 
which show that Sartre is not interested in such a task. Therefore, we can conclude 
that the primary and major concern of Sartre is not to look for a foundational science. 
2.1.3 Heidegger and his pursuit of fundamental ontology 
We can see, from Sartre's perspective, that the phenomenology of Husserl is 
aiming to establish a foundational science. This is a motive and task which is not 
found in the book of BN, and we can be sure that Sartre has no intention to turn his 
phenomenological investigation into such a science. However, we have still not 
excluded the possibility that Sartre is conducting an investigation that is identical to 
that of Heidegger. It requires another examination into the motive and objective of the 
analysis in BT. 
The analysis in the last chapter tells us that Being is the essential constitution for 
every entity. This characteristic of Being implies that it is always presupposed by all 
sciences of entities or ontical inquiries. For example, positive sciences and traditional 
85 As Husserl says in the Ideas I, "The old ontological doctrine that the cognition of 'possibilities 'must 
precede the cognition of actualities is ... a great truth." (Ideas I, p. 190) This sentence shows that 
Husserl understands his project as asking about the "conditions of possibilities" of truth, as the 
experiencing acts of all other sciences must base upon the eidetic structure of consciousness. We can 
also find a similar view in the book An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology by Bernet, Kern and 
Marbach. As it says, "[f]or Husserl, all the foregoing considerations concerning the theory of science 
come to a peak in the transcendental-philosophical thesis of the "essential relation" between all ideas of 
Being and consciousness." (p. 83) All these implies that pure phenomenology - as the eidetic science of 
this structure of consciousness - will be foundational for all other sciences. For more details, please see 
Bernet, Rudolf; Kern, Iso; Marbach Eduard, An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology (Evanston, 
111., Northwestern University Press, 1993), pp. 83-84. 
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ontologies (e.g., the Aristotelian metaphysics which studies the substratum) can never 
fully understand the meaning of their own task if they fail to notice the essential 
constitutive character of Being. Upon this consideration, we should agree that the 
theoretical inquiry into the meaning of Being would be a study that grounds every 
other ontical sciences. That is why Heidegger would call this inquiry of the meaning 
of Being the fundamental ontology^6: 
The question of Being aims therefore at ascertaining the a priori conditions 
not only for the possibility of the sciences which examine entities as entities 
of such and such a type, and, in so doing, already operate with an 
understanding of Being, but also for the possibility of those ontologies 
themselves which are prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their 
foundations. Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly 
compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and 
perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the 
on 
meaning oj Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task. 
At the first glance, it seems that the investigation of Sartre is looking for 
something similar. For instance, we can see that Sartre tries to distinguish existents 
into phenomenon of being and being of phenomenon, and this distinction is made 
according to the being or the mode of being of the existents. It is for this reason we 
say that Sartre is also conducting an ontological inquiry. However, there exists a 
crucial difference between the investigations of Sartre and Heidegger. Sartre clearly 
tells us the underlying objective of his ontological inquiry: 
Thus we have left "appearances" and have been led progressively to posit 
two types of being, the in-itself and the for-itself... A multitude of questions 
remain unanswered: What is the ultimate meaning of these two types of 




these two radically separated regions of being?88 
It is by the description of this totality that we shall be able to reply to these 
two questions: (1) What is the synthetic relation which we call 
being-in-the-world? (2) What must man and the world be in order for a 
relation between them to be possible?89 
It is true that Sartre has assimilated the crucial elements of the ontological 
inquiry of Heidegger, but it does not imply that he has totally assimilated Heidegger's 
ontological orientation. The above sentences show that the main objective of BN is 
not to look for the meaning of Being in general or the Seinsfrage^ What Sartre 
concerns is rather a unique region of existents called the Being-for-itself or human 
reality91. On one hand, this existent is unique as it is capable to include within itself 
the phenomenon of being and being of phenomenon92; on the other hand, this existent 
always exists as a being-in-the-world - i.e., it always exists in the synthetic relation 
with the “world”. It reveals that the investigation of Sartre can be understood as an 
ontological one - only to the extent that he is not questioning about the essences or 
facts of existents, but rather the mode of being of them. Perhaps it will be too hasty to 
judge here that Sartre is completely uninterested in the Seinsfrage or the meaning of 
Being, yet we can be sure that this is not the primary and major motive that induces 
him to carry out the investigation in BN. In short, we can say that Sartre is not aiming 
for a project of fundamental ontology. 
88 BN,p. 30. 
8 9 厦，p. 34. 
90 BN 11: Ontological inquiry is indeed more primordial, as over against the ontical inquiry of the 
positive sciences. But it remains itself naive and opaque if in it researches into Being of entities it fails 
to discuss the meaning of Being in general {Sinn von Sein iiberhaupt). 
91 11 is important to note that what Sartre means by "human reality" is exactly what we called the 
"human being". However, there are some philosophical considerations that urge him to designate this 
existent with a different name. This would be explained in the last section of this chapter. 
92 W e should pay attention to the fact that the distinction of phenomenon of being and being of 
phenomenon can somehow be used the synonyms of being-for-itself and being-in-itself. For example, 
both of these distinctions are drawn according to the modes of being of the existents, and both of them 
aim to stress the fundamental differences between conscious existents and non-conscious existents. 
This will be elaborated thoroughly in the next chapter. 
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Someone may oppose that, even though Sartre is not conducting a fundamental 
ontology, still he is aiming to analyze an existent that is characterized by its unique 
mode of being. Is not this a Sartrean version of the analysis of Dasein! It is true that 
Sartre is proceeding an investigation that is somehow similar to the analysis of Dasein. 
Nevertheless, unlike the analysis of the human reality that is made in BN (we would 
see this in Part 2.2.4 in this chapter), the analysis of Dasein enjoys only a sequential 
priority of inquiry in the whole project. As we know, the investigation of Heidegger is 
lead by the question of the meaning of Being in general. It indicates that every inquiry 
in BT is done and should be understood with reference to the Seinsfrage. From this 
point of view, the analysis o^ Dasein is merely a preliminary research which is 
necessary for explicating and answering the Seinsfrage. As an entity, “[t]he ‘essence， 
of Dasein lies in its existence” , and ‘‘[t]hat Being which is an issue for this entity in 
its very Being, is in each case mine."94 The existence (Existenz) of Dasein implies 
that it always exists in a mode of Being that is different from other entities, and its in 
each case mineness {Jemeinigkeit) implies that it is an entity which always exists in 
an average understanding of its own Being. These two characteristics of Dasein make 
it suitable to be the starting point of answering the Seinsfrage, and hence the analysis 
of it would take priority over the analysis other entities.95 All these imply that the 
93 BT 42. We should be careful about Heidegger's wordings here. Heidegger clearly uses the term 
"essence" {Wesen) in a way different from its traditional sense {essentia). Traditionally, essentia refers 
to the defining attributes of an existent. It expresses the "what" or the fact of an existent, which 
describes the ontical aspect of it. On the other hand, within Heidegger's context, "essence" as Wesen 
refers to the defining character of this unique entity of Dasein. It expresses about the way how this 
entity exists. This is what Heidegger means when he says that "So when we designate this entity with 
the term 'Dasein', we are expressing not its 'what' (as if it were a table, house or tree) but its 
Being.”C67"42). It is in this sense that Heidegger redefines the term "essence" in his own context and 
usage. 
94 BT 42 
95 Heidegger points out that, in the questioning about the meaning of Being, one must find a suitable 
entity to be the starting point of the whole inquiry. This is what he called "that which is interrogated' or 
ein Befragte (BT 5). The entity which is called Dasein takes priority over all other entities in three ways, 
and thus it is chosen as the Befragte of the whole inquiry. First of all, it is ontically prior: it is an entity 
which has its essence in its Being, and this entity is defined or determined by its unique mode of Being. 
(BT42) Second, Dasein is ontologically prior: it is an entity which is always in a pre-ontological 
understanding of its own Being. Finally, Dasein is ontic-ontologically prior: it has a pre-ontological 
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analysis of Dasein is just a preliminary research of the fundamental ontology or the 
explication of the Seinsfrage, and it is neither the initiating motive nor the final goal 
of his project. 
We can see in what sense Sartre has assimilated the phenomenology of his 
predecessors. It is undoubtedly true that he has adopted some of the most crucial 
elements from the philosophy of Husserl and Heidegger, but it is confined only to 
their phenomenological methods or perspectives. The above analysis shows that 
Sartre is neither interested in establishing a foundational science that asks about the 
validity or truth of natural sciences, nor a fundamental ontology that reveals the 
meaning of Being in general. What is the motive that prompts him to carry out his 
project then? What does he want to find out through his investigation in BN? 
§ 2.2 A project of phenomenological anthropology 
2.2.1 Sartre and his anthropological concern 
We are now ready to examine the underlying concern of Sartre's project. Our 
previous analysis shows that Sartre has adopted the phenomenological methods and 
perspectives from his predecessors, but he does not share the same research motives 
and goals with them. As I have indicated, Sartre does not tell us the aim of his 
investigation until he reaches the concluding parts of BN. He clearly tells us, in these 
parts, that his investigation in BN is conducted out of an anthropological-ethical 
concern. This is a motive which is emphasized neither in the researches of Husserl nor 
that of Heidegger, and it is the most crucial difference between the investigation of 
Sartre and his predecessors. We should now go through the relevant discussions in BN 
carefully, and find out what does it mean by "anthropological-ethical" here. 
understanding of the Being of those entities which are other then its own. It is upon this three 
considerations that Dasein becomes "the one which must first be interrogated" in the ontological 
inquiry (BT \3). See 11-15. 
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It is not difficult to pick out themes which are relevant to what we commonly 
called ‘‘ethics” from the book of BN. As we can see, these "ethical" themes - e.g., bad 
faith and — being of value 一 can always be found in the discussions of other moral 
philosophers. However, it is astonishing that Sartre has never understood his analysis 
as an ethics or moral philosophy in an ordinary sense. For instance, he considers his 
analysis of bad faith as a "description" that captures the “conditions of possibility" of 
this phenomenon96, and there he shows no intention in telling whether it is right or 
wrong for us to deceive ourselves. This analysis eventually ends up not by providing 
evaluative or prescriptive principles of human values, but only a demonstration of the 
mode of being in which human reality exists. Moreover, we cannot find any doctrines 
or prescriptions of moral value throughout his investigation of the “being of value". 
As we would see, this part of investigation is just an inquiry which explicates a certain 
aspect of the being (the human ekstasis of Transcendence) of human reality.97 It 
neither aims to establish a standard that helps us to evaluate or judge moral actions, 
nor to account for a hierarchy of moral values that we ought to follow. Here, we can 
exclude the possibility that Sartre is trying to give a normative theory of ethics. If this 
is the case, then what is Sartre attempting to do in BN? This can only be answered by 
• • Q O 
looking at the concluding part of BN. The part “Ethical Implications" shows that 
Sartre is highly aware of the target and limitations of his project. He admits that his 
descriptive project in BN is incapable to account for any "ethical precepts".99 
However, he also tells us that this is not the purpose of his research. What is the really 
fundamental task of BN if it is not going to establish a normative ethical theory? To 
answer this question, we must examine this concluding part of the book in great 
96 BN, p. 96. 
97 BN, p. 137-146. 
98 BN, pp. 795-798. 
99 BN,p. 795. 
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detail. 
In this part, we can see how Sartre understands his own project. As he says, his 
project is consisted of two major tasks: ‘‘ontology” and “existential psychoanalysis”. 
Our previous analysis has already shown that ontology is a descriptive inquiry into the 
^ay how an existent or a phenomenon exists, and it is an examination of the mode (or 
modes) of being of the existents. However, we have also disclosed that Sartre is not 
interested in the Seinsfrage articulated by Heidegger. If he is not going to ask about 
the meaning of Being in general, then what would be the subject matter of his 
ontology? The following paragraph clearly reveals the essence of such an ontology: 
Ontology itself can not formulate ethical precepts. It is concerned solely 
with what is, and we can not possibly derive imperatives from ontology's 
indicative. It does, however, allow us to catch a glimpse of what sort of 
ethics will assume its responsibilities when confronted with a human reality 
in situation. Ontology has revealed to us, in fact, the origin and the nature of 
value; we have seen that value is the lack in relation to which the for-itself 
determines its being as a lack. By the very fact that the for-itself exists, as 
we have seen, value arises to haunt its being-for-itself.100 
This paragraph lucidly tells us the distinctive features of Sartre's ontology. The 
first thing we should notice is that, the purpose of his ontology is to show us the 
unique mode of being of human reality - i.e., an existent which always ''exists in 
situation”. On the one hand, it shows that Sartre is concerning about the way how an 
existent exists, and it is in this sense that we can understand both the project of him 
and Heidegger as an ontological one. But on the other hand, we can notice the most 
crucial difference between the project in ^vVand BT. Instead of looking for the 
meaning of Being in general, Sartre is rather interested in demonstrating the 
"essence" - or in the Heideggerian term, the Wesen — of human reality. It reveals that 
100^V，p. 795. 
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these analyses are playing different roles within the projects of the two 
phenomenologists. While the analysis of Dasein is only a preliminary inquiry for 
other investigations (e.g., the Seinsfrage), the analysis of human reality is itself the 
goal of the whole project, and it indicates that the "essence" of human reality is itself 
the central and ultimate theme which Sartre wants to examine in BN. It is a project 
which intends to explicate the essential characteristics or the Wesen of human 
reality, and thus we can say that this project is first of all motivated by an 
anthropological concern. 
I 
2.2.2 The ontology of human reality and its ethical implication 
We can see that the investigation of Sartre is motivated by a concern for the 
Wesen of human reality. However, we have not yet look at the implications which this 
analysis would bring out. As he says, this project can let us know about "what sort of 
ethics will assume its responsibilities" for human reality. What does it mean here? 
It is not difficult to understand that every normative theory of ethics should be 
founded upon an appropriate comprehension of human reality. This would be the very 
basic requirement or precondition of establishing a valid and applicable normative 
theory. And according to our previous examination, if we want to obtain a thorough 
comprehension of an existent, then we must first of all understand the ontological 
characteristics or the being of it. It is at this point where the descriptive analysis of 
human reality is related to ethics. As Sartre says, this ontology of human reality would 
reveal us the ‘‘origin and the nature of value”. It is certain that what he refers to here is 
not the antecedent of a causal relation, but rather the essential constitution and the 
meaning of "value ”. The ontology of human reality is capable to reveal the essence of 
value, because human reality is an existent which, in its being, introduces or 
projects value into the world. It implies that it will be impossible to examine the 
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meaning of value independent from the being of human reality, and the inquiry into 
the being of human reality would eventually reveals the way how value is projected 
into the world. All these imply that the ontology of human reality — an analysis which 
reveals us how human reality projects value — would be the pre-requisite for any 
normative theories of ethics, and hence it is said to be carrying ethical implications. 
Here, we should further examine the "ethical implications" of Sartre's analysis. 
We are sure that Sartre is not looking for a normative theory of ethics. However, it is 
still inappropriate to define his project as an inquiry of metaethics. We should note 
that his analysis is not merely restricted to human actions that contain moral value 
(e.g., those actions that can be judged as "right or wrong" or "good or bad"), but it 
covers all human deeds that are related to the broadest sense of value. For example, 
the nature of instrumental value and the problem of authenticity towards oneself are 
also discussed in his analysis. It implies that Sartre is striving to explicate the 
eidetic structure and the essential constitution of value projections as such. 
Therefore, what he does in BN is to describe how value is brought into the world 
through the being of human reality, and he is not arguing about what or which sort of 
value(s) should the human reality adopts. Although this ontology does not provide us 
with any ethical precepts or prescriptions, it shows us the necessary condition of every 
projection of value — which includes moral value. This ontology will further help us to 
exclude those normative theories that are irrelevant or does not correspond to the 
being of human reality, and attach only to those that are founded upon an appropriate 
understanding of the ontological characteristics of human reality. Thus, this 
ontological analysis of human reality would reveal the origin and meaning of value, 
and this would in turn ground the possibility of ethics for human reality., in another 
word, it has demonstrated the conditions ofpossibility of ethics for human reality. It is 
in this way that the ontological inquiry of human reality would contribute to 
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other inquiries of ethics, and it is the reason why Sartre says that his project 
carries ethical implication. 
2.2.3 Existential psychoanalysis as a moral description 
We can see the how the ontology of human reality contributes to the discussions 
of ethics. However, we must not forget the part of existential psychoanalysis. The 
name of this task is somehow confusing: the term "existential" is usually applied to 
philosophical researches that are more or less related to the phenomenology of 
Heidegger, while the name "psychoanalysis" always refers to the theory (and the 
school) of psychology that is founded by Sigmund Freund. So what is this inquiry 
going to ask about? We can find the answer in the following paragraphs: 
It follows that the various tasks of the for-itself can be made the object of an 
existential psychoanalysis, for they all aim at producing the missing 
synthesis of consciousness and being in the form of value or self-cause. 
Thus existential psychoanalysis is moral description, for it releases to us the 
ethical meaning of various human projects.101 
Existential psychoanalysis is going to reveal to man the real goal of his 
pursuit, which is being as a synthetic fusion of the in-itself with the 
for-itself; existential psychoanalysis is going to acquaint man with his 
• 1 0 2 passion. 
But the ontology and existential psychoanalysis... must reveal to the moral 
7 103 
agent that he is the being by whom values exist. 
As we all know, phenomenology always endeavors to show us the universal 
structure and meaning of human experience or existence, and thus it always requires 
itself to begin and found its research upon the ground of concrete experiences of 
m BN, p. 796. 
W2BN,p. 797. 
103 BN, p. 797. 
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human reality. This is one of the most crucial differences between phenomenology 
and any speculative (or even dogmatic) philosophy, as the latter always base their 
researches on the analyses and deductive reasoning of abstract concepts. This feature 
of phenomenology implies that every of its inquiry would include a demonstration of 
the universal structure of human experiences or existence, and a descriptive 
examination of the relevant concrete human experiences.104 It does not mean that 
they are two particular or separated tasks. Quite the contrary, these tasks are the two 
aspects of the one and the same inquiry, and thus they are interdependent and 
“ 
complementary to each other. On the one hand, every observation of the universal 
structure has to be grounded on the descriptions of these experiences, or else it would 
become dogmatic and groundless; on the other hand, the descriptive analyses of these 
experiences should reveal the universal structure of human experience or existence, or 
else it would become trivial and redundant. That is why we should not consider these 
tasks separately, and should understand them as the different aspects of the same 
inquiry. 
We can observe an identical framework in Sartre's investigation. It is obvious 
that the ontology of human reality is exactly the part which demonstrates the universal 
structure of human experiences and existence. This part aims to explicate the eidetic 
structure and the essential constituent of the human reality. The existential 
psychoanalysis, on the other hand, would correspond to the descriptive analysis of 
104 It is not dif ficult to notice that Heidegger used a similar strategy (or method) of investigation in BT. 
As Charles Guignon says, "[t]he phenomenology of Dasein is carried out in two stages. In the first 
stage, Heidegger identifies certain 'formal' structures of Dasein that are supposed to provide initial 
clues as to what might be disclosed in the course of the investigation... In the second stage, Heidegger 
presents a phenomenological description of everyday life in order to show the concrete content such 
formal structures may have in actual modes of existing.”(p. 121). Guignon's analysis further suggests 
that the structure of BN - i.e., an ontology on human reality with a corresponding part of existential 
psychoanalysis — is probably adopted from Heidegger's inquiry in BT. For the article of Guignon, see 
Guignon, Charles, "Becoming a Self: The Role of Authenticity in Being and Time”, in The 
Existentialists: Critical Essays on Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre, edited by Charles 
Guignon (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), pp.119-132. 
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human experiences. As Sartre says, it examines the “passions” and the relevant tasks 
of the human reality, and such an analysis would discloses the structure of 
consciousness or the being of human reality “in the form of value or self-cause ”. It 
means that existential psychoanalysis is having the same objective as the ontology of 
human reality, and both of them are striving to reveal that the projection of value is 
founded in the being of human reality. All these evidences show that existential 
psychoanalysis is neither an empirical psychology nor a positive science, but is a 
phenomenological inquiry. But why is this phenomenological inquiry given the 
confusing name of "existential psychoanalysis"? What does its name mean? First of 
all, this analysis is an "existential" one as it is grounded on and pointing towards the 
being of human reality. It is an analysis that aims at scrutinizing different instances of 
the everyday existence or the being of human reality, and ends up by revealing the 
universal structure of the being of human reality. This means that both the research 
motive and the objective of this analysis are targeting on the being or existence of 
human reality. Secondly, this analysis is a “psychoanalysis”，as it aims to reveal the 
hidden dimensions of the concrete experiences that are acquired by human reality in 
its being. These "passions" or "experiences" should not be considered in a 
psychological or scientific sense; rather, they refers to those experiences that are 
observed and understood from a phenomenological perspective - i.e., they are the 
concrete lived-experiences that are revealed /or consciousness, Dasein or human 
reality. It is important to note that all these experiences and tasks have presupposed, 
and are resulted from, the projection of value in the being of human reality. Hence, the 
analysis of them will reveal us the universal structure and way which value is 
projected in the being of human reality. In other words, existential psychoanalysis is a 
phenomenological analysis which describes and examines those concrete experiences 
that disclose the projection of value in the being of human reality, and the analyses of 
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these experiences will eventually show us the origin and nature of value - i.e., value is 
introduced and projected into the world through the being of human reality. It implies 
that these descriptive analyses will also demonstrate us the conditions of the 
possibilities of ethics, and thus it will carry the same ethical implications as the 
ontology of human reality does. It is in this sense that existential psychoanalysis is 
a "moral description” which discloses the ethical dimension of the being of human 
reality. 
2.2.4 Human r eality versus Daseinl 
The above analysis has sufficiently shown the anthropological motive and ethical 
implications of Sartre's project. It is certain that he is giving an ontological inquiry 
into an existent which projects value in its being. This unique existent is what he 
called “human reality". Although we have mentioned the name of this unique existent, 
still we have not grasped the meaning of this existent in a crystal clear manner. This 
does not mean that we are completely ignorant of its meaning. We know that the 
defining characteristic of this existent lies in its being, and its name suggests that it is 
closely related to what we mean by "human being". These understandings imply that 
we have already seized some of the most crucial aspects of this unique existent. Yet 
such an understanding is not adequate for us to distinguish human reality away from 
other existents that resemble to it. The true meaning of human reality can only be 
revealed by answering the following two questions. First of all, is human reality 
{realite humaine) equal to what we commonly called human being? Second, is human 
reality identical to Daseinl Is it simply a Sartrean translation — or misinterpretation — 
of the Heideggerian concept?105 
105 The term realite humaine is first found in a French translation of Heidegger's "What is 
Metaphysics?" by Henry Corbin. There the term realite humaine is used as a direct translation of the 
Heideggerian term Dasein. See Heidegger, Martin, "Qu'est ce que la Metaphysique?", translated by 
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We can only find the answer in the book of BN. Let us look at the section of "The 
Phenomenological Concept of Nothingness"}06 In this section, we can observe that 
Sartre has adopted a very interesting attitude towards the phenomenology of 
Heidegger and his concept of Dasein. This can be revealed from the following 
sentences: 
Heidegger in his most important work has shown the legitimacy of raising 
the question concerning being... There is a meaning of being which must be 
clarified; there is a ‘‘pre-ontological comprehension" of being which is 
involved in every kind of conduct belonging to human reality — i.e., in each 
of its projects.107 
We know that for Heidegger the being of human reality is defined as 
“being-in-the-world.”... This means both the “human reality" springs forth 
• • • 1 f)0 
invested with being and “finds itself ' (sich befinden) in being... 
In these sentences, Sartre is using the term human reality as the synonym of 
Dasein. Such a usage can also be seen in many other paragraphs throughout BN. 
However, Sartre only considers the two terms as synonyms in cases where he agrees 
with the observations of Heidegger, and he clearly distinguishes the references and 
meanings of these the terms in cases where he disagrees with Heidegger: 
Now the characteristic of Heidegger's philosophy is to describe Dasein by 
using positive terms which hide the implicit negations.109 
Heidegger... begins with the existential analytic without going through the 
cogito. But since the Dasein has from the start been deprived of the 
dimension of consciousness, it can never regain this dimension.110 
Henry Corbin (Paris: Gallimard, 1938). 
1 0 6 ^ , p p . 49-56. 
107 BN,p. 50. 
108 BN, pp. 50-51. 
109 層，p. 52. 
110 BN,pp. 119-120. 
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The above paragraphs have shown us the subtle relation between human reality 
and Dasein. We can notice that there are numerous similarities between them. The 
most crucial similarity between them is that both of these concepts are derived from 
the ontological perspective. On the one hand, these concepts can only be observed 
from the inquiries about the being or Being of the existents. It means that one can 
understand the meaning of these concepts if he or she has adopted the ontological 
differences. On the other hand, both human reality and Dasein are existents that are 
defined by its being or Being. It means that both of the concepts are expressions of the 
being or Being of that unique existent. These similarities allow us to understand the 
two concepts as interchangeable terms in specific occasions — e.g., when we are 
designating the existent which is defined by its unique way of being/Being/existence. 
In spite of these similarities, there exist fundamental differences between human 
reality and Dasein. For example, Sartre criticizes Heidegger that he has deprived of 
the dimension of consciousness and nothingness in the description of Dasein. His 
criticism reveals that the concept of Dasein fails to depict these aspects of the being of 
human reality. As we will see, in the next chapter, this is the most important aspect 
which characterizes the being of human reality. Moreover, we can find that Sartre 
always preserves the term of Dasein in places where he disagrees with Heidegger. He 
neither attempts to "translate" Dasein into human reality, nor to use them as 
synonyms. It apparently shows that Sartre is trying to prevent his readers from mixing 
up the two concepts in these occasions. All these evidences imply that Sartre has 
never thought that the concept of human reality is equivalent to the concept c^Daseirj. 
Thus, instead of treating human reality as a misinterpretation or incorrect translation 
of Dasein, it will be more reasonable to believe the contrary: Sartre is clearly aware 
of the differences between Dasein and human reality, and he always retains the 
differences of them. And here we can conclude that human reality and Dasein are two 
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different concepts. 
It is obvious that both Sartre and Heidegger are performing an ontological 
inquiry - an inquiry which asks about the being or Being of the existents. However, 
due to the discrepancies of their research motives, their inquiries would focus on and 
emphasize different features of the same subject matter. As we know, Heidegger is 
conducting an ontological inquiry into the meaning of Being. It means that he has 
approached and comprehended his subject matter with reference to the Seinsfrage, 
and what he wants to focus and concentrate on will be the ontological implications of 
this entity - e.g., its unique mode of Being111 and its investigative priorities112 in the 
Seinsfrage, It this situation, the anthropological aspect of Dasein is much weakened, 
and the ethical dimension of this existent is greatly concealed.113 The etymological 
construction of the term Dasein has already shown that it should not be understood 
primarily as a person, human being, or an existent which projects value, but an entity 
which exists with a unique mode of Being (e.g., in its average understanding of 
111 BT 41-44 
112 Heidegger points out that, in the questioning about the meaning of Being, one must find a suitable 
entities to be the starting point of the whole inquiry. This is what he called ‘that which is interrogated' 
or ein Befragte (BT 5). The entity Dasein takes priority over all other entities in three ways, and thus it 
is chosen as the Befragte of the whole inquiry. First of all, it is ontically prior: it is an entity which has 
its essence in its Being, and this entity is defined or determined by its unique mode of Being. (BT42) 
Second, Dasein is ontologically prior: it is an entity which is always in a pre-ontological understanding 
of its own Being. Finally, Dasein is ontic-ontologically prior: it has a pre-ontological understanding of 
the Being of those entities which are other then its own. It is upon this three considerations that Dasein 
becomes 'the one which must first be interrogated' in the ontological inquiry (BT 13). See BT 11-15. 
113 Our anal ysis here is adopting a view that is similar to the one hold by William Earle and Tze-wan 
Kwan. In "Phenomenology and Existentialism" (an article written in reply to another article which 
shares the same name, written by Herbert Spiegelberg), Earle says "[i]n Heidegger, the first thing to be 
noticed is that the phenomenology given in Sein und Zeit is controlled in the view of the author by 
another consideration, namely, the question What is Being? Hence the philosophical anthropology 
developed is not an independent investigation but is presented as a propaedeutic to an ontological 
investigation, which moreover, as we all know, has never appeared. Thus the anthropology is not 
initially presented as exhaustive; it is rather those considerations of human being relevant to the 
question of Being its elf” (p. 192). Kwan also pinpointed this crucial aspect of Dasein. As he says, 
"despite the fact that Dasein is by virtue of its distinction taken as the only point of departure for 
"Being," Heidegger did notice that Dasein, not like the ego of Descartes, cannot be founded upon itself, 
but must be understood in relation to “Sein”, even though the word Sein still remains obscure."(P- 53) 
See Earle, William, "Phenomenology and Existentialism", in The Development and Meaning of 
Twentieth-Century Existentialism, edited by William L. McBride (New York: Garland Pub., 1997), pp. 
189-198; and also wan, Tze-wan, "Heidegger's Quest for the Essence of Man", in Analecta Husserliana, 
Vol. 17，pp. 47-64. 
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Being). Therefore, in Heidegger's context, the concept oihuman being is solely 
ascribed to the traditional and ontical sciences like anthropology, psychology or 
biology, while the name of Dasein is reserved for the unique entity that is 
examined in the Seinsfrage. 
However, the situation is different for the case of Sartre. We can see that Sartre 
has explicitly identified human being with human reality: 
Man is the being through whom nothingness come to the world... Yet it is 
not given to "human reality" to annihilate even provisionally the mass of 
being which it posits before itself. Man's relation with being is that he can 
modify it.115 
As the paragraph suggests, this existent is exactly what we common mean by 
human being. However, why does Sartre choose to designate this subject matter with 
a new name, instead of simply calling it ‘‘human being"? We know that Sartre's 
project is not carried out with reference to the Seinsfrage. It means that it is not 
necessary for him to eliminate the anthropological or ethical implications from his 
object of study. Quite the contrary, it is the "human" feature — e.g., the projection of 
value - that constitutes the being or the defining characteristic of this existent. It 
implies that he must preserve the human aspects of this existent if he wants to reveal 
the "true essence" or the "reality" of this unique existent. If this is the case, then what 
he needs to do is to exclude any naturalistic or ontical implications from this very 
existent, and to emphasize that this existent are observed from a phenomenological 
and ontological perspective. Therefore, Sartre uses the name “human reality” to 
designate ‘‘human being，，as to be observed under the phenomenological and 
ontological perspective - not with reference to the Seinsfrage, but only with 
1,4 BT 45-52 
115 题，pp. 59-60. 
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reference to an anthropological and ethical concern of human being. The term 
human shows that the subject matter of this inquiry is not any anonymous or unknown 
existent, but is exactly ourselves, the human being', and the term reality implies that 
this existent is observed from a perspective — i.e., the phenomenological and 
ontological perspective - which can reveal its real and fundamental meaning. We are 
here justified to conclude that, the ontology of human reality is equivalent to a 
phenomenological ontological investigation of human being, and we are talking about 
its mode of being when we denote human being with the term human reality. 
After a series of comparisons and analyses, we should now agree that Sartre's 
project is motivated by an anthropological concern, and his project also contains 
important ethical implications (see the table below). It is clear that his project aims to 
explicate the eidetic and ontological structure of human reality, and this would show 
that value is projected and introduced into the world in its own being. However, we 
should be careful that this is just the concluding observation of his entire project. 
What concerns us most is the way how Sartre arrives at this observation, and this 
implies that we must go through the itinerary of his phenomenological investigation in 
great details. In the above analysis, we can see that the project in BN is composed of 
the “ontology of human reality" and "existential psychoanalysis". This structure 
indicates the direction of our further inquiry: we should better carry on by looking at 
his demonstration of the universal structure of human experiences and existence — i.e., 
the "ontology of human reality". 
I 
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Table 1: Comparison between the phenomenological inquiry of Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre 
\ C o m p o n e n t s of Erfragte 
Gefragte Befragte 
^inqui ry Objective of (that which is to 
Methods adopted (that which is (what is 
research be found out by 
asked about) interrogated) 
Philosophers N . the asking) 
Conditions of The eidetic and 
Phenomenological Pure 
Foundational possibilities of the intentional 
Husserl erioxil； intentional consciousness; 
science validity and unity structure of 
analysis pure experience 
of science consciousness 
The ontological 
The meaning of 
difference; the 
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Chapter 3 
Being-for-itself and being-in-itself 
§3.1 A preliminary sketch of being-for - itself and being-in-itself 
3.1.1 The wrestling between the Husserlian and Heideggerian elements in BN 
The analysis in the last chapter has provided us with a general picture of the 
Sartrean phenomenological ontology. As we can see, the investigation in BN is 
motivated by an anthropological concern. This investigation not only shows us the 
essential structure of the experience and existence of human reality, but it also reveals 
us the "the origin and the nature of value". It is the reason why Sartre concludes that 
his project is carrying ethical implications. 
It seems that we have already clarified all the important features of Sartre's 
inquiry. However, we should not be satisfied with such an investigation result. We 
should still remember that the phenomenological ontology of Sartre is originated from 
and composed of the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger，and there exist 
tremendous differences - including their concerns, methods and themes — between 
their investigations. The situation here implies that, if Sartre cannot find the way or 
the point to synthesize these wrestling or opposing elements of his predecessors, then 
his "phenomenological-ontological" method would simply become self-contradictory 
and implausible. So is it possible for Sartre to synthesize and connect these opposing 
elements together in a tenable way, hence contributes to a new investigating method 
that is appropriate for his project? 
Once again we have to examine the Husserlian and Heideggerian elements that 
are present in BN. We know that Sartre adopts the phenomenological e兀0劝 from 
Husserl, and this allows him to access to the intentional and eidetic structure of pure 
consciousness. This adoption is reflected in Sartre's distinction betweenpercipere and 
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percipi. The percipere refers to the spontaneous process of pure consciousness or 
revelation, and percipi refers to the intentional object that is posited or revealed by the 
process of consciousness. In addition to the above Husserlian elements, Sartre also 
assimilates the ontological differences and Seinsfrage from Heidegger, and these grant 
him the horizon to ask about the being or the mode of being of different regions of 
existents. Such assimilation is revealed in the distinction between phenomenon of 
being and being of phenomenon. The phenomenon of being refers to the mode of 
being of those existents which spontaneously reveals the being of its own and its 
object, while the being of phenomenon refers to the mode of being of those existents 
which is revealed by somebody else. We can see that these two sets of distinctions are 
describing "intentional and eidetic structure" and “mode of being" of existents 
respectively. It appears that they are inquiries conducted in two opposite directions, 
and it looks quite impossible to find the linkage between them. However, Sartre 
immediately hints us, after elaborating his basic phenomenological stance, that these 
two perspectives or sets of inquiries can be comprehended not as something 
incompatible; on the contrary, they can be considered as the corresponding parts of 
one and the same inquiry about the same subject matter'. 
Certainly we could apply to consciousness the definition which Heidegger 
reserves for Dasein and say that it is a being such that in its being, its being 
is in question. But it would be necessary to complete the definition and 
formulate it more like this: consciousness is a being such that in its being, 
its being is in question in so far as this being implies a being other than 
itself. 116 
We must understand that this being is no other than the transphenomenal 
being of phenomena and not a noumenal being which is hidden behind them. 
It is the being of this table, of this package of tobacco, of the lamp, more 
116 服，p. 24. 
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generally the being of the world which is implied by consciousness. ... The 
transphenomenal being of what exists for consciousness is itself in itself 
(lui-meme en soi).117 
The meaning of the being of the existent in so far as it reveals itself to 
consciousness is the phenomenon of being.118 
These paragraphs show that the distinction ofpercipere and percipi is in 
correspondence to the distinction of phenomenon of being and being ofphenomenon. 
We can notice that both these distinctions are expressing the ''how ” of the existents. 
They are either expressing the way they exist (with or without an understanding of 
their own being), or the way they manifest (to reveal or to be revealed). If the 
existence or the being of an existent is just the same as the manifestation of 
appearances, then we should agree that these two sets of distinctions are in fact telling 
us the same information about existents with different expressions. On the one hand, 
the phenomenon of being refers to the mode of being of an existent which always 
understands and reveals the being of its own and its object, and this average 
understanding of being is done in the way of consciousness or percipere. On the other 
hand, the being of phenomenon refers to the mode of being of an existent which is 
without an understanding of being. This existent always exists as that which is 
revealed in the phenomenon of being, and it follows that they are always for 
consciousness and exists as the percipi. The equivalence between consciousness and 
the mode of being of the phenomenon of being is not only the key of bridging or 
synthesizing the Husserlian and Heideggerian elements in BN] 19; it is also the key to 
117 题，p. 24. 
118 厦 , p . 25. 
119 S omeone may question about the suitability of "bridging" or "synthesizing" the eidetic analysis of 
intentionality with the ontological differences. This question is certainly out of the scope of our current 
discussion, and we are incapable to go through this theme in detail. However, in his article 
"Phenomenological Reduction and the Double Life of the Subject", Rudolf Bernet has commented the 
phenomenological reduction of Husserl as follows: "Phenomenological reduction is much more than a 
mere reflective redoubling of consciousness, since it effects a genuine split. The phenomenon made 
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understand one of the central themes of BN: the distinction between being-for-itself 
(lyetre-pour-soi) and being-in-itself {lyetre-en-soi).120 
3.1.2 Two regions of being: their eidetic and ontological implications 
The concepts of being-for-itself and being-in-itself are introduced immediately 
after he has elaborated the intimate relation between the distinctions of “percipere and 
percipi” and “phenomenon of being and being ofphenomenon". There he says: 
Since the being of consciousness is radically different, its meaning will 
necessitate a particular elucidation, in terms of the revealed revelation of 
another type of being, being-for-itself (/ 'etre-pour-soi), which we shall 
define latter and which is opposed to the being-in-itself (/ 'etre-en-soi) of the 
phenomenon.121 
In particular the preceding reflections have permitted us to distinguish two 
absolutely separated regions of being: the being of the pre-reflective cogito and 
• 122 
the being of the phenomenon. 
It is important to note that the concepts of being-for-itself and being-in-itself are 
originated and derived from the distinctions of ‘‘percipere and percipi” and 
“phenomenon of being and being ofphenomenon”. Thus, being-for-itself and 
being-in-itself would carry both the implications about "the intentional and eidetic 
manifest for the first time by the spectator is the ontological difference between constituting 
consciousness and constituted world. It is this difference that the natural life is unaware of and that 
reestablishes the correlation between subject and world within the work of constitution. The aim of 
phenomenological reduction is therefore quite ontological. 'To reflect' phenomenologically on the 
work of the world's constitution is therefore not only to awaken transcendental consciousness from its 
sleep in the world, but also and above all to make manifest the ontological difference between the 
transcendental subject and world."(pp. 250-251). His comment here shows that it is somehow quite 
reasonable to "bridge" or "synthesize" the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger in the way 
Sartre did. For further details of Bernet's research, see Bernet, Rudolf, "Phenomenological Reduction 
and the Double Life of the Subject", in Reading Heidegger From The Start: Essays In His Earliest 
Thought, edited by Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1994), pp. 245-267. 
120 As Sartre sa ys, his project in BN is an inquiry which aims to find out "the ultimate meaning of these 
two types of being" (BN, p. 30). Thus, his whole book can be understood as an analysis and description 
of being-for-itself and being-in-itself. See BN, p. 30. 
121 题 , p . 25. 
122 题，p. 26. 
69 
structure" and ‘‘mode of being" of existents. First of all, the concepts of 
being-for-itself and being-in-itself are expressions about different modes of being of 
the existents. As we can see, being-for-itself refers to an existent that exists in 
consciousness, where it is “a being such that in its being, its being is in question in so 
far as this being implies a being other than itself}23 It implies that being-for-itself is 
an existent which always understands both the being of its own and that of other 
existents. This is no more than a Sartrean and an anthropological way of saying that it 
is an existent that always exists in the average understanding (or a pre-ontological 
comprehension) of being.124 On the other hand, being-in-itself refers to those existents 
which exist without this understanding of being, and its being can only be understood 
or revealed by the being-for-itself. All these show that the distinction between 
being-for-itself and being-in-itself is carrying an ontological implication, as it 
distinguishes existents according to their modes of being. 
However, this is not the only implication that we can find underneath this 
distinction. Being-for-itself and being-in-itself are also observations that are made 
from the dimension or standpoint of intentional and eidetic analysis. The above 
quotations show that the two concepts are denoting the "being of the pre-reflective 
cogito" and "being of the phenomenon" respectively. Here, being-for-itself refers to 
the existent which exists in the way of percipere or pure consciousness. It implies that 
it is always that which spontaneously posits and reveals its object. Being-in-itself, on 
the other hand, refers to the existent which exists in the way of percipi or intentional 
object. It indicates that it is always that which is posited or revealed by consciousness. 
Therefore, we must admit that, the distinction between being-for-itself and 
123 BN,p. 24. 
124 As Sartre sa ys, "The phenomenon of being, like every primary phenomenon, is immediately 
disclosed to consciousness. We have at each instant what Heidegger calls a pre-ontological 
comprehension of it; that is, one which is not accompanied by a fixing in concepts and elucidates." See 
BN, p. 24. 
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being-in-itself also carries an eidetic implication, for it distinguishes existents 
according to their places in the intentional and eidetic structures of human 
• 125 
experiences. 
The above analysis has shown us the distinction between being-for-itself and 
being-in-itself contains both eidetic and ontological implications. However, what or 
^ho exactly is this "being-for-itself? The following sentences would certainly tell us 
the answer: 
This ‘conscious being' is the human reality}26 
We have seen that human reality as For-itself is a lack and that which it 
lacks is a certain coincidence with itself.127 
Of course our human-reality must of necessity be simultaneously for-itself 
and for-others … 
We can see that Sartre is using the term “human reality" and “being-for-itself' in 
an almost identical way. If this is the case, why does Sartre use the two concepts in an 
almost synonymic way? If we go through BN carefully, we would find that Sartre 
always refers to being-for-itself with the personal pronoun “I”. It indicates that the 
explication of being-for-itself is always done from the first personal perspective and 
experience — not only of Sartre, but of the human reality. It implies that, human 
125 In the fir st chapter of our thesis, we found that Sartre is going to conduct a "phenomenological 
ontology" in BN. This subtitle of BN suggests that it would be an investigation which contains both the 
"phenomenological" and "ontological" elements. If we are following Sartre's own terminology strictly, 
then here we should call the above characteristics of being-for-itself and being-in-itself their 
"phenomenological implication". Such a name clearly tells us that this distinction is drawn from the 
Sartrean "phenomenological ontological" perspective. However, within the current context of our thesis, 
the term "phenomenological" fails to depict the essence of this distinction in a precise way. For 
example, this term will not be able to reflect which specific phenomenological element that underlies 
these two concepts. On the contrary, the term "eidetic" can lucidly show that the distinction between 
being-for-itself and being-in-itself is drawn from the dimension or standpoint of the Husserlian 
intentional and eidetic analysis of consciousness. Upon these considerations, it is better for us to call 
these characteristics of being-for-itself and being-in-itself their "eidetic implication". 
126 BN,p. 59. 
127 57V, p. 147. 
m BN, p. 376. 
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reality is exactly the existent which exists in the same way as a being-for-itself- i.e., 
human reality is the existent which, in its being, is conscious of the being of its own 
and its object. 
We should now be able to see that the distinction between being-for-itself 
and being-in-itself is having dual - the eidetic and ontological - implications. The 
two concepts are expressions about the modes of being of existents, and also 
descriptions of the intentional and eidetic structure of human experiences. We should 
bear in mind that the eidetic implication of this distinction is inseparable from its 
ontological implication. For Sartre, every sort of understanding must be done upon 
the dimension of consciousness. There will be no exception even for the average 
understanding of being, and it means that the understanding of being is always equal 
to the consciousness of the being of itself and its object.129 Thus, we can now consider 
consciousness (or the spontaneous process of "to be conscious of") as a unique mode 
of being - to exist with an understanding of being would be the same as to be 
conscious of the being of its own and its object.m 
Someone may oppose that Sartre is trying to synthesize the phenomenology of 
Husserl and Heidegger in an illegitimate way. It is true that Heidegger has never 
identified consciousness with the Being (or the average understanding of Being) of 
Dasein, but it does not follow that what Sartre tells us here is wrong. Here we should 
ask about the reason why Heidegger refuses to ascribe consciousness to the Being or 
129 Besides the above quotations, we can find another important paragraph which shows that, in 
Sartre's perspective, the average understanding of being must be done through the spontaneous 
process of consciousness: "Heidegger, wishing to avoid that descriptive phenomenalism which leads 
to Megarian, antidialectics isolation of essences, begins with the existential analytic without going 
through the cogito. But since Dasein has from the start been deprived of the dimension of 
consciousness, it can never regain this dimension. Heidegger endows human reality with a 
self-understanding which he defines as an "ekstatic pro-ject" of its own possibilities. It is certainly not 
my intention to deny the existence of this project. But how could there be an understanding which 
would not in itself be the consciousness (of) being understanding? This ekstatic character of human 
reality will lapse into a thing-like, blind in-itself unless it arises from the consciousness of ekstasis." 
For relevant discussions, see BN, p. 119-120. 
130 BN, p. 24. 
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the constitutive state {Verfassung) of Dasein. According to Sartre, the major reason for 
this is that Heidegger wants to exclude any Husserlian elements or implications from 
his ontological project. With reference to the ontological inquiry, "consciousness" 
would appear as containing too many implications of the intentional analysis and 
foundational science131. For example, Sartre says: 
Heidegger is so persuaded that the ‘‘I think" of Husserl is a trap for larks, 
fascinating and ensnaring, that he has completely avoided any appeal to 
consciousness in his description of Dasein. His goal is to show it 
immediately as care; that is as escaping itself in the projecting of self 
toward the possibilities which it is. 
To prevent his ontological inquiry from being distracted by an attitude of 
theoretical knowledge or a quest of foundational science, Heidegger chooses to begin 
his investigation not from the point of "consciousness" but elsewhere. In contrast, 
Sartre does not share a similar burden with Heidegger. Sartre has already shown that 
he is not interested in establishing a foundational science in the beginning chapters of 
BN. In this situation, the implication of the Husserlian foundational science has been 
greatly reduced, and it is not a must for him to abandon the discussions about 
I 
consciousness. Also, Sartre is not aiming at accounting for a fundamental ontology in 
BN. What he wants to show is the essential constitution or characteristics of human 
reality — or human being. It is not necessary for him to subsume or relate his inquiry 
to any other leading questions (as Heidegger does), and it means that that is no reason 
131 Such a n understanding can be seen in the researches of a number of scholars. For example, Michael 
Haar says that, in the eyes of Heidegger, Husserl has committed the error of "interpreting all the 
relations between consciousness and the world ultimately on the basis of a relationship of knowledge." 
For Heidegger, this attitude of theoretical knowledge is a derivative or secondary attitude that 
presupposes the ready-to-handness or the Being of Dasein, and "consciousness" is exactly a subject 
matter which is founded upon or discovered within this attitude of theoretical knowledge. In order to 
avoid the error that has been committed by Husserl, Heidegger chooses to start his investigation not 
from the point of consciousness, but from Dasein. See Haar, Michel, "Sartre and Heidegger" in 
Jean-Paul Sartre ——Contemporary Approaches to his Philosophy, edited by Hugh J. Silverman and 
Frederick A. Elliston (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1980)，pp. 169-171. 
132 BN，pp. 133-134. 
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for him to refrain himself from discussions about consciousness. Therefore, it will be 
inappropriate to accuse Sartre of making a wrong interpretation of his predecessors. 
We have finally figured out the basic meaning and definition of the distinction 
between being-for-itself and being-in-itself. As we can see, they are 
eidetic-ontological concepts which refer to two different regions of existents. 
‘‘Being-for-itself，(abbreviated as “For-itself，henceforth) refers to the existent 
which，in its being’ is conscious of the being of its own and its object; while 
‘‘Being-in-itself，(abbreviated as “In-itself，henceforth) refers to the existents 
whichf in its being，exists as the phenomenon or object of consciousness.133 In spite 
of this, we should be careful that the above analysis has just provided us with a 
preliminary sketch of the central theme in Sartre's investigation. It is still inadequate 
to demonstrate the complete structures of these two regions of existents and the 
intertwining relation between them. This implies that it will be necessary for us to 
pursue the complete meaning of these two concepts in a thoroughgoing way. 
§3.2 Being-for-itself as the origin of nothingness (l’ori2ine du neant) 
3.2.1 The meaning of nothingness (neant)134 
We have just seen the meaning of For-itself and In-itself. They are distinctions 
that are drawn according to the intentional and eidetic structure and the mode of being 
of existent. Moreover, human reality is a For-itself, which means that it is an existent 
133 In fact, the ter ms "being-for-itself' and "being-in-itself' possess two interrelated but slightly 
different meanings within the context of BN. In some cases, the terms refer to the being or the 
particular modes of being of two different regions of existents. In other situations, however, the terms 
are used to designate the existents that exist with the corresponding mode of being. Sartre does not 
distinguish the usages of these terms in a very clear or rigorous manner, and in some cases they really 
bring us with ambiguity — even though they are always minor and harmless ones. However, for the 
convenience of our upcoming discussions, we shall restrict our usage of these terms as follows: from 
now on, the terms "being-for-itself' and "being-in-itself' will only be used - within the discussions in 
this thesis - to designate those existents that exist with the corresponding mode of being. 
134 The term neant is a French word. The term is identical to the noun form of the English adjective or 
adverb of "nothing", and it can be translated as "nothingness" in English. 
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which is always conscious of the being of its own and its object. That is the reason 
why Sartre would sometimes called human reality or For-itself a "conscious being". 
This name reveals that we must explicate the complete structure of "consciousness" if 
we want to understand the essential constitution or the mode of being of human reality 
or the For-itself. 
Haven't we retrieved the full structure and meaning of "consciousness" already 
when we are looking for the Husserlian elements in BN1 The answer is no. We should 
note that the analysis of Husserl is attempting to demonstrate the universal structure of 
human experiences. In this case, he is approaching his subject matter primarily from 
an intentional or eidetic dimension, but not from an ontological perspective. As a 
result, the relation between consciousness and the meaning of being has not been 
thematically explored in the analysis of Husserl. On the contrary, in Sartre's 
perspective, consciousness is closely related to the understanding of being and the 
mode of being of human reality. It implies that we can never disclose the full meaning 
and structure of consciousness only by resorting to the investigation of Husserl. In 
order to achieve this, we must re-examine the spontaneous process of consciousness 
not merely from an intentional and eidetic dimension, but at the same from an 
ontological perspective — e.g., to ask about the specific way which consciousness 
reveals the being of its own and its object. 
It appears that the question about the structure of consciousness can be easily 
resolved by examining it with reference to the mode of being or understanding of 
being of existents. But we have not yet arrived at the truly difficult and crucial part to 
the whole problem. After introducing the distinction between For-itself and In-itself, 
Sartre suddenly tells us an astonishing observation: throughout our inquiry into being, 
we are simultaneously surrounded by what he called nothingness (neant): 
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...But behold, at the moment when we thought we were arriving at the goal, 
a glance cast on the question itself has revealed to us suddenly that we are 
encompassed with nothingness... What being will be must of necessity arise 
on the basis of what it is not. What ever being is, it will allow this 
formulation: ‘‘Being is that and outside of that, nothing.” 
Thus a new component of the real has just appeared to us - non-being. 
Our problem is thereby complicated, for we may no longer limit our inquiry 
to the relations of human being to being in-itself, but must include also the 
relations of being with non-being and the relations of human non-being with 
1 o c 
transcendent-being 
It sounds sarcastic to say that the key to resolve our current problem lies in what 
Sartre calls "nothingness". Nevertheless, every one of us should know that the book 
we are currently examining and revisiting is exactly called Being and Nothingness. 
The title of the book lucidly tells us that “nothingness” and “being，’ are the two central 
themes which the book wants to examine, and the conjunction “and” has already 
indicated that the meaning of "being" can only be understood by taking "nothingness" 
into account. Therefore, in order to explicate the complete structure and relation 
between being and consciousness, we must find out the meaning of “nothingness”. 
At this point, we are still not sure about the exact meaning of nothingness. But if 
we revised our preceding analysis carefully, we will find that Sartre has already given 
us the clues for answering this question. First of all, as we can see, the In-itself (i.e., 
the percipi or the being of phenomenon) are always revealed to us in a perspectival 
manner. It means that every In-itself is consisted of Abschattungen that are already 
revealed and those that are not yet revealed. In other words, every In-itself would be 
constituted by the being and non-being of Abschattungen. Moreover, the existence or 
the life of the For-itself is not merely made up of being or presence. As we know, the 
existence of the For-itself is a process that is done in a temporal manner. It indicates 
135 BN, p. 36. 
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that the For-itself is always existing along the temporal dimensions of past, present 
and future; put it differently, the being of the For-itself is always consisted of its past, 
present and future. This temporal characteristic or structure of the For-itself indicates 
that non-being is always a constitutive element of this structure: the past of a 
For-itself is that which was and no longer now, and its future is that which will be but 
not yet. It shows that the existence or life of For-itself is always made up of the being 
of its present and the non-being of its past and future. However, the true essence of 
nothingness can only be revealed from Sartre's analysis of negatitesP1 N egatites 
refers to various phenomenon of non-being that we would encounter in our daily life. 
As he says, the phenomenon of distance, change, regret, imagination and otherness 
are all examples of negatites}^ These phenomenon are unique, because they are all 
having nothingness or non-being as a necessary element of their constitution. This 
can be illustrated in Sartre's well-known example — the absence of his friend Pierre. 
In that example, Sartre is waiting for his friend Pierre in the cafe. Suddenly, he 
realizes that Pierre is late, and he starts to look for Pierre in the cafe. What structure 
does this situation reveal? Let us elaborate this by substituting ourselves into the first 
person perspective of Sartre. By doing so, we can see that: 
( l ) It is the non-being or non-existence of Pierre which discloses the particular 
situation that I am engaged in. Before I search for Pierre, I am just engaged 
in my situation without thematically aware of this very situation and the 
existents in it. Suddenly, I start to realize that Pierre is absent, and hence I try 
to search for him from my surroundings. It means that the world is suddenly 
136 The relation betwee n nothingness and the temporal ekstasis (or the temporality) of For-itself would 
be thoroughly examined in the next chapter of this thesis. 
137 浙，p. 55. 
m BN, p. 55. 
]39 BN, pp. 40-42. 
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disclosed to me through the non-being or absence of Pierre; the non-being of 
Pierre discloses to me the situation where I am in. 
(2) In my search of Pierre, the world is disclosed to me as the non-being or 
absence of relations. At the time when I start to look for Pierre, the whole 
cafe becomes the “undifferentiated ground" of my search.140 It is the ground 
or background of my search, because it is the place where I search Pierre 
from and within; it is undifferentiated, because everything in the cafe is now 
treated as that existents that are “not Pierre". None of the glass of wine, the 
chair I am sitting and the lady across the table is "Pierre". The existents and 
the referential relations of the cafe are in this sense "nihilated". 
(3) It is the non-being of Pierre which constitutes my whole action of search. He 
is certainly the one who I am looking for, who catches my concerns and care 
at the moment. He is also the figure which I will compare everything with -
e.g., I will compare every existent in the cafe with reference to Pierre. 
However, this is all possible only because Pierre is exactly an absent existent. 
To search is always to search for some existents which are not existing at the 
moment. 
(4) The action of search is in fact a process of negations. Throughout my search, 
I will pay attention to and examine every single existent in the cafe. However, 
once I discover that they are "not Pierre", they will be immediately surpassed 
and discharged back into the undifferentiated background. It means searching 
is always a process of negating and discharging those existents which we are 
not looking for. 
Here, we can see that non-being or nothingness is a necessary constituent of the 
140 BN,p.4\. 
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negatites or phenomenon of absence. From the analysis of negatites, we can also find 
that this nothingness which Sartre refers to is a part of the eidetic and ontological 
structure of the world: it is the way how the world and its existents reveal themselves. 
The above analysis of negatites reveals that there is always a mist of non-being 
which surrounds the In-itself and the world.141 At this point, we should admit that 
both being and nothingness are the essential constitution of the In-itself. However, 
what exactly is nothingness? Sartre writes that: 
Between wholly positive realities (which however retain negation as the 
condition of the sharpness of their outlines, as that which fixes them as what 
they are) and those in which the positivity is only an appearance concealing 
a hole of nothingness, all gradations are possible. In any case it is 
impossible to throw these negations back into an extra-mundane 
nothingness since they are dispersed in being, are supported by being, and 
are conditions of reality. ... Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being -
1.1 142 
like a worm. 
First of all, nothingness is not resulted from the process of abstraction. It 
indicates that nothingness should neither be taken as the logical operation of negation, 
nor the mental and conceptual operation of negative judgment”3 Instead, 
nothingness is always concrete, as it is always a constitutive element of the concrete 
experiences or being of the For-itself. For example, nothingness always manifests as 
the emptiness or void which surrounds the corporeal existents, the separation between 
141 The analysis of the example of Pierre reminds us of a similar set of inquiry done by Heidegger. In 
§16 of BT, Heidegger mentions that the worldly character — or the worldhood — of the world is 
manifested in the unusability, obstrusiveness and obstinacy of tools (BT 73-74). As Bernet concludes, 
“[t]hese three instances of the first reduction have in common the function of presenting the being of 
equipment and of concernful Dasein against a backdrop of absence.'Xp. 259). If Bernet is correct, then 
it implies that all these modalities of tools are also negatites, and the worldhood of the world can only 
be manifested in the absence of existents. For the analysis of Bernet, see Bernet, Rudolf, 
"Phenomenological Reduction and the Double Life of the Subject", in Reading Heidegger From The 
Start: Essays In His Earliest Thought, edited by Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1994)，pp. 245-267. 
142 题 ’ p. 55-56. 
143 層，p. 37. 
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(the identities of) this object and that object, or the potential Abschattungen of an 
existent which is currently existing. Thus, nothingness is always the non-being of 
existents, of the In-itself, and it is always “the emptiness of something".144 Moreover, 
nothingness is irreducible to being or the being of any existents. The above analysis 
has already shown that it is being and nothingness which constitutes the world and its 
existents. This observation implies that, similar to “being，’, “nothingness” is an 
ontological expression which designates the way how the existent exists. Therefore, 
nothingness is not an existent, but that which is presupposed by every existent. 
Nothingness is different from being in a radical way. Nothingness is always the radical 
denial or refusal of the being or existence of existents — it is exactly not-being, 
not-to-exist. The characteristic of it implies that being and nothingness possesses 
equal eidetic-ontological status, as both of them are the necessary constituents of 
the world and its existents. 
We can see that nothingness is not a logical or judicative negation, but should be 
understood as the non-being which constitutes the eidetic and ontological structure of 
existents. Such an observation has revealed us an important clue to find out the 
relations between being, consciousness and nothingness. If human reality or For-itself 
is an existent which posits, reveals and understands the meaning of the world the 
In-itself, then it certainly implies the following fact: human reality would be an 
existent which, in its being, is always conscious of the meaning of being and 
nothingness: 
The Being by which Nothingness arrives in the world is a being such that in 
its Being, the Nothingness of its Being is in question. The being by which 
Nothingness comes to the world must be its own Nothingness. By this we 
must understand not a nihilating act, which would require in turn a 
144 题 ’ p. 48. 
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foundation in Being, but an ontological characteristic of the Being 
required.145 
Man presents himself at least in this instance as a being who causes 
Nothingness to arise in the world, inasmuch as he himself is affected with 
non-being to this end.146 
The above sentences have pointed out the origin of nothingness. Nothingness is 
understood and introduced into the world in the being of the For-itself. It means that 
nothingness — the non-being which constitutes the world and the In-itself - is the 
ontological characteristic or the mode of being of the For-itself, in another word, 
nothingness is the way how the For-itself exists. What does it mean when Sartre 
says that nothingness is the mode of being or the way of existence of the For-itself? 
How can an existent “exist” and “not exist" at the same time? How does nothingness 
“comes to the world" or “arise in the world" through the being of For-itself? The 
problems can be resolved only by looking at the essential structures of 
consciousness 一 its nihilation and pre-reflective cogito. 
3.2.2 Consciousness as nihilation ( neantisation) 
Our previous reflections have shown that it is inadequate to consider the 
For-itself merely as an existent which, in its being, is conscious of its object. It is easy 
to note that such an observation focuses mainly on the relation between consciousness 
and being, and Sartre's analysis of negatites has just revealed that nothingness is 
another essential constitution of the world and its existents. It means that, besides 
being conscious of or having an average understanding of being, the For-itself is also 
having a similar conscious or understanding of nothingness. Thus, the above 




in the sense that such description pinpoints how consciousness reveals and affirms the 
being of the world and existents — would be incapable to disclose this essential 
structure or aspect of it. To explicate the truly fundamental structure of consciousness, 
we must examine the For-itself in the other way round, and examine its consciousness 
of or average understanding of nothingness. It implies that we have to pay attention to 
and describe how consciousness denies or refuses the being of the world and its 
existents. 
It seems that it would be very difficult to describe consciousness in a "negative" 
way. Fortunately, our previous examination on the intentional and eidetic structure of 
experiences has already provided us the clue to carry on our inquiry. As we can see, 
consciousness refers to the noetic side of the intentional and eidetic structure of our 
experiences. It is itself a perpetually flowing stream of experiences and the 
spontaneous process of intentional acts. It is always that which intends, posits or 
reveals its intentional object, and it is thus we say that it is the percipere. Such a 
feature implies that consciousness is always the process which reveals or posits its 
object, and it would never be able to exist as the intentional object which is revealed 
or posited - e.g., the percipi or the noematic pole of experiences This observation 
simply hinted us with the following thing: consciousness is, on the one hand, defined 
as the percipere or the spontaneous process of intentional acts; on the other hand, it 
can also be understood as that which is not the percipi or the object revealed: 
What is present to me is what is not me. We should note further more that 
this "non-being" is implied a priori in every theory of knowledge. It is 
impossible to construct the notion of an object if we do not have originally a 
147 Such a s tandpoint is also held by Hugh Silverman. As he says, "When Sartre claims that this true 
self is entirely for-itself (pour-soi), he means that it cannot be an object for itself and still be itself. So 
he calls the true self, this being for-itself, nothingness. As nothingness (le neant), the self is a meaning 
with no referent, an existence with no essence, a consciousness with no object that is other." See Hugh 
J. Silverman, "Sartre's Words on the Self', in Existentialist Ontology and Human Consciousness, ed. 
William L. McBride (New York: Garland Pub., 1997), p. 89. 
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negative relation designating the object as that which is not 
• 148 
consciousness. 
The thing, before all comparison, before all construction, is that which is 
present to consciousness as not being consciousness. ... Negation comes 
from the for-itself. ... [B]y the original negation the for-itself constitutes 
itself as not being the thing.149 
The negative which is the nothingness of being and the nihilating power 
both together, is nothingness.m 
It indicates that the relation between consciousness and its object, between the 
percipere and percipi, has already presupposed nothingness. Consciousness is always 
that which is not the percipi and “not being the thing"; the intentional object is always 
that which is not the percipere or "that which is not consciousness". This mutual 
relation or correlatedness signifies that each of them is defined as the denial or 
refusal of the other side, and it shows that nothingness is a part of the essential 
constitution of the intentional and eidetic structure of our experiences. It follows that 
every consciousness (as the spontaneous process of positing and revealing its object) 
is itself a process of differentiation and separation that is done at the eidetic and 
ontological level. It is the process of classifying，disengaging and separating the 
being of its own — i.e.，the percipere 一 from the being of its objects - i.e. the percipi. 
This “nihilating power" of consciousness, which is also the fundamental way of being 
of For-itself, is what Sartre calls nihilation {neantisation)}^ 
m BN, p. 241. 
149 BN, p. 242. 
150 BN, p. 125. 
151 The French ter m neantisation is the noun form of the French word neantir. It is important to note 
that both of these words are not found in the common daily French, and they are supposed to be 
technical terms invented by Sartre based on the French word of neant. In the context of BN, the word 
neantir denotes the action, process or occurrence where consciousness "introduces neant (or 
nothingness) in between" itself and its objects. In another word, it designates the process where 
consciousness differentiates and separates its own being from that of its object. The word 
neantisation is the noun that refers to this process. It shows that neantisation and neantir are terms 
which describe the eidetic-ontological structure of existent or human reality. In Barnes translation, 
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We can now understand what does it mean when Sartre says that ‘‘[t]he being by 
which Nothingness comes to the world must be its own Nothingness"}52 This is not a 
meaningless or self-contradictory proposition, as Ayer accused153. It is also not a 
judgment which eventually leads to a nihilism of human life (e.g., the claim that there 
is no such thing as "value" in the world), as the popular existentialist interpretation 
suggests. It is rather a description of the eidetic and ontological structure of 
consciousness or conscious existent. The term nihilation points out that the For-itself 
is an existent which nihilates - i.e., it is the existent which, in its being, differentiates 
and separates the being of its own from the being of its object. Therefore, 
consciousness, the understanding of being and nihilation are just different expressions 
or descriptions (done from different dimensions) of one and the same thing: 
consciousness is always the process which averagely understands the being of its own 
and that of its object, and it is fundamentally a process which differentiates and 
separates the being of them - i.e., the nihilation. 
3.2.3 Consciousness (of) self and pre-reflective cogito 
We have eventually clarified the relations between consciousness, being and 
they are rendered into "nihilation" and "nihilate" respectively. As we can see, same as neantisation and 
neantir, the words "nihilation" and "nihilate" are technical terms that are newly created, and Barnes 
says that ‘The English word "nihilate" was first used by Helmut Kuhn in his Encounter with 
Nothingness’ {jp. 804). However, her choices of words are somehow inappropriate, and it can barely 
reflect the true meaning of neantisation and neantir. The term "nihilation" and "nihilate" hardly reveal 
that they are descriptions about the eidetic-ontological structure of existent or human reality, and they 
easily give the readers the impression that they are closely related to "nihilism" - i.e., the opinion or 
position which thinks that the human world is without any meaning and value, and the existence of 
human being is meaningless and desperate. It fact, these terms really make the popular masses or even 
scholars in the past to understand existentialism (and Sartre's philosophy in general) as a philosophical 
nihilism. We must bear in mind that Sartre has never meant anything like "nihilism" or any opinion 
about "human life and value" when he uses the words neantisation and neantir. Nevertheless, for the 
convenience of discussions and references, I would choose to retain and follow her translation, and 
rendered the term neantisation and neantir as "nihilation" and "nihilate". 
152 餅，pp. 57-58. 
153 Ayer, A.J., "Novelist-Philosophers V—Jean-Paul Sartre", Horizon XII’ Nos. 67-68, July-August, 
1945, quoted from Natanson, Maurice, A Critique of Jean-Paul Sartre's Ontology (New York: Haskell 
House Publishers, 1972), pp. 20, ftn.. 
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nothingness. Consciousness is the way how the For-itself or human reality exists, and 
it implies that it is always conscious of or nihil at es the being of its own and its object. 
It is in this way that the For-itself posits or reveals its object (or the In-itself). 
Nonetheless, we now face the following problem: an In-itself or an intentional object 
always reveals itself as the that which is posited by consciousness or the object for 
consciousness, but how does consciousness reveal itself to itself, or reveal itself as the 
percipere? Our previous elucidation has shown that this can never be achieved by 
another consciousness; in this case, the consciousness revealed will become an 
intentional object or the percipi of another consciousness, but not the percipere. It 
signifies that the only possible way for a consciousness to reveal itself as the 
percipere will be: it reveals itself by being conscious of itself. This is what Sartre 
called self-consciousness or consciousness (of) self (conscience (de) soi).154 
In fact, Sartre has already given us the hint to the answer in his early work, the 
Transcendence of the Ego}55 Past philosophers think that consciousness always 
reveals itself through the thematic awareness of the activity of “I think’’. This is what 
. . 156 
we commonly known as the mental activity of "reflection" , and it is best depicted 
by the Cartesian datum "Cogito, ergo sum". However, this understanding of 
154 The translation of "self-consciousness" may give the readers an impression that it is a part of, or 
even a faculty of, consciousness which we have mentioned. We must be careful here that, the term 
"self-consciousness" is a rendering of the French word conscience (de) soi, where it can be directly 
translated into "consciousness (of) self'. The French original of the term reveals that it is a not an 
attribute or faculty of consciousness, but rather a description about the way how the process of 
consciousness is related to itself - i.e., the way how the process of consciousness is conscious of itself. 
Our following analysis would show that every process of consciousness is conscious of its objects in a 
positional and thetic way, and at the same time conscious of itself in a non-positional and non-thetic 
way. It order to distinguish this "non-positional and non-thetic consciousness of itself', which is the 
essential structure of every consciousness, from the "thetic and positional consciousness of itself' or 
what we commonly called "reflection", Sartre chooses to denote the former as "consciousness (of) self'. 
The parenthesis added on the word ‘‘of’ signifies that this consciousness of itself is done in a non-thetic, 
non-positional and pre-reflective way. Similar examples of this term can be found in BN, pp. 14-16 and 
119-123. 
155 Sartre, Jean -Paul, The Transcendence of the Ego: An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness, 
translated by Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1957); 
abbreviated as TE henceforth. 
156 TE, p. 44. 
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consciousness (and self-consciousness) has presupposed a "knower-known" 
relationship. This will eventually lead us to an infinite regress - a new "knower" is 
needed to be aware of the previous "knower-known" relationship, and this would 
multiply to infinity. According to Sartre's research, the problem of this Cartesian 
picture or understanding of consciousness lies in the following: it fails to notice the 
differences between cogito as the spontaneous process of consciousness, and cogito as 
157 
the object of consciousness. On the one hand, t he cogito as the spontaneous 
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process of consciousness is always that which posits or reveals an object . It is the 
percipere or the noetic side of the intentional and eidetic structure of experiences, and 
in every percipere there accompanies a non-positional or non-thetic consciousness of 
itself. On the other hand, the cogito as the object of consciousness (in BN, it is called 
the “consciousness reflected-on") is always an intentional object being posited or 
revealed. It is thus the percipi or the noematic pole of the intentional and eidetic 
I'L 
structure of experiences.159 This intentional object or percipi - i.e., the cogito as the 
object of consciousness- is what we commonly called the ego, and it is not a part of 
the structure of the spontaneous process of consciousness. That is the reason why 
Sartre says that consciousness is a field which is “impersonal; or, if you like, 
‘pre-personal,，without an /."160 
This analysis of the relation between consciousness and reflection shows that 
these two cogito (s) are totally different, as they exist with different modes of being. 
157 TE , p. 50. 
158 In fact, Sartre has alread y observed in TE that every moment of consciousness is comprised of a 
non-thetic, non-positional consciousness of itself and a thetic, positional consciousness of its objects. 
"Indeed, the existence of consciousness is an absolute because consciousness is consciousness of itself. 
This is to say that the type of existence of consciousness is to be consciousness of itself. And 
consciousness is aware of itself in so far as it is consciousness of a transcendent object ….We should 
add that this consciousness of consciousness — except in the case of reflective consciousness which we 
shall dwell latter — is not positional, which is to say that consciousness is not for itself its own object. 
Its object is by nature outside of it, and that is why consciousness posits and grasps the object in the 
same act.... We shall call such a consciousness: consciousness in the first degree, or unreflected 
consciousness." See TE, pp. 40-41. 
159 pp. 44-45. 
160 TE，p. 36. 
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His observation in TE has allowed him to carry out a more in-depth examination of 
consciousness in BN, and eventually to the discovery of the pre-reflective cogito}6^ 
To understand this, we must explicate the way how consciousness is conscious of its 
object. Sartre has provided us a detailed examination on the structure of 
consciousness: 
The immediate consciousness which I have of perceiving does not permit 
me either to judge or to will or to be ashamed. It does not know my 
perception, does not posit it; all that is of intention in my actual 
consciousness is directed towards the outside, toward the world. In turn, this 
spontaneous consciousness of my perception is constitutive of my 
perceptive consciousness. In other words, every positional consciousness of 
• • • • • • 1 f\1 an object is at the same time a non-positional consciousness of itself. 
Thus reflection has no kind of primacy over the consciousness reflected on. 
It is not reflection which reveals consciousness reflected-on to itself. Quite 
the contrary, it is the non-reflective consciousness which renders the 
reflection possible; there is a pre-reflective cogito which is the condition of 
the Cartesian cogito. At the same time it is the non-thetic consciousness of 
counting which is the very condition of my act of adding.163 
The self-consciousness we ought to consider not as a new consciousness, 
but as the only mode of existence which is possible for a consciousness of 
something}64 
Here we must elaborate the meaning of “positional” and "non-positional" 
consciousness. These words are referring to the different aspects or modes of being of 
the pure consciousness which we have previously mentioned. The word "positional" 
161 "In an article in Recherches Philosophiques I attempted to show that the Ego does not belong to the 
domain of the for itself. I shall not repeat here. Let us note only the reason for the transcendence of the 
Ego: as a unifying pole of Erlebnisse the Ego is in-itself, not for-itself.... Thus the Ego appears to 
consciousness as a transcendent in-itself, as an existent in the human world, not as of the nature of 
consciousness.”(厦’ pp. 155-156) For the relevant discussion, please refer to BN, pp. 155-158. 
162 •，p p . 12-13. 
163 BN, p. 13. 
164 BN, p. 14. 
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refers to the mode of being of consciousness when it intends or reveals its object. As 
we know, consciousness always intends or reveals its object in a thetic way, and in 
this case we can say that consciousness is "positing" an intentional object which is not 
a part of the structure of itself. On the other hand, the term “non-positional” denotes 
the mode of being of consciousness when it is conscious of or revealing itself not as 
an intentional object, but as that - as a spontaneous process’ or an intentional act -
which intends or reveals its object.165 In this case, consciousness is not intending or 
revealing itself in a thetic way - as in the case of reflection or reflective thinking — but 
it is revealing itself in a non-thetic and pre-reflective way. 
How is this pre-reflective cogito or consciousness possible? As we can see, every 
process of consciousness is a nihilation. This feature of consciousness implies that it 
is always conscious of the being of its own and that of its object. It will be impossible 
to have any differentiation or separation if we do not have the least sense of 
consciousness or understanding of the both sides, or else it would not be a process 
which differentiates and separates the being of itself from that of its object. 
Nevertheless, Sartre tells us that although I - as a For-itself or a conscious existent — 
am conscious of myself, I am only conscious of it in a vague and average way. This 
can be illustrated in the instances of counting.166 It is for sure that in this case I am 
conscious of my own act of counting. I am conscious of the being of my own and my 
object (the cigarettes), and I am differentiating or separating the being of them. But 
throughout this whole process of counting, I am always thematizing or focusing onto 
the object which I am counting. And myself, the conscious existent who is counting, 
does not reveal itself thematically or as an object of consciousness; my consciousness 
and my act of counting is just lived through, “passed without being reflected-on" 167 
165 57V, pp. 12-13. 
166 BN, p. 13. 
167 厦，p. 13. 
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and vaguely acknowledged. This consciousness of my own act is done before I carry 
out any kind of reflection or thematic positing, and it is always presupposed or 
required by every moment of consciousness. This vague and average consciousness 
of its own being that constitutes every moment of consciousness is what Sartre calls 
the upre-reflective consciousness”，“pre-reflective cogito，，or the ‘‘consciousness (of) 
self，. 
It is important to note that neither the pre-reflective cogito nor the positional 
consciousness are new consciousnesses that are different from the spontaneous 
process of consciousness which we have previously mentioned. As we can see, every 
moment of the process of consciousness is comprised of the consciousness of itself 
and its object; it is always conscious of or nihilates the being of its own and its object. 
It means that every spontaneous process of consciousness is simultaneously the 
non-positional, pre-reflective consciousness of itself, and the positional, thetic 
consciousness of its intentional object. The pre-reflective cogito and positional 
consciousness are reciprocal and interdependent, and they are just the different 
aspects or constitutive parts of one and the same process: the spontaneous process of 
consciousness. This also explains why Sartre describes the conscious existent as 
"For-itself: a For-itself is always intentionally relating all things — pre-reflectively 
and averagely — to and for itself in every single moment of its being.168 In a word, 
they are the essential structure or the way every consciousness of an object is enacted. 
168 Contraril y, the In-itself is so named because it lacks the kind of intentional spontaneity that is found 
in the For-itself. As Catalan�says, Sartre is trying to "draw our attention to the absolute unity that 
things have with themselves.’，(p. 45). In my opinion, what Sartre wants to depict is the intentional 
"inertness" or "passivity" of this existent. For example, an In-itself is an existent which does not 
intentionally relate itself to other existent; it does not intentionally go "outside of itself', and it does not 
ontologically differentiate and separate its being with that of other existents. In this way, we can say 
that this existent - in a metaphorically way — is one that remains "intact", and exists solely "in its own 
self'. Upon these considerations, it will be appropriate for Sartre to name this region of existents as the 
In-itself. For the relevant discussions of the naming of these two regions of being, see Catalano, Joseph 
S.，A Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), p. 
43，45-46. 
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The above analysis should have illustrated the meaning of nothingness. It has 
also elucidated and the basic structure of consciousness (or For-itself) from the 
dimension of nothingness. Nevertheless, we should not forget that the For-itself is an 
existent which is always conscious of, understands the being of, or nihilates its object. 
It indicates that the For-itself is always relative or correlated to the In-itself, and an 
examining of the In-itself would be inevitable if we want to discern the meaning of 
For-itself completely. 
§3.3 Being-in-itself as transcendent object 
Our analysis in Section 3.1 has shown the In-itself refers to a region of existent 
which exist in a totally different way - or mode of being - from the For-itself. It is 
clear that this distinction carries both the eidetic and ontological implications, and it 
implies that the concept of In-itself can also be assessed from both of these 
dimensions. To consider from an eidetic dimension, the concept of In-itself refers to 
the existent which exists as the intentional object of consciousness; it belongs to the 
noematic pole or the percipi side within the intentional and eidetic structure. And to 
consider from an ontological point of view, the concept designates the existent which 
is without any understanding of the being of its own and other existents, and hence the 
In-itself would never be able to raise any questioning about the meaning of being. 
However, haven't we just disclosed that there is always a mist of nothingness which 
surrounds the existents in the world? It reveals that, similar to the case of the 
For-itself or consciousness, it will be insufficient to comprehend the In-itself just from 
the eidetic and ontological points of view; we must re-understand In-itself from the 
dimension of nothingness as well. 
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3.3.1 The transcendent obiect and its transphenomenality 
In order to understand the In-itself from the dimension of nothingness, it will be 
necessary to inquire into the meaning and origin of nothingness in the first place. The 
analysis in Section 3.2 has shown the For-itself is an existent which nihilates the 
being of its own and its object, and it is the way how nothingness is introduced into 
the world. Moreover, we have also revealed that every process of nihilation is 
intentional, and it means that every process of nihilation must presuppose the structure 
of that which nihilates and that which is nihilated. If the For-itself is an existent which 
nihilates - differentiates and separates the being of - itself and its object, then the 
In-itself would be the existent which is always nihilated by existent other then itself. 
However, what exactly does it mean by "to be nihilated"? This can be shown from the 
following paragraphs: 
Let us note first that there is a being of the thing perceived — as perceived. 
Even if I wished to reduce this table to a synthesis of subjective impressions, 
I must at least remark that it reveals \isQ\f qua table through this synthesis, 
that it is the transcendent limit of the synthesis, the reason for it and its end. 
The table is before knowledge and can not be identified with the knowledge 
which we have of it; otherwise it would be consciousness - i.e., pure 
immanence - and it would disappear as table.169 
To say that consciousness is consciousness of something is to say that it 
must produce itself as a revealed-revelation of a being which is not it and 
• • 170 
which gives itself as already existing when consciousness reveal it. 
The For-itself is the existent which spontaneously differentiates and separates the 
being of its own and its object. Correspondingly, the In-itself is the existent which is 
being differentiated and separated away from that of the For-itself. It follows that 
the In-itself is never a part of the consciousness; it is always “outside •，consciousness. 
169 BN, p. 18. 
170 BN, p. 24. 
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The feature of “outside” can be understood in the following two senses. First of all, 
this “outsidedness” can be considered from the perspective of intentional and eidetic 
analysis. We can see that the In-itself is always the percipi, the synthetic ideal unity or 
the noematic pole which stands over and remains unchanged as the stream of 
experience - i.e., consciousness — flows. It shows that the In-itself is always revealed 
as that which is given. Such a characteristic of the In-itself implies that even though it 
is that which is revealed, it has its own way of revelation, e.g., in a perspectival or 
adumbrated way while preserving an unity along time. The In-itself is neither a part of 
the constitutive structure nor the inherent content of consciousness, and it is thus said 
to be “outside” of consciousness. Second, the “outsidedness” of the In-itself can be 
understood from an ontological point of view. Just now we pointed out that the 
In-itself is the existent which is without any understanding of being, and it is always 
that which is revealed by the For-itself. From the first person point of view of the 
For-itself, the In-itself is always disclosed as that which is already "out there ” in the 
world. The In-itself is always revealed first of all as the instrument which is either in 
I' 
front of me or over there; they are existent which is not me, but for me. These 
characteristics of "outside" is that which defines the being of the In-itself, and it is the 
limit or boundary that distinguishes and separates these two regions of existents. To be 
an In-itself means to exist as that which is not and “outside “ (in the two 
aforementioned senses) of the For-itself. This is the reason why Sartre always calls the 
In-itself as the transcendent or the transcendent object. 
There is another reason why the In-itself is called the transcendent object. The 
In-itself in not only an existent which is "outside" the For-itself, but is also an existent 
which can never be exhausted by the For-itself or consciousness. We can still 
remember that the In-itself, as the percipi, is always revealed in a perspectival or 
adumbrated way, and its unique mode of being has implied the following 
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"inexhaustibility"171 or what Sartre calls the character of Transcendence172'. 
If the phenomenon is to reveal itself as transcendent, it is necessary that the 
subject himself transcend the appearance toward the total series of which it 
is a member... Thus the appearance, which is finite, indicates itself in its 
finitude, but at the same time in order to be grasped as an 
appearance-of-that-which-appears, it requires that it to be surpassed toward 
infinity...Similarly a certain “potency” returns to inhabit the phenomenon 
and confer on it its very transcendence - a potency to be developed in a 
series of real or possible appearances.173 
We must understand that the intentions aim at appearances which are never 
to be given at one time. It is an impossibility on principle for the terms of an 
infinite series to exist all at the same time before consciousness... Thus the 
being of the object is pure non-being. It is defined as a lack. It is that which 
escapes, that which by definition will never be given, that which offers itself 
only in fleeting and successive profiles.174 
Let us be reminded that every In-itself must be revealed as the percipi, which 
, ：丨 
means that it would manifest itself as the totality of its Abschattungen and its 
synthetic ideal unity. This mode of being or revelation of the In-itself implies that the 
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In-itself is always “the infinite in the finite". On the one hand, the In-itself is 
"infinite". It is not difficult to conceive that, as an object of consciousness, an In-itself 
is possible to be approached in various perspectives or orientations (e.g., its front or 
171 BN,p. 6. 
172 We should be careful that in BN the term "transcendence" has two different usages, and they are 
referring to two different characteristics of being which belongs to the For-itself and the In-itself 
respectively. On the one hand, the term is used to mean that an existent always exists as that which is 
nihilated and "outside" consciousness. In these cases, the term "transcendence" is denoting the mode of 
being of the In-itself or the intentional and eidetic structure of the percipi (as in the case when Sartre 
mentions the "Transcendence" of the ego). However, the term is also used to describe the mode of 
being or the ekstasis of the For-itself. In these circumstances, the term "transcendence" is expressing 
the feature that the For-itself is always escaping from its factical situation and surpassing itself towards 
the future. We should be care that what we mean by "transcendence" here in this chapter is the "mode 
of being of the In-itself', and the character of "transcendence" as "the mode of being or ekstasis of the 
For-itself' would be discussed in the next chapter of this thesis. 
m BN 6. 
174 浙，p. 22. 
175 BN,p. 6. 
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rear sides), by different For-itself (e.g., you and me, and anyone in this world), and at 
any moment in the coming future (e.g., this moment, the next minute, or tomorrow). 
All these suggest that an In-itself is not only made up of the Abschattungen that is 
already manifested; it also includes an infinite number of possible or potential 
Abschattungen that is currently absent or not yet revealed, and this is the reason why 
Sartre would say that nothingness is a part of the essential constitution of the In-itself. 
But besides this feature of “infinity”，the In-itself would also manifest to us its 
"finitude". It is true that an In-itself possesses an infinite number of Abschattungen. 
Yet it is also true that these Abschattungen of the existent - no matter those that are 
already shown or those that are not yet but possible to show — will not be given to us 
altogether in one single moment. Every In-itself manifests itself in a perspectival 
manner, and it will only show us one of its Abschattungen at each single moment. 
This perspectival or adumbrated way of being of the In-itself implies that there is 
perpetually something more than any particular moment or grasp of consciousness, 
and it indicates that we will never be able to exhaust an In-itself or a phenomenon. In 
this sense, the In-itself always transcends or even "escape" from the grasp of 
consciousness, and its being — i.e., its synthetic ideal unity and all of its 
Abschattungen — can never be exhausted by any particular moment of consciousness. 
This is the second reason why the In-itself would be called the transcendent or 
transcendent object. 
3.3.2 World and instrumentality 
We should be careful that the In-itself is not solely a transcendent - e.g., it is 
outside of the consciousness. As that which is nihilated (by the For-itself), the In-itself 
is always revealed as an existent which is out there in the world. It indicates that this 
feature of^out there in the world" is a result of being nihilated, and it is thus a part of 
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the essential constitution of the In-itself that needs to be examined. 
Every one of us should agree that an existent must be an existent within the 
world. However, ordinary people will easily arrive and stop at the following opinion: 
to exist “within the world" simply means to exist in an objectively and exteriorly 
spatial way, or to exist with corporeal and spatial extension. In another word, an 
existent "within the world" is characterized by being a purely physical or corporeal 
existent. We can notice that this ordinary understanding of existent has presupposed a 
notion of “world，’. Under this presupposition, the world is comprehended as the 
empty spatial void which is possible for the physical and corporeal existents to exist. 
Nevertheless, these are merely conceptions which come from the perspective of the 
natural sciences. According to this point of view, both the existent and the world are 
considered as neutral substances. It does not mean that they are revealed without 
prejudice, but merely signifies that they are not invested with any sort of value. This 
observation is contrary the descriptions obtained from a phenomenological 
perspective. In his analysis of the Worldhood of the world, Heidegger tells us that all 
entities within the world are primarily revealed, in the average everydayness of 
Dasein16, as “Things’，which are "invested with values".177 This “Thinghood，’ or the 
value of Things is not simply the essences or factual attributes of them, but is the 
unique mode of Being of those entities which the Dasein encounters in its everyday 
world: it is the way in which the now-Dasein entities exist in the world. 
The observation of Heidegger is also applicable to the case of the In-itself. Every 
In-itself is revealed as an existent within the world through and in the everyday being 
of us, the For-itself. It implies that the characteristic of “within the world" of the 
In-itself can only be explicated by examining the way how it shows itself in our 
176 BT 43-44 
177 BT 63 
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everyday being. How does the In-itself shows itself in our experiences of everyday 
being? And what sort of value does the In-itself show us? Sartre has provided us the 
answer through the example of writing: 
In the act of tracing the letters which I am writing, the whole sentence, still 
unachieved, is revealed as a passive exigency to be written. . . .At the same 
time in the very framework of the act an indicative complex of instruments 
reveals itself and organizes itself (pen-ink-paper-lines-margin, etc.)... Thus 
in the quasi-generality of everyday acts, I am engaged, I have ventured, and 
I discover my possibilities by realizing them and in the very act of realizing 
them as exigencies, urgencies, instrumentalities.178 
The description here has accurately depicted the essential constitution and 
structure of our everyday being. It reminds us that the acts we perform in our 
everyday being are never done in a disinterested or neutral way. We can always find 
that we are engaged or involved in the exigencies and urgencies of different tasks and 
I 
projects. These tasks and projects never reveal themselves in an individual or discrete 
manner. Instead, all these human tasks and projects are mutually referring to and 
indicating each other, and they are interwoven to form a huge complex of indicative 
relations. For example, a pen would always show itself as that which is related to the 
act of writing, and it would also show itself as the existent which puts “ink” in 
between the "line" and "margins" of the "paper". Moreover, the act of writing would 
be further related to some other tasks — let say, to write a letter to my friend, or an 
article that is going to be read out at a press conference. It means that we, the 
For-itself, are always involved and engaged in an indicative complex or a relational 
totality which is composed by various tasks and projects. Thus, the "world" should 
neither be understood as the totality of existents, nor the realm (or empty spatial void) 
which encompasses the multiplicity of these existents. As Heidegger says, the world is 
178 BN，p. 74. 
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the ultimate relational (or referential) totality of concernful dealings, significances 
j n Q 
and involvements. And it is for sure that this system of relations is built up by the 
purposive activities of our human tasks. 
The preceding reflections show that the world is not the empty spatial void where 
the purely physical and corporeal existents exist. In our everyday being, the world 
always reveals itself as a relational totality composed by human tasks and projects, 
and we should now be able to understand what does it mean by an In-itself to exist 
“within the world'. Obviously, this relation of within the world is primarily not an 
objectively and exteriorly spatial relationship. The understanding which considers 
“world” primarily as a physical void is resulted from the reduction or experimental 
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procedure of the scientists (and their scientific perspective) ，but not originated from 
the everyday being of us, the For-itself. At this moment, we should agree that, for an 
In-itself, "to exist within the world" means the same as to exist ‘‘within “ the 
indicative complex, the relational totality of human tasks and projects'. 
...[T]his world is a world of tasks. In relation to the tasks, the this which 
they indicate is both “the this of these tasks"一that is, the unique in-itself 
which is determined by them and which they indicate as being able to fulfill 
them——and that which does not have to be these tasks since it exists in the 
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absolute unity of identity. 
The thing, in so far as it both rests in the quiet beatitude of indifference and 
yet points beyond it to tasks to be performed which make know to it what it 
has to be, is an instrument or utensil. The original relations between things, 
that which appears on the foundation of the quantitative relation of the 
182 
thises, is the relation of instrumentality. 
The thing is not first a thing in order to be subsequently an instrument; 
179 BT 86-87. 
180 BN,p. 275. 
181 厦，p. 274. 
182 BN,p. 274. 97 
neither is it first an instrument in order to be revealed subsequently as a 
thing. It is an instrumental-thing.183 
The In-itself are always posited or revealed by us as a part of the indicative 
complex of human tasks. Here, we can see that the In-itself - i.e., the existents “in the 
world" — is related to the indicative complex of human tasks — i.e., the world - in a 
reciprocal way. The In-itself is always understood within this indicative complex of 
human tasks, and shows itself as apart of this indicative complex. For example, a pen 
will always reveal itself with reference to the human act of "writing", and it can only 
- ,:1 
be understood within the context of the human act of "writing". Meanwhile, the 
In-itself would always reveal itself as that which points towards and helps to fulfill 
specific human tasks. For instance, a "pen" (or any tools that serves the same function 
as a pen) would always show itself as that which helps to achieve or fulfill the human 
task of "writing". Our observation here has disclosed the following thing: the In-itself, 
I 
as the existent within the world, always manifests itself as the tool or instrument that 
serves for different human tasks or projects. It does not mean that the In-itself is 
something which exists as a purely physical or corporeal "thing" in the first place, and 
latter acquire its essence of being an ‘‘instrument’，. Instead, the In-itself is always the 
existent which, in its being, exists as the uinstrumental-thing " or an existent as 
instrument that fulfills different human tasks. It means that this characteristic of "to 
exist as instrument" - or instrumentality — is the mode of being of the In-itself. 
We should now be familiar with the meaning and relation between the For-itself 
and In-itself. These concepts are not merely descriptions and differentiations that are 
made according to the eidetic and ontological structure of the existents; more 
183 57V, pp. 274-275. 
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importantly, they are observations made from the dimension of nothingness. We can 
see that that For-itself is the existent which differentiates or separates the being of 
itself from that of its object, while In-itself is the intentional object which exists 
"outside" consciousness and “within the world" as instruments. These observations 
should be sufficient to show that they are referring to two different but correlated 
regions of existent. Nevertheless, our analysis of the In-itself has brought us with 
another crucial problem. If the In-itself is revealed or understood by the For-itself as 
that which is situated in the indicative complex or relational totality made up of values, 
tasks and projects - i.e., the world - , then where does this "indicative complex" or 
"relational totality" of "values, tasks and projects" come from? If these are results of 
the nihilation or the being of For-itself, then what would be the relation between this 
"indicative complex of values, tasks and projects" and the For-itself? And we must 
not forget that what Sartre wants to inquire in BN is the "origin and nature of value". 
So what is the linkage between the projection of value, the world, and the being of the 
For-itself? All these can only be answered by explicating the various aspects or 
expressions of the being of the For-itself — i.e., its ekstases of Facticity, 
Transcendence and Temporality. 
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Chapter 4 
Human ekstasis: Facticity, Transcendence and 
Temporality 
§ 4.1 From nihilation to human ekstasis 
4.1.1 The under-thematized aspects of the For-itself 
From time to time, the discussions of Facticity, Transcendence and Temporality 
have rarely caught the eyes of those scholars who study BN. It is not difficult to find 
that most of the them do not pay much attention to these three ekstases of the human 
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reality or For-itself. The case here can be explained by the following two reasons. 
Firstly, we can notice that the discussions of these ekstases are originated from the 
phenomenology of Heidegger. For instance, the term Facticity, Transcendence and 
Temporality are used by Heidegger to designate the essential constitution of Dasein. 
He has also spent great efforts and length in examining the meaning of these 
constitutive elements of Dasein. Such an inquiry by Heidegger has cast a shadow on 
the project of Sartre, as it has given us the impression - or even leads us to the 
assertion — that Sartre is just repeating the observations of his phenomenological 
predecessor. Secondly, it seems that these ekstases are rarely mentioned in other parts 
of BN. The discussions of these human ekstases look like something that is irrelevant 
to other central themes in BN (like bad faith, being-for-others and freedom); at least it 
appears that the rest of the discussions in BN cm be carried out and understood 
184 For example, we cannot find any thematic discussions about these human ekstases from most of the 
Sartrean scholars in the English world. Hazel E. Barnes, Peter Caws, Gary Cox, Arther C. Danto, David 
Detmer, Christian Howells and Mary Warnock have considered the discussions of these ekstases in BN 
as simple adoptions of themes and concepts from the Dasein analysis in BT. Barnes, Cox, Detmer and 
Warnock have spent extra efforts in examining the ekstases of Facticity and Transcendence in a number 
of their books, particularly when they are studying the concept of value in BN. However, their 
discussions on these human ekstases are relatively brief (comparing to the length and effort they have 
devoted to other parts of their discussions), and these discussions are usually subordinated to the 
questioning of "the possibility of an existentialist ethics". The relation between these three ekstases and 
the ontology of For-itself are thus under-thematized in the studies of the aforementioned scholars. 
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independent of that of the human ekstases. 
These are reasons why most Sartrean scholars in the English speaking world are 
not interested in Sartre's examination of human ekstases. Nevertheless, it is necessary 
to point out that these scholars have, to a very large extent, under-evaluated the 
significance and novelty of Sartre's examination. The aforementioned accusations can 
be dismissed easily by performing a closer study of BN. First of all, it is true that the 
analysis of human ekstases in BNhdiS largely assimilated the results of the Dasein 
analysis which Heidegger undertakes in BT. However, our preceding analysis in 
Chapter two has already shown that the inquiry in BN is conducted out of an 
anthropological-ethical concern, and it is totally different from the pursuit of 
fundamental ontology of Heidegger. Instead of disclosing the structure of Dasein — 
which is an entity that exists in its understanding of Being — Sartre wants to 
demonstrate the linkage between the being of human reality and its own value, and it 
is exactly through the examination of the human ekstases that Sartre shows us their 
relationship: human reality (or the For-itself) is an existent which, in its being, 
projects and surpasses towards its own value. This is an aspect of the being of human 
reality or Dasein which Heidegger did not emphasize. Moreover, Sartre's examination 
of the human ekstases is not a task that is irrelevant or redundant to other parts of BN. 
In our upcoming analysis, we will see that the human ekstases of Facticity and 
Transcendence are closely related to the choice and action of human reality, and it is 
the examinations of these ekstases which disclose the fact that the Transcendence and 
choice of human reality has already implied human freedom. The analysis in Chapter 
5 will further show that the phenomenon of bad faith is grounded in the ekstases of 
human reality. As we will see, self-deception is resulted when we try to disintegrate 
the unity within our own ekstases of being, and consider our own Facticity, 
Transcendence and Temporality in an independent or separated way. Hence, the 
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discussions of bad faith and freedom must presuppose the discovery and explication 
of the human ekstases. Upon these considerations, it will be necessary for us to revise 
the examination of human ekstases in BN with reference to Sartre ’s 
anthropological-ethical concern. It means that we should examine the relation 
between the three human ekstases - especially the ekstasis of Transcendence - and the 
projection oi value that is carried through in the being of human reality. 
4.1.2 The inadequacy of our preceding analysis 
I have anticipated, at the end of Chapter 3, that our analysis of For-itself is still 
inadequate to reveal the complete structure of this existent, and a further examination 
of its ekstases will be required. It is obvious that we are deeply interested in finding 
out the meanings of these human ekstases, and we can foresee that they will become 
the central themes of the analysis in this chapter. However, we are still unprepared to 
examine the meanings of them. Before looking at the meanings of these three human 
ekstases, it will be necessary to revise our foregoing analysis of the For-itself, and to 
find out in what way it is still "inadequate". 
Our previous analysis has demonstrated the meaning and relation between the 
For-itself and In-itself. Generally speaking, we can say that the For-itself is the 
existent which nihilates - i.e., which differentiates and separates the being of — itself 
and its object, and the In-itself is the existent which is always nihilated by the 
For-itself. Such an observation indicates that these existents are correlated in the way 
of "nihilates - nihilated", and it implies that we have eventually discovered the way to 
inspect and express the being of existents from the dimension of nothingness. 
Nevertheless, these observations are still insufficient to tell us the following two 
things. First of all, the description that the For-itself and In-itself are correlated as 
“nihilates - nihilated" is just a very formal and abstract one. It fails to articulate the 
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specific aspects or expressions of the process of nihilation, and it is far from telling us 
how the For-itself experiences or exists in its everyday being - i.e., how it experiences 
or exists "concretely" and "really" “in this world: But this is not the only inadequacy 
of our previous observations. As we can see, the process of nihilation of the For-itself 
is exactly the eidetic or ontological structure of this very existent. However, what is 
the linkage between this eidetic and ontological structure of the For-itself and the 
projection of value that is found in the being of this existent? Here we must admit that 
our preceding analysis of the For-itself and In-itself is still insufficient to exhibit that 
the origin of value is grounded in the being of the For-itself, and value is introduced 
or “projected" into the world through the being of this unique existent. 
It is in these senses that our previous analysis is still "inadequate". Fortunately, 
our preceding analysis of In-itself has shed light on our current problem. This analysis 
tells us that the In-itself is not merely the transcendent object that is "outside" 
consciousness, but is also that which is revealed within the indicative complex of 
u world", and helps us to achieve various human tasks and projects. This discovery is 
no more than saying that the In-itself, as the existent which is nihilated, always 
manifests itself as uinstrumental-thing " or instruments in our concrete experiences of 
everyday being. On the one hand, this result of analysis gives us half of the answer to 
our previous question, as it has told us how the In-itself appears or exists in our 
concrete experiences of everyday life. On the other hand, it provides us with the clue 
and direction for our further examination of the For-itself. The In-itself always exists 
as instrument which emerges within the indicative complex of values, tasks and 
projects, and it is the concrete and specific way in which the In-itself is nihilated by 
the For-itself. If this is the case, then what would be the relation between the 
“indicative complex of values, tasks and projects" of "world" and the being (or 
nihilation) of the For-itself? Here we may further expand our inquiry of the For-itself 
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in accordance with the following three interrelated questions: 
(1) What role or place does the For-itself occupies in the indicative complex of 
“world?? 
(2) What does it mean to the For-itself to have its own values/tasks/projects? 
(3) In virtue of what temporal characteristic is the For-itself able to have a world 
and its own values/ tasks/ projects? 
These questions are raised in accordance with the human ekstases of Facticity, 
Transcendence and Temporality respectively. At this point, we should be able to see 
the linkage between our preceding analysis and our current investigation. Let us begin 
our inquiry by looking at the basic meaning of the term “ekstasis”. 
4.1.3 The phenomenological concept of human ekstasis 
The term “ecstasis” or "ekstasis" is originated in Ancient Greek. At that time, the 
word EKoxaoK； is used by the Greeks to signify the standing out, displacement or 
removal of something. Heidegger reserves the root meaning of the word, and 
transforms it into a philosophical term for his phenomenology. In BT, the term 
‘‘existential ekstasis” is used to denote the "the phenomena of the future, the character 
of having been, and the Present" - i.e., three dimensions of the temporality — of 
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Dasein. Sartre adopts the basic meaning of the term from Heidegger's 
phenomenology, and further reinterprets the concept with his own philosophical 
thoughts. What does the term ekstasis mean in the context of BN? The following 
sentence gives us the hint: 
We find ourselves then in the presence of two human ekstases: the ekstasis 
which throws us into being-in-itself and the ekstasis which engages us in 
185 See BT 329 and its footnote. 
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non-being.186 
This sentence is found after Sartre has finished his examinations of the 
nothingness or the nihilation of the For-itself. The "ekstasis" of the For-itself "throws 
us into being-in-itself’ — which is the existent nihilated by the For-itself- and 
‘‘engages us in non-being" 一 where this non-being is always originated in the being of 
the For-itself. It shows that the term "ekstasis" is not solely restricted to mean the 
Temporality of Dasein or For-itself. Instead, it refers to all those specific expressions, 
aspects or ways which the nihilation of the For-itself accomplishes; in other words, it 
designates the different processes or dimensions of the ‘‘standing out”’ "removal" 
and “displacement” that are found in the being of the For-itself. On the one hand, the 
Facticity of the For-itself is exactly the ekstasis which compels it to encounter and get 
involved in those existents which are not itself- e.g., the indicative complex of 
In-itself. On the other hand, the Transcendence of the For-itself is the ekstasis which 
engages it in the non-being of its own -e.g., its own possibilities, values and future. 
And the Temporality of the For-itself is the ekstasis which both separates and unifies 
these expressions of nihilation - e.g., to ascribe the temporal dimensions of Past, 
Present and Future onto the same For-itself. 
We are now clear about the basic meaning of human ekstases, and also the 
general relation between the three ekstases of Facticity, Transcendence and 
Temporality. It is the time for us to explicate them one by one. Let us, first of all, 
examine the relation between the For-itself and the indicative complex where it is 
found, and try to figure out the meaning of its Facticity. 
186 厦，p. 83. 
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§4.2 The human ekstasis (1): Facticity 
4.2.1 The For-itself and its pre-destined situation 
The term Facticity (Faktizitat) is originated in the phenomenology of Heidegger. 
As we can see, this term is derived from a very simply and common word - fact 
1 0*7 
(faktisch; Faktum). In our daily usage, the word "fact" is used to indicate those 
states of affairs or entities that are already in its case. Thus, the word "fact" always 
implies that something is already determined, and thus in some way unalterable. 
These implications have disclosed an important aspect of the term “Facticity”. In BT, 
the term "Facticity" is used to denote one of the aspects or characteristics of Dasein's 
existence: Dasein is always bound up with the existence of other entities in a 
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“destined’’ way. It indicates that Dasein is the entity which always exists in relation 
to entities other than itself. It is important to note that this is a description of the mode 
of Being of Dasein. It indicates that Dasein is not something that "first" exists as an 
independent or solipsistic existent, and “latter’’ establishes its relation with other 
entities. To exist as Dasein always means that it necessarily exists in relation to other 
entities in a pre-determined way. 
Sartre also admits that Facticity is one of the ekstasis of the For-itself. In the 
section “The Facticity of the For-itself'189, Sartre says: 
The for-itself is, in so far as it appears in a condition which it has not 
chosen... it is in so far as it is thrown into a world and abandoned in a 
187 The noun Faktizitat is a philosophical term derived from the noun Faktum and the adjective (or 
adverb) faktisch. As the translators of BT says, the term faktisch "can often be translated simply as 'in 
fact' or 'as a matter of facV\BTl,ftn.2). However, the translators want to emphasis the philosophical 
implications carried by the term faktisch and its noun form Faktizitat, and they eventually decided to 
render the two German terms as "factical" and "facticity" respectively. 
188 bt 55 丁here Heidegger says, "Whenever Dasein is, it is as a Fact; and the factuality of such a Fact 
is what we shall call Dasein's "facticity". This is a definite way of Being [Seinsbestimmtheit], and it has 
a complicated structure which cannot even be grasped as a problem until Dasein's basic existential 
states have been worked out. The concept of "facticity" implies that an entity 'within-the-world' has 
Being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its 'destiny' with the 
Being of those entities which it encounters within its own world." 
m BN, p. 127. 
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"situation".190 
The concrete consciousness arises in situation, and it is a unique, 
individualized consciousness of this situation and (of) itself in situation.191 
The term “Facticity，, refers to the characteristics which the For-itself is always 
existing - or engaged - in a determined or destined network of existents. This 
"network of existents" is what Sartre calls “situation”. We should be careful about the 
specific philosophical meaning of the term. In this context, "situation" does not 
simply signify the totality or aggregation of existents, events or states of affairs, but it 
also includes the specific orderings or relations among the existents. Therefore, we 
should not understand the term in its ordinary sense, but should consider it as an 
expression of the eidetic or ontological structure of the world: it refers to the 
indicative complex of human tasks and projects where the In-itself (as instrument) 
emerges, and also where we as the For-itself are situated in. In another word, it is not 
saying about the what of our surrounding world, but is revealing the how or the 
relations between different existents. 
It will be necessary for us to elaborate the determined or destined aspects of the 
being of For-itself. The determined or destined aspects of its being can be traced back 
to its relation with the In-itself. In the previous analysis, I have shown that the In-itself 
is always the existent that is nihilated by the For-itself. It indicates that the In-itself 
always exists as transcendent object that is "outside" consciousness, and as that which 
is given to the For-itself. If what we mean by "world" or "situation" is the indicative 
complex that underlies the In-itself, then certainly this indicative complex would 
reveal itself to the For-itself — together with the In-itself- as an overall and general 
givenness. The case here necessarily implies the following two things. On the one 
190 BN, p. 127. 
191 BN,p. 141. 
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hand, the world or the situation of For-itself always reveals itself as that which is 
given, already established and existed prior to our choices and modifications. For 
example, the In-itself or the instruments are revealed as already present or absent 
before we can utilize it, and the world is revealed as already existing and 
well-established before we can respond to or modify it. It means that a situation is 
always that which is not determined or chosen by the For-itself. On the other hand, a 
For-itself can never exist as an independent or solipsistic existent without its world, its 
situation, or other In-itself, but is always bound to its factical situation (let us recall 
that the For-itself and In-itself are relative and reciprocal existents, and it is 
impossible for them to exist independently of one another). Thus, the Facticity of the 
For-itself is not a result of its own will or choice, but is the way in which the For-itself 
exists. It follows that a For-itself can never choose to be related with other existents or 
not, as it is always a For-itself that is related to other existents or in a situation., it is 
even incapable to choose which existent to relate to, or the specific way to relate to 
them. For example, a human being is "determined" or ‘‘destined” to relate to the 
specific world in which we are, but not other possible worlds; and it must relate to the 
existents in the world in, let's say, a certain corporeal way. As a result, every 
For-itself must exist as a For-itself in its particular situation that is given. This is 
the reason why Sartre has described the being of For-itself as "thrown" and 
"abandoned" in its situation. 
4.2.2 The engagement in projects, tasks and instruments 
We have shown that the For-itself is always bound to its situation, but we have 
not yet clarified the concrete way which the For-itself is “in the world' or “in its 
situation”. We find, in the preceding analysis, that the In-itself always exists within 
the world-ox the indicative complex of human tasks and projects — as an instrument. 
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So what is the relation between the For-itself, the In-itself as instruments, and the 
indicative complex of the world? We can find the answer in the descriptions of our 
everyday being below: 
In order for the totality of being to order itself around us as instruments, in 
order for it to parcel itself into differentiated complexes which refer one to 
another and which can be used, it is necessary that negation rise up not as a 
thing among other things but as the rubric of a category which presides over 
the arrangement and the redistribution of great masses of being in things. 
Thus the rise of man in the midst of the being which "invest" him causes a 
1 Q9 
world to be discovered. 
For human reality, being-in-the-world means radically to lose oneself in the 
world through the very revelation which causes there to be a world——that is, 
to be referred without respite, without even the possibility of "a purpose for 
which" from instrument to instrument with no recourse save the reflective 
revolution. It would be useless to object that the chain of "for whats" is 
1 QO 
suspended from the "for whoms" (Worumwillen). 
These paragraphs show that the For-itself is an existent which always exists in 
the way of being-in-the-world (In-der- Welt-sein)}9A This mode of being of the 
For-itself can be understood from two aspects. First of all, the world is not simply the 
empty void where the physical or corporeal existents exist, but is always primarily 
revealed as the indicative complex of human tasks and projects (this is a point which I 
have previously mentioned). It means that the being-in-the-world of the For-itself 
should never be apprehended as "locating in", or a spatial relationship in a physical, 
geometrical or corporeal sense195. We should also note that the For-itself never exists 
"within the world" as a transcendent and instrument, as this is the mode of being 
pertaining to the In-itself. The term being-in-the-world indicates the unique mode of 
192 厦 ’ p. 59. 
193 BN, p. 275. 
194 BN, p. 34, 50-51 
195 BT 55 
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being of the For-itself, and it means that the For-itself is always being-in this 
indicative complex. As Heidegger says, the “In” of Dasein is derived from and carries 
the meaning of “to reside" and ‘‘to dwell alongside".196 This “In” implies that the 
Dasein or For-itself is always participating into the world in a concernful way. The 
For-itself is always dealing with or handling various tasks and projects which it meets, 
and it is always dealing with them by devoting or '"investing" himself into these tasks 
and projects. What the For-itself concerns, in these cases, is the way how it can 
achieve or fulfill these tasks which it meets by utilizing the In-itself or instruments 
around him, but not to reflect or question upon the purposes and implications of these 
tasks and instruments. In other words, the For-itself is always participating “In” the 
indicative complex of human tasks and projects in a first person and pre-reflective 
manner. Thus, we can say that the For-itself is always pre-reflectively involved and 
engaged into the exigencies and urgencies of (the indicative complex of) human 
values，tasks and projects，and the readiness to make use of the In-itself to achieve 
them. 
The second aspect we should note is that there can never be a “world” outside the 
being or the nihilation of the For-itself. Our preceding analysis has shown that the 
In-itself is always that which is nihilated by the For-itself. If what Sartre means by 
"world" is the indicative complex that underlies the In-itself, then we should agree 
that the world would also exist as that which is nihilated by the For-itself. Here, we 
are not saying that the world and the In-itself is something which is freely constructed 
or created by the For-itself (as in the case of imagination). What it means is: it is the 
For-itself which posits and reveals the world as an indicative complex of human tasks 
and project. It discloses that the For-itself is an existent which, in its being, nihilates — 
i.e. to differentiate and to separate its own being from 一 the In-itself and the world 
196 BT 54 
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with reference to the values, tasks and projects of its own. On the one hand, the 
For-itself is always pre-reflectively conscious of itself as that which is not the world 
and not the instrument “to be used'; it is the one who is engaged in the indicative 
complex of tasks and projects, and ready to use the instruments for its own purposes. 
On the other hand, it is through this process of nihilation that the world is disclosed as 
the indicative complex of human tasks and projects, and the In-itself as the instrument 
which is “to be used' for these tasks. Such a reciprocal relation between the world and 
the For-itself shows that they are always existing in a relational or correlated way. It 
will be impossible for a For-itself to exist without its situation or its world; it is an 
existent which always exists in the world or in its own situation. 
4.2.3 Facticity and reality 
We can see that the For-itself is an existent which is always determined or 
destined to exist in the indicative complex of tasks and projects. This situation is not 
something which the For-itself can choose, but is always that which is given to it. 
However, we should be careful that this notion is not suggesting a "determinism" of 
human life. Our analysis in Chapter 2 has revealed that Sartre is not attempting to 
provide us a prescription or evaluation about human lives. What he does, in his 
investigation in BN, is to describe the eidetic and ontological structure of the being of 
human reality. Hence, the Facticity or the being-in-the-world of For-itself is solely a 
descriptive observation acquired from the eidetic-ontological investigation of human 
reality, and it has nothing to do with the "determinism" or similar evaluations about 
197 Jonathan Dancy has offered us a general description of what the Anglo-American philosophers 
called "determinism". As he says, "The causal determinist argues that every event and every action is 
caused by other events, and therefore that in no case is it true that we were able to act otherwise than 
we did. For what it is for one event to cause another is (or includes) that given the first event and the 
attendant circumstances, the second could not have been otherwise than it was. A free action is one 
which could in the circumstances have been otherwise than it was. So if all actions are caused, no 
action is free." See Dancy, Jonathan., Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1985), p. 201. 
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human lives - they are inquiries which belong to two complete different orders or 
categories. In spite of this, it would still be worthwhile for us to explore the relation 
between the Facticity and the acts of choices of the For-itself, and to see if Sartre is 
suggesting a so called "determinism" in any sense. The following paragraph clearly 
tells us the answer: 
This inapprehensible fact of my condition, this impalpable difference which 
distinguishes this drama of realization from drama pure and simple is what 
causes the for-itself, while choosing the meaning of its situation and while 
constituting itself as the foundation of itself in situation, not to choose its 
position. ... Without facticity consciousness could choose its attachments to 
the world in the same way as the souls in Plato's Republic choose their 
condition.198 
In fact, what we mean by reality is always that which is revealed in a factical or 
given way. The givenness of my object and situation implies that their being or 
revelation is not completely subjected to or arranged by my will, wish or intuition. For 
instance, the perspectival givenness of a phenomenal existent implies that at each 
particular moment I can only perceive one of its various sides, and it is the factical 
condition of perception which I can never change. My Facticity implies that I am 
engaged in the very situation which I am currently in, and it is impossible for me to 
alter or "choose again" all those things that have already happened and passed. 
However, it is exactly this givenness which distinguishes a subjective creatum or 
phantasm of my sheer imagination from the real presence of an object or situation. 
Only God can choose His own "situation" or the objects in the world in an infinitely 
unlimited way, but it is certainly a mode of being which does not belong to and is 
unconceivable by us. Therefore, it is my engagement in the factical or given situation 
that reveals my concretely real being in the world. It is this pre-destined “fact of my 
198 57V, pp. 131-132. 
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condition ” that distinguishes me from an imaginative world of “drama pure and 
simple ”，and in this way we can say that Facticity is the foundation of reality for both 
the being of the For-itself and In-itself. 
The above observation of Facticity does not rule out our possibilities of choices. 
On the contrary, it is within the givenness of the world and the object - i.e., this 
reality - which we make our choices. It shows that we, the For-itself, always chooses 
values or endows meanings from and within a given situation. It does not mean that 
our choices or possibilities are something false (as we cannot choose the situation 
where we are in); it only implies that we are not enjoying the kind of unlimited 
possibilities like God or in the case of imagination, and our choices must be done 
upon the given background of reality. 
We can see that Sartre has never implied a determinism of human life in his 
discussion of the Facticity of For-itself, and it means that any deterministic 
interpretation of his analysis of For-itself will certainly be an inappropriate one. All 
these types of interpretation have committed an identical mistake: they have forgotten 
that Facticity is only one of the three ekstases of For-itself, and have considered or 
understood Facticity as an ekstasis which is isolated from other of human ekstases. 
Those who understand Facticity in this way only notice the "given" or “determined” 
aspects of the being of For-itself, and overlook that the For-itself is also an existent 
which always “escapesfrom” its factical situation.199 It indicates that we should treat 
Facticity and other human ekstases as an organized unity or the different aspects of 
being of the same existent. And if we are to understand the complete meaning of the 
Facticity of For-itself, we must also explicate the very ekstasis which enables it to 
"escape from" - i.e., its ekstasis of Transcendence. 
199 BN, p. 152. 
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§4.3 Human ekstasis ⑵：Transcendence 
4.3.1 Transcendence as the ekstasis of the For-itself 
The above discussions have briefly delineated the relation between Facticity and 
Transcendence of the For-itself. As I have mentioned above, the term 
"Transcendence" is used by Sartre in two very different ways. On the one hand, the 
term refers to the mode of being of the In-itself. Our preceding analysis in Chapter 3 
has thoroughly demonstrated this characteristic of the In-itself, and we shall not repeat 
the details of that part of observation here. In short, as the existent which is nihilated 
by the For-itself, the In-itself is always revealed as that which is “not a part of，and 
"outside" consciousness. It is always that which exists at the noematic side of the 
intentional structure, and is out there as an instrument within the indicative complex 
of the world. This is the reason why Sartre calls the In-itself the transcendents or 
transcendent objects, and this feature of "outsidedness" of the In-itself as 
"Transcendence". However, we can also find that the term is having very different 
meaning in other contexts: 
Of course the fact of this presence will be the very transcendence of the 
for-itself. But it is precisely the nihilation which is the origin of 
transcendence conceived as the original bond between the for-itself and the 
in-itseli. 
What Sartre means by "Transcendence" here is not the "outsidedness" or the 
mode of being of the In-itself. In the above sentences, the term u Transcendence ” is 
clearly denoting one of the aspects or expressions of the being of the For-itself. This 
Transcendence as the mode of being of the For-itself what we are going to examine 
in this section. 
200 BN, p. 134. 
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The term Transcendence is derived from the word transcend201. In our daily 
usage, the term transcend refers to the act whereby someone “goes beyond" or 
"overpasses" the original state of its own. We should note that this action of "going 
beyond" or "overpassing" is not done in an arbitrary way or without any orientation. 
To transcend always implies that someone (or something) is surpassingyrow a 
specific point towards another specific destination. It reveals that the action of 
transcending is describing the relation between two points, levels or states. This basic 
meaning and usage of the term has reflected the most significant philosophical 
implications of the term Transcendence: 
To comprehend possibility qua possibility or to be its own possibles is one 
and the same necessity for the being such that in its being, its being is in 
question. But to be its own possibility~~that is, to be defined by it—is 
precisely to be defined by that part of itself which it is not, is to be defined 
• 202 as an escape-from-itself toward . 
The above paragraphs tell us that the For-itself is an existent which, in its being, 
is an "escape-from-itself. This characteristic of "escape" is an aspect of the nihilation 
201 In fact, H eidegger has also examined the meaning of "Transcendence" in his essay "On the Essence 
of Ground". However, he uses the term in a way that is radically different from that of Sartre. 
Heidegger uses the term to denote the state when a Dasein projects its understanding not to the entities 
in the world, but towards the wholeness or the "referential totality" of the world as a whole. It is out of 
the scope of our thesis to look at the understanding of Heidegger here in a detailed way, so I will quote 
two crucial paragraphs which reveals the way how Heidegger understands the meaning of 
"Transcendence". 
"Several points are already visible from these brief hints: (1) World refers to a "/zow" of being of beings, 
rather than to these beings themselves. (2) This "how" determines beings as a whole. In its grounds it is 
the possibility of every "how" in general as limit and measure. (3) This "how" as a whole is in a certain 
manner prior. (4) This prior "how" as a whole is itself relative to human Dasein. The world thus 
belongs precisely to human Dasein, even though it embraces in its whole all beings, including Dasein." 
(P- 112) 
"Human Dasein - a being that finds itself situated in the midst of beings, comporting itsdf towards 
beings — in so doing exists in such a way that beings are always manifest as a whole. Here it is not 
necessary that this wholeness be expressly conceptualized; its belonging to Dasein can be veiled, the 
expanse of this whole is changeable. This wholeness is understood without the whole of those beings 
that are manifest being explicitly grasped or indeed "completely" investigated in their specific 
connections, domains, and layers. Yet the understanding of this wholeness, an understanding that in 
each case reaches ahead and embraces it, is a surpassing in the direction of the world." (p. 121) 
See Heidegger, Martin, "On the Essence of Ground", Pathmarks, edited by William McNeill 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 97-135. 
202 BN, p. 152. 
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or the being of the For-itself, and it is through this characteristic which the For-itself 
comprehends and lives through “its own possibility". There are two sets of questions 
which arise from this understanding of Transcendence. Firstly, this characteristic of 
“escape’’ implies that a For-itself is an existent which, in a certain way, leaves behind 
itself, and surpasses towards something other than itself. How should we understand 
this process oi^leaving behind" and “surpassing towards "7 What are the "starting 
point" and the "destination" of this process? Second, as the above paragraph suggests, 
this process of “escape from itself towards " is exactly the way how the For-itself 
obtains or exists in its own possibilities. So what is the relation between this "escape 
from itself towards " and the possibilities of the For-itself? And what is the 
relation between its ekstasis of Transcendence and the value of its being? 
4.3.2 Transcendence as projection and surpassing 
To start with, we must refer back to the ontological structure of care {Sorge) of 
Dasein that is discovered by Heidegger. As he says, Dasein is always engaged, in its 
everyday Being, in a world of dealings (Umgang) . It is always busying and 
concerning with different tasks and projects, and is always involved in the referential 
totality that underlies them. Dasein will find that the entities around it would appear 
themselves as equipments which can be utilized " in-order-to (uetwas um-zu …” )2M 
serve for different tasks; it will also find that the projects or tasks which it is going to 
achieve would appear themselves as the “towards-which” or the goals towards which 
these equipments are serving for. The everyday Being of Dasein precisely reveals that 
it is an entity which is always "beyond" and "ahead of’ itself: 
The possibility of this entity's Being-a-whole is manifestly inconsistent with 
203 BT 66 
204 BT 68 
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the ontological meaning of care, and care is that which forms the totality of 
Dasein's structural whole... The ‘ahead-of-itself,, as an item in the structure 
of care, tells us unambiguously that in Dasein there is always something still 
outstanding, which, as a potentiality-for-Being for Dasein itself, has not yet 
become 'actual'. It is essential to the basic constitution of Dasein that there 
is constantly something still to be settled [eine standige 
Unabgeschlossenheit]. Such a lack of totality signifies that there is 
• • • • 90S 
something still outstanding in one's potentiality-for-Being. 
The "not-yet" which belongs to Dasein, however, is not just something 
which is provisionally and occasionally inaccessible to one's own 
experience or even to that of a stranger; it 4is' not yet 'actual' at all.... 
• • • 206 Dasein must, as itself, become — that is to say, be — what it is not yet. 
The above paragraph shows that Dasein is an entity which, in its Being, always 
projects a part of "itself ' which is yet to become. This mode of Being of Dasein 
signifies that it is never an existent that is just confined to its current and momentary 
Being: Dasein is always something “more than" what it presently is, and it always 
exists with a part of itself which is “not yet become ‘actual，” and “still to be settled'. 
This characteristic of Dasein does not mean that it would be replaced by another new 
existent in this process of becoming; it is not the case like when we change our old 
houses or clothes with a new one. What Heidegger means by “become” is that the 
Dasein will eventually turn into and exist as the part of "itself' which is yet to 
become. Thus, the relationship of becoming is not a relation between two different 
entities; it is a matter about how one and the same Dasein relates the different 
aspects or expressions of its own Being together. Such a characteristic or mode of 
Being of Dasein grants it the possibility to understand the equipments it encounters 
and the tasks or projects which it is going to achieve. For example, equipments are the 
entities which Dasein utilizes to achieve something which is not yet, and tasks or 
205 BT 236 
206 B T 243 
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projects are that which will be achieved through the becoming of the Dasein - i.e., 
through turning itself into and existing as that which is not yet. In other words, Dasein 
is an entity which, in its Being, projects and becomes "what it is not yet”. This is what 
Heidegger calls the ontological structure of care of the Dasein. 
Sartre's analysis of Transcendence is founded upon the above observations made 
by Heidegger. As we know, the For-itself is an existent which always nihilates its 
object — i.e., it always separates and differentiates its own being from that of the 
In-itself. However, the For-itself does not just nihilate its object or the In-itself; it also 
nihilates itself. 
Yet I am indeed already there in the Future; it is for the sake of the being 
which I will be there at the turning of the path that I now exert all my 
strength, and in this sense there is already a relation between my future 
being and my present being. But a nothingness has slipped into the heart of 
this relation; I am not the self which I will be. First I am not that self 
because time separates me from it. Secondly, I am not that self because what 
I am is not the foundation of what I will be. Finally I am not that self 
because no actual existent can determine strictly what I am going to be... I 
am the self which I will be, in the mode of not being it208 
The for-itself, as the foundation of itself, is the upsurge of the negation. The 
for-itself founds itself in so far as it denies in relation to itself a certain 
being or a mode of being.209 
Thus... human reality as itself must necessarily be something other than 
itself. This possible is that element of the For-itself which by nature escapes 
it qua For-itself.210 
Similar to Dasein, the For-itself is an existent which is “ahead-of-itself ’. The 
For-itself is an existent which always differentiates, separates and disengages a part 
207 BT 192 
208 BN,p. 68. 
209 BN, p. 138. 
210 57V, pp. 151-152. 
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of itself away from its own. It means that the For-itself is always, in its being, 
projecting a part or an aspect of itself “ahead o f ' itself. This absent part or aspect 
projected by the For-itself is the part of itself which it is yet to become (for the 
convenience of discussions, let us call the aspect or part of the For-itself its 
"YoY-'\t^\i-yet-to-become" from now on). What is the difference and relation between 
the For-itself and its projected part? As we can see, the For-itself is a concrete and real 
existent which exists, and it is thus characterized by its being or presence. Contrarily, 
its Yox-\XsQ\i-yet-to-become is characterized by its non-being or absence. It is exactly a 
part or an aspect of the For-itself which is not yet actual, or still awaiting to be 
determined. But this characteristic of the Yox-\\s,Q\f-yet-to-become does not indicate 
that it is a new existent discrete from or foreign to the For-itself. The analysis of 
Dasein by Heidegger has hinted us that the For-itself would necessarily relates to its 
Yox-iX^Xf-yet-to-become by the relation of becoming: the For-itself would eventually 
turn into and exist as its Yox-\i?>Q\f-yet-to-become. It signifies that the 
For-itself-yet-to-become is just an absent and missing part of the For-itself; and the 
For-itself is an “incomplete ” existent which always has a part of itself missing. This 
self-nihilation of the For-itself is a part of its eidetic and ontological structure. It 
implies that a For-itself necessarily exists in the projection of its “not yet actual，， 
and undetermined part，and becomes its For-itself-yet-to-become. 
4.3.3 The self of For-itself 
We should now be familiar with the basic meaning of the self-nihilation of the 
For-itself. Through this process, the For-itself differentiates, separates and disengages 
itself from its Vox-\\SQ\i-yet-to-become. However, this is not the only result of its 
self-nihilation. To grasp the full picture of the process of self-nihilation, we must first 
look at the basic structure of lack. According to Sartre, every instance of lack must 
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presuppose me irinary structure or tne lacKing, tne existing ana me lacKea. were, 
what he means by the existing is the remaining part or "residuum" of a proposed 
totality; the lacking refers to the absent or missing part that is "complimentary" to the 
existing�and the lacked refers to the proposed but unachieved totality that would be 
restored by synthesizing the lacking and the existing?12 This structure of lack reveals 
that any existent which misses a part of its own necessarily implies a totality that is 
unachieved and yet to be restored; put it differently, any existent which is the existing 
(that loses its part of lacking) necessarily implies the totality of the lacked. 
Furthermore, the structure of lack has already presupposed nothingness. As we can 
see, the lacking is defined as the missing part which is complimentary to the existing, 
while the lacked is the proposed totality that is not achieved and yet to be restored. It 
reveals that the lacking and the lacked are always constituted by non-being or 
absence - they are negatites. This observation indicates that every instances (or the 
trinary structure) of lack must be grounded in nothingness. 
The relation of the For-itself and its Yox-\is,Q\i-yet-to-become can be described 
and elaborated by this structure of lack. Here, the For-itself corresponds to the existing 
of this structure, as it is the remaining part or the residuum of a proposed (or projected) 
totality. On the other hand, the Vov-iistXf-yet-to-become is the lacking of this structure, 
as it is the missing part that is complimentary to the For-itself. Through this structure 
of lack, we can also find that the projection of the For-itself is a twofold process. The 
For-itself does not only project its absent or missing part of For-itself-yet-to-become; 
at the same time, it also projects or surpasses itself towards an unachieved totality 
2丨1 浙，pp. 135-136. 
212 This can be illustrated by Sartre's example of the crescent of moon. In the case when the moon is 
not full, the missing crescent of the moon is the lacking; the currently existing and remaining crescent 
of the moon is the existing., and the full moon, which is the totality going to be restored by the synthesis 
of the lacking and the existing, is the lacked. See BN, p. 135. A similar example can also be found in BT 
when Heidegger tries to elaborate that Dasein is always "a lack of totality" which can never exist in its 
Being-a-whole. See 57243-244. 
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which is composed of itself and its For-itself-yet-to-become. However, what is this 
unachieved totality which the For-itself is always in lack of? To answer this question, 
we must look at the unique mode of being of the For-itself once again. As we can see, 
the For-itself is an existent which always projects an absent part of itself (its 
¥or-itsQ\f-yet-to-become) "ahead o f ' itself. This signifies that the For-itself always 
exists as an incomplete existent: it is an existent which is always having a part of itself 
or its own self, missing. In this case, we can neither call the For-itself or the 
Y ox-\X?>Q\f-yet-to-become the true and complete self of the For-itself, because both of 
them are just a part of the true and complete self of the For-itself. It means that 
complete "itself' — or the own self- of the For-itself will be that which comprise the 
For-itself and Yox-ii^QXi-yet-to-become. Put it in another way, the unachieved totality 
that is composed of the For-itself and For-itself-yet-to-become is the self of the 
For-itself. Only this totality will be able to include every part or aspect of the 
For-itself, and truly serves to be the self of the For-itself. 
The above analysis shows that the unachieved totality composed of the For-itself 
and its Yox-iXstM-yet-to-become is the self of the For-itself. The relations among them 
indicate that the self of the For-itself always exists as the lacked of the aforementioned 
structure of lack; and in this case, the For-itself is said to be always its own lack: 
Such is the origin of transcendence. Human reality is its own surpassing 
toward what it lacks; it surpasses itself toward the particular being which it 
would be if it were what it is. Human reality is not something which exists 
first in order afterwards to lack this or that; it exists first as lack and in 
immediate synthetic connection with what it lacks. Thus the pure event by 
which human reality rises as a presence in the world is apprehended by 
itself as its own lack. 
An existent is its own lack when it is always conscious of itself or exists as the 
213 BN, p. 139. 
121 
remaining part (the existing) of a totality that is proposed but yet to be achieved (the 
lacked). It follows that the For-itself is an existent which, in its being, is always its 
own lack; it always escapes from its original state of being a “remaining part" or 
“residuum ”，and surpasses towards its unachieved totality of its own self by becoming 
its For-itself-yet-to-become. This characteristic or mode of being further discloses that 
the For-itself is always something more than what it currently is, and the true and 
complete self of the For-itself will be something that is partially absent and awaiting 
to be restored. This is what Sartre means when he says that the For-itself or human 
reality “is its own surpassing toward what it lacks," and "surpasses itself toward the 
particular being which it would be if it were what it is". Thus, the For-itself is an 
existent which, in its being, projects or surpasses towards the totality of its own self. 
This process or mode of being of the For-itself is what Sartre calls the human 
ekstasis of Transcendence. 
- — — - - -
f ^ ^ ^ For-itself-
\ For-itself ^ ^ yet-to-become 
(The existing) \ �� (The lacking) 
� , ) 
The (complete)^// of the For-itself 
(The lacked) ^ � 
^ Projection 
V J 
Diagram 1: The Transcendence of the For-itself 
122 
4.3.4 The radical undeterminedness of the For-itself 
We should now be clear about how the For-itself transcends. The Transcendence 
of the For-itself is the process, or its mode of being, which projects or surpasses 
towards the unachieved totality of its own self. Our previous analysis has also 
demonstrated how the Yox-\XsQ\i-yet-to-become exists. The Yox-\is>Q\f-yet-to-become is 
the non-being or absent part of the For-itself, and the For-itself will eventually retrieve 
this missing part of its own by becoming or existing as it some time latter. It seems 
that the relation between the For-itself, its Yox-\XsQ\f-yet-to-become and its own self 
can be completely described by the structure of lack or absence. However, our 
attentive readers may still remember that the ¥ov-\tsQ\{-yet-to-become is not merely 
characterized by its non-being or absence. It is, more importantly，a part or aspect of 
the For-itself which is "yet to become ”， "not yet actual“still outstanding” and 
uawaiting to be determined". What exactly is this undetermined character that is 
found in the ¥ov-itsQ\f-yet-to-become? And how will its undeterminedness affect the 
being of the For-itself and the unachieved totality of its own self! 
Perhaps we can begin our explication here by comparing the undeterminedness 
of the For-itself (or Yox-iXs^M-yet-to-become) with that of the In-itself. We should still 
remember that an In-itself is no more than a totalized series of exhausted and 
unexhausted Abschattungen. This mode of being of the In-itself indicates that it 
always exists with an infinite number of potential Abschattungen, and its 
inexhaustibility implies that the For-itself can never exhaust all of the Abschattungen 
of an In-itself. It is in this sense that Sartre says that the In-itself always transcends or 
"escapes" from the grasp of consciousness, and it is why he will call this characteristic 
or mode of being of the In-itself "Transcendence". The situation here seems to suggest 
that the In-itself will always, to a certain extent, remain "undetermined". So what is 
the difference between the characteristics of undeterminedness of the For-itself and 
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In-itself? It is true that every In-itself is having an infinite number of Abschattungen 
that is unexhausted by the For-itself. Nevertheless, we should also be careful that 
every Abschattung of the In-itself will appear as a specific or particular appearance 
of one and the same totalized series. It means that even though we can never exhaust 
the Abschattungen of an In-itself, we can still completely grasp its essence or 
synthetic ideal unity that is revealed alongside each of its momentary Abschattung. 
For example, even though we would never be sure about which particular 
Abschattung or profile a cup will appear to us in the next moment (e.g., its front side, 
rear side, or its top view), still we are sure that its upcoming Abschattung will always 
appear to us within a synthetic ideal unity of this cup. We can be sure that the 
upcoming Abschattung must be a particular profile of this instrumental thing — the 
utensil that is used to hold any liquid for drinking and this is exactly the finite or 
determined aspect which we can always find from the In-itself. 
However, the undeterminedness of the For-itSQlf-yet-to-become is something 
very different. Although the ¥or-itsQ\f-yet-to-become is that which is non-being or 
absent - i.e., a negatite - we should not consider it as something absolutely separated 
from the For-itself. As an aspect or a part projected by the For-itself, the 
Vox-iisQlf-yet-to-become is what the For-itself will eventually exist as or turn into. The 
notion here shows that we are not completely ignorant of the characteristic of the 
Yox-iXstXi-yet-to-become. We can always find that the Vox-\isQ\f-yet-to-become will be 
somehow related to the being of the For-itself. We can anticipate that the 
For-itself-yet-to-become comes from the For-itself which is present, and it indicates 
that the For-itself-yet-to-become always comes from an existent that is involved or 
engaged in a specific factical situation. However, what else can we know about the 
For-itself-yet-to-become？ Unlike the Abschattungen of the In-itself — which are 
always the appearances subsumed under a definite essence or ideal synthetic unity -
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we can never apprehend or grasp the YoX'\XsQ\i-yet-to-become in a definite way, or as 
something with a determined essence. As a negatite, the For-itself-yet-to-become 
exactly represents the part or aspect of the For-itself which has not yet happened or 
existed. It shows that the For-itself-yet-to-become is that which is not determined by 
the factical situation, and it is a part or an aspect of the For-itself which does not 
possess any concrete content or factual attributes that can be mentioned. Perhaps 
someone will still argue that the For-ilsQlf-yet-to-become would be more or less 
restricted to the factical situation where the For-itself is in. Nevertheless, it does not 
imply that this factical situation (at the moment) is defining or determining the factual 
attributes or essences of the ¥or-itsQ\f-yet-to-become. The case here only signifies that 
the For-itSQlf-yet-to-become is always being projected on the ground of reality: it is 
impossible for the For-itself to know in advance what it is going to become, be that 
anything it desires (this is going to be explicated in Section 4.3.6). 
The above analysis shows that the ¥or-itsQ\f-yet-to-become is a part which is 
radically undetermined or without essence. It means that the For-itself will never be 
able to know what it will exactly be. It can never ensure what it will exist as (e.g., will 
I go to the museum tomorrow? Will I choose to study the doctoral degree?); it will 
never know what sort of projects, tasks or values that it will be involved or engaged in 
(e.g., will I be still working as a teacher? Will I still remain to be a pious Christian?); 
and it is even not certain about where it is going to be (e.g. will I be still living in my 
homeland? Or will I choose to live in some other community?). All these “contents，， 
or factual attributes of the For-itself-yet-to-become are yet to exist or yet to happen， 
and they are waiting to be decided or determined by the For-itself that exists at the 
moment. Therefore, our previous examination is far from telling us any substantial 
information about the essence, content or factual (and ontical) attributes of the 
Y ox-\XsQ\^yet-to-become. It is just formally exhibiting the eidetic and ontological 
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structure - or the mode of being — of the For-itself. In this regard, what a For-itself 
will know is that it will necessarily become and exist as its Vox-\XsQ\f-yet-to-become 
somehow latter. But it can be sure about nothing more than this, because it will never 
be certain about what particularly will it become.214 Thus, the undeterminedness of 
the For-itself-yet-to-become does not merely mean that it will possess an infinite 
number of possible Abschattungen; it is rather a part where it is not determined with 
any essence or factual attribute. 
The radical undeterminedness of the Yox-\\sdi-yet-to-become indicates that the 
own self of the For-itself will always be a totality that is composed of an 
undetermined part. It follows that the self of the For-itself will also be that which is 
radically undetermined: 
[H]ence the self-as-being-in-itself is what human reality lacks and what 
makes its meaning. It is the self which would be what it is which allows the 
for-itself to be apprehended as not being what it is; the relation denied in the 
definition of the for-itself... is a relation (given as perpetually absent) 
between the for-itself and in-itself in the mode of identity.... What the 
for-itself lacks is the self - or itself as in-itself.213 
Human reality is a perpetual surpassing toward a coincidence with itself 
which is never given.216 
The being of human reality is suffering because it rises in being as 
perpetually haunted by a totality which it is without being able to be it, 
precisely because it could not attain the in-itself without losing itself as 
for-itself.217 
As a totality which is composed of the Vox-iXstM-yet-to-become, the self of the 
For-itself will always have an absent part which is without any specific content and 
214 BN, p. 562. 
215 题，p. 138. 
216 浙，p. 139. 
211 BN, p. 140. 
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yet to be determined. It means that the own self of the For-itself is a totality that is 
radically undetermined as well - e.g., its essences or factual attributes are always yet 
to be determined. Such an observation implies that the self of the For-itself can never 
exist in the way as an In-itself does, because only an In-itself will be capable to exist 
with definite essence or factual attributes. This is what Sartre means when he says 
that the self of the For-itself would never exist as a self-as-being-in-itself. This 
undeterminedness of the self of the For-itself further reveals that the For-itself is 
always existing in a highly paradoxical way. The For-itself is not merely an existent 
that is "ahead of itself' or "more than" what it currently is. It is an existent which 
always projects or surpasses towards the totality (of its own self) that is perpetually 
without essence, and also becomes its For-itself-yet-to-become which is perpetually 
undetermined. This is the same as to say that the For-itself can never restore its own 
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self, or to completely determine its own self like an In-itself with definite essence. 
Hence, the For-itself is always an existent that is its own lack; it is one which 
perpetually exists in the lack of a determined self, or a self-as-in-itself. 
4.3.5 Possibles and the possibility of being 
We can see that the For-itself is an existent which, in its being, projects or 
surpasses towards the unachievable totality of its own self. This process is what Sartre 
calls Transcendence. This self-projection and surpassing of the For-itself also implies 
that it is always a lack, as the For-itself will never be able to restore the unachieved 
totality of its self, and perpetually remains incomplete. Nevertheless, the above 
analysis of the Transcendence is still an insufficient one. It has just depicted the 
human ekstasis of Transcendence from the eidetic and ontological dimension, but they 
has not demonstrated us the relation between this human ekstasis and the projection of 
218 题，p. 138. 
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value in the being of human reality. As Sartre says, the Transcendence and 
undeterminedness of the For-itself seems to suggest that it always exists in an 
"unhappy state": 
The being of human reality is suffering because it rises in being perpetually 
haunted by a totality which it is without being able to be it, precisely 
because it could not attain the in-itself with losing itself as for-itself. Human 
reality therefore is by nature an unhappy consciousness with no possibility 
of surpassing its unhappy state.219 
As an existent which projects and surpasses towards its unachievable totality, the 
For-itself is never able to grasp the essence of its own self. It is thus required to exist 
in the face of ‘‘its own nothingness" . However, this undetermined character of the 
self of For-itself and its For-itsQlf-yet-to-become also signifies a kind of openness or 
potentiality which is yet to be determined. It implies that the ekstasis of 
Transcendence has granted every For-itself the possibility to choose the sort of 
Yox-\is>di-yet-to-become it desires to become. Thus, the human ekstasis of 
Transcendence means that the For-itself always exists in its own possibility: 
What is given as the peculiar lack of each for-itself and what is strictly 
defined as lacking to precisely this for-itself and no other is the possibility 
of the for-itself... Thus the for-itself can not appear without being haunted 
9? 1 
by value and projected toward its own possibles. 
But to be its own possibility - that is, to be defined by it — is precisely to be 
defined by that part of itself which it is not, is to be defined as an 
i 222 escape-from-itself towards . 
• • • 223 The missing For-itself is the possible. 
219 層，p. 140. 
220 BN, pp. 57-58. 
221 BN,p. 147. 
222 BN, p. 152. 
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The possible is an absence constitutive of consciousness in so far as 
consciousness itself makes itself.224 
We have just seen that the self of the For-itself is a totality which is always 
undetermined and perpetually without essence. The undeterminedness of the self of 
For-itself is rooted in its missing part of the ¥or-itsQ\f-yet-to-become. As a part which 
is characterized by its absence or non-being, the ¥or-itSQ\f-yet-to-become is a negatite. 
However, in spite of its characteristic of absence or non-being, this 
Yox-\\sQ\f-yet-to-become is always related to the For-itself by the relation of becoming: 
this Yox-\XsQ\f-yet-to-become is always the existent which I, the For-itself, will turn 
into and exist as in the future. This relation implies that even though the 
Yox-\XsQ\f-yet~to-become is something which does not exist yet, it can be — and has to 
be — brought into being and determined by the For-itself which exists at the present 
moment. What the For-itself is doing today will necessarily turn into history and the 
past, and results in shaping the situation — i.e., the Facticity and the determined 
aspects - of the For-itself-yet-to-become that will exist tomorrow. On the one hand, 
the For-itself will become and exist as the particular possible it has chosen and 
accepted. But on the other hand, the choice of this For-itself will simultaneously 
imply that it will not become or exist as those possibles which it has refused or 
rejected. For example, I will never know what sort of person I will be in the future, 
and in this case I have not yet determined any parts of my ¥or-itsQ\i-yet-to-become. 
Latter, I decide to steal money from my neighbours, and I perform it. Through this 
choice and action, I have decided a part of my undetermined Fov-itself-yet-to-become. 
Starting from the moment I steal the money, I have chosen to become and exist as a 
person who has been a thief and stolen money from someone else, and have chosen 
224 BN, p. 153. 
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not to become or exist as an honest person who does not steal. My current choice and 
action of stealing has in this way determined a part of the undetermined aspect of the 
¥OY-itsQ\f-yet-to-become. Such an example reveals that any will, choice and action 
which the For-itself performs now would eventually become and determine my 
undetermined aspects of the For-itself-yet-to-become. Thus, the Transcendence 
of the For-itself or Yor-\\sQ\i-yet-to-become does not merely bring us with the 
undeterminedness of self and essence. It also represents or means that I, as a For-itself, 
can always determine and decide what exactly I will become. This characteristic or 
mode of being of the For-itself is its possibility; and in this case, the 
¥or-itSQ\f-yet-to-become that I could choose to exist are exactly my possibles. 
4.3.6 Choice and reality: the Transcendence in Facticity 
It is important to note that the possibility or possibles of the For-itself are not 
something without restrictions. First of all, despite the fact that we can choose what 
we will be, we can never choose not to project or surpass towards the 
¥or-itsQ\f-yet-to-become. We should still remember that the human ekstasis of 
Transcendence is the mode of being of the For-itself. It indicates that there is no 
For-itself which can exist without its Transcendence, and no For-itself can choose to 
exist without projecting and becoming it own possibles. What the For-itself can 
choose or determine is what it desires and wills to become. I can will and choose to 
become a waiter, a teacher, a robber, to buy a new car next month, to have lunch now, 
to study abroad, or even to kill myself; but I can never choose not to surpass towards 
225 It is i mportant to note that we have arrived at a problem which is out of the scope of this thesis. As 
Sartre says, "No factual state whatever it may be... is capable by itself of motivating any act 
whatsoever", and "No factual state can determine consciousness to apprehend itself as a negatite or as a 
lack." (BN, p. 562) These observations reveal that every For-itself can only “make the motive” of his 
actions by his own, and this has already implied freedom as the precondition of our actions or choices. 
However, our analysis in this thesis is still unprepared for an inquiry or examination of the meaning of 
freedom in BN. This will be elaborated in the concluding chapter of this thesis. For the relevant 
discussions by Sartre, see BN, pp. 559-619. 
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or become anything, or choose not to have any projection of the 
Yox-\\SQ\f-yet-to-become. It is in this sense which Sartre says that we, the For-itself, 
are “condemned to be free": 
I am condemned to exist forever beyond my essence, beyond the causes and 
motives of my act. I am condemned to be free. This means... we are not 
free to cease being free.226 
Human-reality is free because it is not enough. It is free because it is 
perpetually wrenched away from itself and because it has been separated by 
• . • 227 a nothingness from what it is and from what it will be. 
There is another restriction which limits the Transcendence or choice of the 
For-itself. We should still remember that, besides its Transcendence, the For-itself is 
also an existent which exists in its Facticity. It means that the For-itself always exists 
in a situation which is constituted by the overall givenness of the world and its object 
(the In-itself). The co-presence of these human ekstases implies that the 
Transcendence of the For-itself is always a projection and surpassing^row its factical 
situation. Thus, the For-itself would never choose to become its 
Yov-\\SQ\i-yet-to-become in a fashion of “liberty of indifference" (libertas 
indifferentiae) . As Sartre says: 
The possibility which I make my concrete possibility can appear as my 
possibility only by raising itself on the basis of the totality of the logical 
• • • 229 
possibilities which the situation allows. 
But in order that I may freely give a meaning to the obligations which my 
state involves, then... being-in-itself must be given as the evanescent 
contingency of my situation. This is the result of the fact that while I must 
226 BN, p. 567. 
227 BN, p. 568. 
228 BT 144 
229 層 ’ p. 67. 
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play at being a cafe waiter in order to be one, still it would be in vain for me 
，1 n 
at being a diplomat or a sailor, for I would not be. 
The above paragraphs clearly show that the For-itself can only choose and 
become its possibles, or ¥or-itsQ\f-yet-to-become, from its given situation. Even 
though the ¥or-iisQ\f-yet-to-become is that which is absent or non-existing, it does not 
mean that they are phantoms or imaginary objects which can be brought into being 
solely by my will or wish. The For-itself, who is responsible to choose and determine 
its For-iisQlf-yet-to-become, is a concrete and real existent which is engaged in its 
factical situation. It means that all the choices and actions of the For-itself must be 
bound to and restricted by the overall givenness of its factical situation, and it can 
only choose and become those possibles which are given and found in its situation. 
For example, at the time when I am working in the restaurant, I can choose to be a 
hardworking waiter, a waiter who shuns away from work, or even to quit my job. 
However, I cannot choose to be a diplomat or a sailor, because I am neither employed 
by the government or ship captain, nor am I now staying in the department of foreign 
affairs or on the deck. I am, at this moment, “employed by a chef ' and "in the 
restaurant". It is true that we can make a certain degree of changes in order to be a 
diplomat or a sailor (let us say, to quit my waiter job and look for some other jobs), 
but it is equally true that I cannot choose to be diplomat or sailor immediately when I 
want to. This example should suffice to show that the For-itself must always choose or 
determine its Yox-\X.sQ\f-yet-to-become within a given or pre-destined situation. Here 
we can conclude that every Transcendence of the For-itself is Transcendence in 
Facticity, and every possibles of the For-itself are possibles that are found in its 
factical situation. 
230 BN, p. 131. 
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4.3.7 Value as the being of For-itself 
We have now arrived at the final question for our analysis of Transcendence. The 
Transcendence of the For-itself is not just the process of projecting and becoming its 
Yox-\\sQ\i-yet-to-become. It is, more importantly, the process which the For-itself 
projects or surpasses towards the unachievable totality of its own self. Our foregoing 
analysis has shown that the undeterminedness of the self of For-itself is a result of the 
absence or non-being of the ¥or-itsQ\f-yet-to-become. At first we get the impression 
that this is an "unhappy state" which is unavoidable, as the For-itself is never capable 
of grasping or understanding itself as an existent with essence. But soon we find that 
the human ekstasis of Transcendence is meaning something more than that. It is the 
ekstasis of Transcendence, or the radical undeterminedness of the 
¥oY-itsQ\f-yet-to-become, which grants the For-itself its own possibility. These 
observations suggest that the complete and own self of the For-itself should not be 
considered solely as the lacked or a totality which can never be restored; it is also a 
totality which can be determined and restored by the For-itself bit by bit through 
choosing and becoming its possibles — even though this restoration is a process which 
can never be completed or achieved. What does this self of For-itself mean if we try to 
consider it with reference to the possibility of our being? Sartre tells us that: 
Now we can ascertain more exactly what is the being of the self: it is 
value.231 
Value is given as a beyond of the acts confronted, as the limit, for example, 
• • • 232 of the infinite progression of noble acts. 
Value in its original upsurge is not posited by the for-itself; it is 
consubstantial with it—to such a degree that there is no consciousness 
231 浙，p. 143. 
232 BN, p. 143. 
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which is not haunted by its value and that human-reality in the broad sense 
includes both the for-itself and value. 
What we mean by value is in fact the own self of the For-itself. Here, we can see 
that value is neither a transcendent nor existent; it is neither something that is revealed 
in givenness nor as that which is for consciousness. Value is rather a part of the 
eidetic and ontological structure of the For-itself. That is why Sartre says that no 
For-itself can exist without projecting, surpassing towards and being "haunted" by its 
own value, as every For-itself is an existent which projects and surpasses towards its 
own self. The above observations also imply that value — as an unachievable totality -
is exactly the lacked of the For-itself.234 The situation here indicat es that the For-itself 
can only perpetually keep on approaching to its value bit by bit, but can never obtain 
the totality of it. This explains the reason why noble acts can only exist in infinite 
progression: the value of ‘‘being noble" or ‘‘being a noble person" is a projected 
totality which can never be completed. All these reveal that value, as the totality 
which is projected and surpassed towards by the For-itself, is that which can 
never be achieved and restored, and it can never be treated as an object that is 
determined or with essence. 
It is important to note that the possibles and the value projected by the For-itself 
are always related to each other in a reciprocal way. At this point, we should refer 
back to our analysis on the linkage in between the For-itself, Yox-\\SQ\f-yet-to-become 
and the self of the For-itself. First of all, we have seen that the For-itself is an existent 
which simultaneously projects the totality of its own self and its complimentary part of 
Y ox-i\SQ\f-yet-to-become. This projection and surpassing also implies that the self of 
For-itself (the lacked) is a totality which is consisted of, or constituted by, the 
233 BN, pp. 145-146. 
234 BN, p. 144. 
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For-itself (the existing) and ¥or-\tsQ\f-yet-to-become (the lacking). If Sartre's 
observation on value and possibles is correct — that is, if the ^ / / ' o f For-itself is what 
we mean by value, and the Yov-iX^Xf-yet-to-become is the possibles — then we should 
agree that value is that which is constituted and composed by the possibles which 
the For-itself chooses and becomes. 
We can see that the self of For-itself is a totality which is composed of the parts 
of For-itself and Yox-i\s>Q\i-yet-to-become. If every choice or action of the For-itself 
becomes and determines the Yor-\X^Q\{-yet-to-become, then we should also admit that 
the For-itself is determining a part of its own self when it becomes the 
Yox-\isQ\i-yet-to-become it has chosen. Such a relation indicates that when the 
For-itself is choosing and becoming its possibles, it is also determining its own 
value. For example, a woman, who has just given birth to her baby, decides to quit her 
job and spends all her time to take care of her infant child. Upon this situation, she 
refuses her possible of "keep working" and chooses to ‘‘look after her child". As a 
For-itself, she has chosen to become the Yox-\\SQ\^yet-to-become — which is the 
missing part of her proposed totality - who “looks after her child", and this further 
determines her own self-her proposed totality — as “a responsible and good mother”. 
We can see that at the time when this woman chooses and becomes her possible of 
“looking after her child", she has also determined and restored a part of her value of 
being "a responsible and good mother". It would be in vain for her to grasp or 
understand herself as “a responsible and good mother" if she has done nothing, 
because her own value (or her own self) can only be determined when she chooses and 
determines her possibles. Thus, the value of a For-itself projects and desires would 
always be constituted, restored and determined by those possibles it chooses and 
becomes. 
We can see that the value of a For-itself is always constituted and composed by 
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the possibles it chooses and becomes. Nevertheless, this is only a part of the whole 
picture. Sartre tells us that value is also the ideal unity which synthesizes all the 
projections or surpassings of the For-itself: 
...[T]he meaning of being for value is that it is that toward which a being 
surpasses its being; every value-oriented act is a wrenching away from its 
own being toward . Since value is always and everywhere the beyond 
of all surpassings, it can be considered as the unconditioned unity of all 
surpassings of being.... Thus value taken in its origin, or the supreme value, 
• 91S 
is the beyond and the for of transcendence. 
As we can see, the projections, choices and becoming of the For-itself is not a 
single and momentary act. All these possibles which are projected and chosen by this 
For-itself along time are not something discrete and unrelated, and we can always 
discover a kind of unity between all these possibles at different times. Perhaps we can 
elaborate this with our previous examples. As a For-itself, the woman who just gave 
birth to her baby has projected, chosen and become different possibles. Let us imagine 
that, on the first day, she has chosen to "quit her job" and decided to "look after her 
child". On the next day, she decided to "attend nursery classes"; and a few days latter, 
she started to "adjust her diet to prepare for breast feeding". In this case, we would not 
consider these possibles, choices or actions the woman undertook as something 
discrete or unrelated. Instead, we would always understand them as a unified series of 
possibles, choices or actions that show a certain direction or orientation - e.g., in 
order to restore the own self or value of this woman as ‘‘a responsible and good 
mother". It shows that every possible projected and chosen by a For-itself must 
always exist as a member of, an instance of, or a part (of the totality) of value which it 
attempts to restore. Thus, value is not simply that which is constituted and determined 
235 BN, p. 144. 
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by the possibles. Value is also the synthetic unity, the limit, and the "orientation" 
of these possibles and choices; it is value which synthesizes each of the individual 
possibles and choices (of a For-itself) into a totalized series of actions with 
specific and consistent meaning. 
\ For-itself ^ " " ^ � The possibles ；' 





Diagram 2: The possibles and value of For-itself 
The above analysis has clearly demonstrated the reciprocal relations between the 
possibles and value. We can see that every projection and choices of possibles that is 
made by a For-itself carries value. On the one hand, the value projected by the 
For-itself is just a proposed totality which is waiting to be restored. This implies that 
the value of the For-itself can only be constituted and composed by real and concrete 
actions — e.g., by choosing and becoming its possibles. Thus, the value of the 
For-itself is necessarily made up of and decided by its choices of possibles — there is 
no value without a choice. On the other hand, the possibles projected and chosen by 
the For-itself are not discrete and individual incidents or options. They are always 
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synthesized into a totalized series of actions with specific and consistent meaning, and 
this ideal unity “beyond” each particular surpassings is exactly what we called value. 
Hence, all possibles are possibles with reference to and surpassing towards certain 
value — there does not exist any choice without value. 
§ 4.4 Human ekstasis (3): Temporality 
4.4.1 A naturalistic conception of time, and time as a holistic structure 
We have already examined the human ekstases of Facticity and Transcendence. 
At the first glance, the analyses of these two ekstases should be sufficient to show that 
the For-itself (or human reality) is an existent which, in its being, projects from its 
factical situation and surpasses towards its value. But soon we discover that these two 
ekstases entail another human ekstasis which we have not yet mentioned. First of all, I 
have shown that the For-itself always exists by engaging in a situation which is 
"given" to it. This ''given" situation always reveals to us as that which is “once” or 
“already” there. Such a characteristic of Facticity implies that I am always separated 
from my situation by the temporal dimensions of present and past - e.g., I am the one 
who is "present" in a situation that is "already there". Moreover, we can see that the 
For-itself is an existent which always nihilates itself and surpasses towards its 
Vox-\\SQ\i-yet-to-become. This Yox-\XsQ\f-yet-to-become, which is a part that is “not 
yet", is that which is currently absent but will exist latter. This structure of 
Transcendence has already presupposed the temporal dimensions of present and 
future - the For-itself (who is "present" now) will become the 
Yox-\Xst\f-yet-to-become (who is "absent" now) somehow at a latter moment. These 
features of Facticity and Transcendence imply that these two ekstases are always 
intertwined with the dimension of time. Thus, if we want to apprehend the full 
meaning of these ekstases and the complete picture of the being of human reality, we 
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must go on and examine the third human ekstasis of it - i.e., its Temporality. 
In order to obtain a thorough understanding of the phenomenon of time, we 
should return to our experiences of everyday being and find out the basic features of 
this phenomenon. In their everyday being, or from a common sensical perspective, 
• • 236 
people always understand time as an external and abstract relation between entities. 
This conception of time can be depicted and summarized by the following two theses. 
Firstly, time is considered to be an infinite series of discrete "nows".237 These 
instantaneous moments are the basic units that constitute the temporal dimensions of 
past, present and future. For example, the past is considered as the "now" which is no 
longer, the future the "now" which is not yet, and the present an instantaneous point 
which always elapses and is unable to be grasped. Secondly, time is treated as an 
• • • • • • • • 238 . 
objective or universal series or flow which exists prior to any existents. In this case, 
time is known as the factor which must be presupposed by all changes and 
movements — as time flows, entities will change or move. Time is considered as the 
universal parameter which demonstrates and conditions the physical or corporeal 
relation of existents. 
Careful observation will show that these common sensical understandings of 
time are inappropriate descriptions of this phenomenon, and they are incapable to 
reveal the essential structure of time adequately. First of all, it is incorrect to consider 
time merely as an infinite series of discrete "nows". It is true that different moments 
or instances of time are separated from each other, but this understanding has failed to 
capture another important character of time: 
Yet temporality is not solely nor even primarily separation.... If, then, time 
is separation, it is at least a separation of a special type 一 a division which 
236 BN,p. 191. 
231 BN, p. 159. 




What can we conclude as the result of this discussion? First of all this: 
temporality is a dissolving force but it is the center of a unifying act.. .240 
The before and after are intelligible.. • only as an internal negation. It is 
there in the after that the before causes itself to be determined as before and 
conversely.241 
People always forget that time is a separation which is done along a unified 
horizon. It is easy for us to find that time is always an ordinal arrangement of before 
242 • • • • 
and after. The dual nature of time shows us the following two characteristics. 
Firstly, the ordinal arrangement of time reveals that the so-called “discrete，’ moments 
of "nows" are not completely or absolutely separated. Different moments of time are 
possible to be arranged in an ordinal or sequential way only when they are separations 
made along a continuous or successive horizon. This is the same as in the relation 
between "point", "distance" and "plane": the "distance" (which is a kind of separation) 
between two discrete "points" are possible only when they are located on one and the 
same "plane". The ordinal arrangement of time implies that the phenomenon of time 
possesses both separateness and continuity, and it is not just an infinite series of 
discrete "nows". Second, the order of before and after is obviously a reciprocal and 
relative concept. Nothing is absolutely before another incident. An incident is before 
another only when it is compared with another incident which is relatively after it. For 
example, my birth is considered as an incident before only when I try to compare it 
with some other incidents - for example, my school life, my marriage, etc. The 
situation will be the same for after, the relation of before and after are understandable 
239 BN, p. 189. 
uo BN, p. 194. 
241 BN,p. 195. 
242 BN, pp. 188-189. 
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only when a particular incident is reciprocally related to another incident. These 
features of time show that the temporal dimensions of Past, Present and Future are 
reciprocal and relational concepts too. In other words, these three dimensions of time 
must exist as a whole or a totality, and none of these dimensions is conceivable 
independent of the rest of the two dimensions. It reveals that time is neither simply a 
separation, nor an infinite series which is made up of numerous discrete "nows"; it is 
always a continuous and successive series of separations which possesses a holistic 
243 structure. 
4.4.2 The concreteness of time 
We should also be careful that time is neither an objective flow which exists prior 
to any existent, nor a universal parameter which conditions all changes and 
movements. As Sartre says, this conception of time is just originated from the 
secondary structure of time244. If what he says is true, then what will be the primary 
structure of time? Sartre has given us the hint when he examined the temporal 
dimension of past.. 
The past is characterized as the past of something or of somebody; one has a 
past. It is this instrument, this society, this man who have their past. There is 
not first a universal past which would latter be particularized in concrete 
pasts. On the contrary, it is particular pasts which we discover first.245 
It is time which is chosen as the practical measurement of distance; this 
town is half and hour away, that one an hour; it will take three days to finish 
this work, etc. It results from these premises that a temporal vision of the 
world and of man will dissolve into a crumbling of befores and afters.246 
243 BN,p. 196, 202. 
244 BN,p. 187. 
245 BN,p. 165. 
246 BN,p. 188. 
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We can see that time (or the temporal dimensions of past, present and future) 
primarily appears in a way that is intertwined with concrete incidents or happenings. 
On the one hand, we always understand time with reference to the concrete practices 
we perform in our everyday being. The examples raised by Sartre have shown that we 
always apprehend time through relating it to, let us say, my walk (e.g., from my home 
to the market) or my work (e.g., of fixing the oven). In another word, the duration of 
‘‘one hour" or "three days" are understood through the everyday experiences of 
"walking" (which is performed with my body and nearby my living place) or 
"labouring" (which is performed by my body and the tools at home). It implies that 
the phenomenon of time will primarily appear alongside a series of concrete and 
particular experiences of everyday being. On the other hand, the dimensions of time 
are always understood with reference to the being of an existent which can experience 
or exist - and this existent can only be the human reality or the For-itself. For instance, 
the duration of "one hour" and "three days" are always apprehended through my 
everyday experiences of "walking" and "labouring". It is me, this very particular 
For-itself, who walk and labour with my body, utilize the tools, get involved in these 
tasks and projects, and live through all these experiences of everyday being. This is 
the same for other incidents or events. For example, the Vietnam War is a happening 
which "belongs" to the past of the Americans, the Vietnamese, and other people who 
are involved; the professional medical examination at 2011 will be an incident which 
"belongs" to the future of my friend Joe and those medical students who are going to 
attend. These elaborations should suffice to show that time always appears itself 
primarily alongside the everyday being or experience of the For-itself. The universal 
and objective time is just resulted from the abstraction of this original mode of time — 
e.g., by eliminating the concrete ingredients of these experiences and the existent 
which time must "belong" to. Therefore, time should not be understood primarily as a 
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universal parameter which exists prior to the being of any existents; it is always the 
time or temporal content which belongs to the For-itself. 
4.4.3 Time as the mode of being of For-itself 
Our analysis has just revealed that time is not a series or flow made up of discrete 
"now" moments, but rather a special type of separation which presupposes a kind of 
continuity and unity. The structure of time also indicates that it is primarily not an 
abstracted and universal parameter of movement, but is always found alongside the 
concrete experiences of the For-itself. However, what is the exact relation between 
these two characteristics of time and the being of the For-itself? Here we can see the 
answer: 
Temporality is not. Only a being of a certain structure of being can be 
temporal in the unity of its being. ..Temporality is the being of the For-itself 
• • • 947 
in so far as the For-itself has to be its being ekstatically. 
Thus Temporality is not a universal time containing all beings and in 
particular human realities. Neither is it a law of development which is 
imposed on being from without. Nor is it being. But it is the intra-structure 
of the being which is its own nihilation - that is, the mode of being peculiar 
to being-for-itself. 
Time, or temporality, is one of the aspect or expression of the nihilation of the 
For-itself, and it is exactly how the For-itself exists. Our preceding examinations have 
shown that time is itself a horizon or structure which is made up of both separation 
and unification. Nevertheless, what exactly is time separating and unifying? Time is 
understood to be a separation, because it has separated the concrete experiences or 
being of the For-itself into the dimensions of past, present and future. To say from an 
247 BN, p. 195. 
248 57V, p. 202. 
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eidetic point of view, time is the way which the consciousness intends to or posits its 
object; the percipere always posits or reveals its percipi as the totalized series of 
Abschattungen which have appeared, is appearing, and not yet appeared. And to 
consider from an ontological point of view，time is the way which the For-itself exists 
or nihilates itself; it always separates and disengages itself as an existent who is 
present in a given situation and projects a part of itself which is not yet but possible. 
These evidences show that time is the way how consciousness or the For-itself 
separates its own experiences or being. However, we should note that even though 
time is a separation, it is still a separation which is done on the basis of unity. 
Although consciousness posits or reveals its object in the three temporal dimensions, 
it does not mean that there are three different consciousnesses to perform the process. 
There is always only one consciousness which is positing and revealing its object in 
three (temporally) different aspects. The situation is the same for the self-nihilation of 
the For-itself: the self-nihilation of the For-itself does not imply that there are three 
separated and new For-itselfs, but are merely the three different aspects of being or 
nihilation of one and the same For-itself. This is the reason why time will be a 
separation with unity — time is a process of self-separation done by one and the same 
consciousness or For-itself. 
We should now be more familiar with the meaning of time. The primary structure 
of time is neither the objective flow which exists prior to all existents, nor the 
universal parameter which conditions or demonstrates the movements or changes of 
them. It is rather the way which the For-itself is conscious of its object and exists; 
time is the mode of being of the For-itself. This timely or temporal character - i.e., 
to separate and unify in an ordinal arrangement which elapses 一 of the being of 
For-itself is what Sartre means by Temporality. The above paragraphs given by 
Sartre have further suggested that time, as the mode of being or the nihilation of the 
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For-itself, is closely related to the human ekstases of Facticity and Transcendence. 
Here, we will examine the temporal dimensions of past, present and future one by one, 
and find out how are they related to the ekstases of Facticity and Transcendence. 
4.4.4 The presence of the For-itself: the temporal dimension of Present 
Let us begin our analysis by examining the temporal dimension of Present. We 
should note that the sequence of our questioning here does not imply that the 
dimension of Present is more significant than or ontologically prior to the rest of the 
two dimensions. As I have shown, time is always a separation that possesses unity and 
totality. It means that it will be impossible to understand the meaning of time without 
taking all these three dimensions together and consider them as a structural whole.249 
We choose to begin our analysis by examining the dimension of Present only because 
it is the easiest to be discovered or disclosed among the three. We can always observe 
the following characteristics from the being of existents: to say that something 
"exists" is the same as to say that this something “is existing at the very moment we 
mention it”. It shows that the meaning of being has already implied the meaning of 
Present. If we, the human reality or the For-itself, is an existent which is always 
conscious of or understands the being both of our own and that of the In-itself, then it 
is a must that we will also be able to understand the meaning of Present through the 
meaning of being. This is the reason why we choose to begin by examining the 
temporal dimension of Present. However, is there any experience, in our everyday 
being, which can show us the relation between the meaning of Present and the being 
of existents? And what will be the relation between the temporal dimension of Present 
and the being of existents? 
The relation between the temporal dimension of Present and the being of 
249 BN,p. 196. 
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existents can be shown through the example of “taking roll call": 
It is clear that what exists in the present is distinguished from all other 
existence by the characteristic of presence. At roll call the soldier or the 
pupil replies "Present!" in the sense of adsum. Present is opposed to absent 
as well as to past. Thus the meaning of present is presence to .250 
When taking roll call, the soldiers or pupils who attend will answer by saying 
‘)Q 1 
"Present" — which means “I am here” (adsum ). This statement or reply contains 
both the ontological and temporal implications. On the one hand, the reply reveals that 
the soldiers or pupils are existents which exist. Through this reply, they are 
announcing or disclosing that ' 7 am here”. It indicates that this reply is showing that 
they are being, with presence, and not absent. But on the other hand, the soldiers or 
pupils who attend and reply must be existents which exist at the moment, or else he or 
she will not be able to make this immediate reply. It shows that every existent that is 
being or with presence must be an existent which exists in the temporal dimension 
of Present, Thus, to exist at the Present moment would be the same as to exist or to 
have presence. In fact, the relation between presence (to exist here) and Present (the 
temporal dimension) can also be elaborated in the reverse case. It is easy to imagine 
that those who do not attend the roll call session will not be able to reply, and they 
will be counted as absent. These soldiers or pupils who are absent, non-being or 
without presence are existents which do not exist in or belong to the temporal 
dimension of Present. They are either those who will never come (those who have 
already quitted) ox yet to come (those who are late or taking a leave), and it means that 
these absentees are those which exist in or "belong" to the temporal dimensions of 
Past or Future. In another word, all those existents which are being or with presence 
250 BN, p. 176. 
251 Lati n {ad-sum, adesse, adfu-i, adfuturus), meaning "be present" in English. See BN, p. 176. 
146 
are those which exist in the temporal dimension of Present, and all those which are 
non-being or in absence are those which exist in other temporal dimensions. 
We know that "to exist in the Present" is the same as ‘‘to exist" or "to have 
presence", but this observation is still not enough to reveal us the complete meaning 
of the temporal dimension of Present. In the above example, we can see that the action 
of roll call taking has presupposed the one who take the roll call (the captain or the 
teacher) and the one who announces, discloses or reveals its own presence (anyone of 
the soldiers or the pupils). If the meaning of the dimension of Present must 
presuppose such a relation, then what or who is announcing and disclosing its own 
being or presence? And to whom is this existent going to disclose or reveal its being or 
presence? Let us look at the following paragraphs: 
Presence to is an internal relation between the being which is present 
and the beings to which it is present... Anything which can be present 
to must be such in its being that there is in it a relation of being with 
• 9 
other beings. 
The structure at the basis of intentionality and of selfness is the negation, 
which is the internal relation of the For-itself to the thing. ..Thus we have 
precisely defined the fundamental meaning of the Present: the Present is 
253 
We should notice that not every existent is capable of being ‘‘present to ，，or 
announce its adsum to other existents. This feature is limited only to those existents 
which can disclose and reveal its own being. As we can see, this ‘‘present to " is 
a relation between the being of existents; ‘‘to be present to something" always means 
that an existent is disclosing or revealing its "own" being to "other" existents. This 
relational structure of "present to " indicates that the one which discloses or 
252 BN, p. 176. 
253 BN, p. 179. 
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reveals its being to other existents must be an existent which differentiates or 
separates the being of its own from the being of other existents. In another word, the 
existent which is ‘'present to ” other existents must be one which can nihil ate 
itself and its object. It signifies that only the For-itself can truly disclose and reveal its 
being, and to be “present 10 ” other existents. In its being, the For-itself would 
be conscious of its own being in a pre-reflective or non-thetic way, and the being of its 
object (or the In-itself) in a thetic way. It is through this process of nihilation which 
the For-itself understands, discloses or reveals the being of its own and that of other 
existents. On the contrary, it is impossible for an In-itself to be “present to " 
other existents, as it can never nihilate its own being; an In-itself can only exist as that 
which is posited, revealed or nihilated by the For-itself. Thus, only the For-itself will 
be able to be "present to “ other existents. 
It is through the nihilation of the For-itself where we apprehends the fundamental 
f 
meaning of the temporal dimension of Present. The For-itself is said to be ‘‘having 
presence" or "existing in the Present" when the For-itself nihilates the being of its 
own and its object, and disclosing its own being to other existents. This is the reason 
why Sartre says that "Present is not”: the Present and presence of the For-itself is 
identical to its nihilation. Here, we can see that the primary structure and meaning of 
the temporal dimension of Present is grounded in the being of For-itself. The temporal 
dimension of Present is primarily understood as the way which the For-itself exists; it 
is its mode of being. To say that the For-itself exists in the Present is to say that the 
For-itself is disclosing and revealing its own being to other existents by the process 
of nihilation. 
4.4.5 The possibilities of the For-itself: the temporal dimensions of Past and Future 
Now we know that the meaning of the temporal dimension of Present is 
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grounded in the being of the For-itself. “To exist in the Present" means that the 
For-itself is disclosing or revealing its own being to other existents, and this is 
obviously an aspect or expression of its nihilation. Our observations here provide us 
the clue to explicate the meaning of other temporal dimensions as well. Our preceding 
analysis has discovered that the meaning of Present is defined by or grounded in the 
being or presence of the For-itself, and those experiences or existents which are 
non-being or in absence will be those which exist in other temporal dimensions — e.g., 
the Past or Future. This indicates that the meaning of Past and Future can be exhibited 
by clarifying the relation between them and the non-being or absence of existents. 
As Sartre says, the temporal dimension of Past is always the Past of something or 
somebody.254 The same situation applies to the temporal dimension of Future: Future 
is always the concrete and particular Future of certain existent. The statement here 
seems to suggest that every existent can "have their own Past" or "have their own 
I 
Future". In fact, we can always find similar understanding in our everyday being. For 
example, the antique coins collected by my grandfather were the money that was used 
in the medieval period, and the escalator had stopped working since yesterday; the 
cargo ship at the port is leaving the city within two weeks, and the watch which I have 
just bought is going to be the gift for my girlfriend tonight. These examples suggest 
that all existents are having their own "history" and "prospect", and it seems to 
indicate that each of them can be understood as having their own "Pasts" and 
"Futures". Is this an accurate description of the meaning of Past and Future? To 
answer this question, we must find out the essential characteristic which distinguishes 
the temporal dimensions of Past and Future from the Present in the very first place. 
Sartre points out that: 
254 BN,p. 165. 
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...I am not my past. I am not it because I was it.255 
The future is what I have to be in so far as I can not be it. 
The Past of an existent is always that which it was, and the Future of it is always 
that which it has to be or will be. The verbs '"was" and “will be” reveal the special 
linkage between the three temporal dimensions of an existent. On the one hand, the 
Past and the Future are always separated from the Present of the existent. As we know, 
the Past of an existent is that which is no longer, and the Future of an existent is that 
which is not yet. If the Present of an existent means that it is disclosing and revealing 
its being - i.e.，"present to ” other existents - , then we should agree that the Past 
and the Future of an existent are characterized by their non-being. The Past and the 
Future of an existent are always that which are absent and do not reveal. For example, 
when we say that the coins were used as money in the Past, it means that the coins are 
no longer used in buying and selling now; it is not the money that can be used at the 
moment. And if I say that the watch I have just bought is going to be the gift in the 
Future, then it means that the watch is not something owned by my girlfriend yet; it is 
not yet the belongings of my girlfriend at the moment. All these suggest that the Past 
or the Future of an existent are those which are non-being or absent, they are 
without presence^ and they do not disclose or reveal themselves at the moment. But 
on the other hand, the Past and the Future of an existent are always unified with the 
Present this very existent. They are not just the parts "possessed by" or "belonged to” 
the existent. The Past of an existent is always what it once has been or has existed as, 
and the Future of an existent is what it is going to be or will exist as. It implies that the 
temporal dimensions of Past, Present and Future (of an existent) are unified together 
by the relation of "becoming", "turning into " or uexisting as". The coins which 
255 履，p. 170. 
256 BN, p. 182. 
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“have their Past" mean that they have been or have existed as the money that was 
used in the Medieval period, but the same coins become and exist as antiques now. 
The watch which "has its Future" signifies that it is still existing as my property now, 
but the same watch is going to become or will exist as the belongings of my girlfriend. 
Thus, the Past, Present and Future of an existent are not "three different 
existents"; they are just the different aspects or expressions of the being of one 
and the same existent. An existent which "has its own Past，，is an existent which 
has existed as and becomes from that which no longer exists, and an existent 
which "has its own Future" is one which will exist as and going to become its own 
Future. 
The findings here hint us the following thing: an existent would "have its own 
Past" or "have its own Future" only if it can differentiate and separate its own being 
into different parts or aspects, and unify them together by the relation of “becoming”. 
It indicates that only a For-itself will be able to truly have its own Past and Future. 
First of all, the Past and Future of an existent is that which does not exist or without 
presence. The case here suggests that the Past and the Future of an existent are always 
negatites: they are exactly characterized or constituted by non-being or absence. Thus, 
only the For-itself — the existent which nihilates — will be able to be conscious of or 
understands the Past and the Future of different existents. Furthermore, we can see 
that the Past and the Future of an existent is always related to its Present in the way of 
becoming. It shows that only an existent which, in its being, projects and surpasses 
“ahead of” itself would genuinely "has its own Past" or "has its own Future". Our 
analysis of the ekstasis of Transcendence has exhibited that the For-itself is an existent 
which is always projecting and becoming its Yov-iisoXf-yet-to-become. Thus, only the 
For-itself can truly be understood as an existent which “has its own Past" and 
"Future". However, we have not yet reached the essence of the phenomenon here: 
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how do the Past and the Future of the For-itself relate to its Present? How does the 
For-itself which I was become the For-itself which I am, and the I am become the I 
will be? The following paragraph tells us the answer: 
The past... is that which is without possibility of any sort; it is that which 
has consumed its possibilities. I have to be that which no longer depends on 
my being-able-to-be, that which is already in itself all which it can be. The 
past which I am, I have to be with no possibility of not being it.... [F]rom 
the content of the past as such I can remove nothing, and I can add nothing 
to it. In other words the past which I was is what it is; it is an in-itself like 
9 S7 
the things in the world. 
It is what the temporal dimension of Past means for the For-itself. What about 
the Future of the For-itself? Sartre also tells us the following observation: 
The Future is the determining being which the For-itself has to be. There is 
a Future because the For-itself has to be its being instead of simply being 
it.258 
. . .[T]his Future which I have to be is simply my possibility of presence to 
being beyond being. In this sense the Future is strictly opposed to the 
Past.259 
The Future is the continual possibilization of possibles — as the meaning of 
the present For-itself in so far as this meaning is problematic and as such 
• . 260 radically escapes the present For-itself. 
As we can see, each of the latter temporal dimensions is in fact the possibles of 
the preceding one (I shall further elaborate this point below). Nevertheless, we should 
note that there is a subtle but important difference between them. We should be 
careful that the Past of the For-itself is the possibility or possibles it has determined 
257 BN, p. 170. 
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and consumed^ while the Future of the For-itself is the possibility or possibles it 
has not yet determined or consumed. Let us, first of all, look at the meaning of the 
Past of the For-itself. In our previous analysis，we can see that the For-itself is an 
existent which always projects or surpasses towards its possibles and value. The 
possibles and value which the For-itself projects are a part of itself which is absent 
and not yet determined, and the For-itself would be destined to determine this part of 
itself through its choices. In the process of choosing, the For-itself is going to become 
and exist as the particular possible it has chosen and accepted, and not to become or 
exist as those possibles which it has refused or rejected. This implies that "choosing" 
is always a process which eliminates the undeterminedness of our being. In other 
words, every choice of us is a process which "consumes" our possibilities, and what 
the For-itself has chosen would immediately become its "former" possibles. Such 
"consumption" of the possibles will bring and result in the own determinedness of the 
For-itself. Let us refer back to the example in our former discussion of Transcendence. 
In that case, I am the For-itself who has stolen money from my neighbours. Maybe I 
will try to confess, to keep stealing money, or to pretend that nothing has happened 
afterwards; but no matter what do I project and choose, we can still be sure I will 
perpetually exist as a person who "has stolen money from my neighbours". My own 
consumed possibility is always a part of my being’ and it is a part which I can never 
alter or deny. This consumed possibility of me is neither simply an attribute of me, nor 
is it the possibles which ‘‘belong to" somebody other than me. I, the For-itself which 
exists in the Present, am exactly that person who has once existed as or becomes from 
the one who steals. The example shows that the consumed possibilities or possibles of 
a For-itself will become a determined part of his or her being; the existent which 
exists in the Present is an existent which becomes from its Past. As that which has 
been，the Past of the For-itself exists as a closed fact that possesses definite 
153 
essence, and separates from the present For-itself; thus, the Past of the For-itself 
is an In-itself. This determined and absent part of the being of For-itself is what 
we mean by its Past, 
This observation implies that the For-itself always projects, surpasses towards 
and chooses its possibles (and value) by "carrying about" the determinedness of its 
own Past. It means that it is impossible for a For-itself to exist without “having its 
own Past". This is what Sartre means when he says that the Past of a For-itself is that 
• • 261 • • which always haunts the For-itself. In this case, its Past appears to it as something 
that is "given"; it is the unalterable and determined “fact of my condition" which I am 
pre-destined to face every time when I make my new choice. This clearly indicates the 
following thing: 
"Facticity" and ‘‘Past” are two words to indicate one and the same thing. 
The Past, in fact, like Facticity, is the invulnerable contingency of the 
• • • • •鲁鲁 a 2^ 2 
in-itself which I have to be, without any possibility of not being it. 
What it is behind it as the perpetual surpassed. It is precisely this surpassed 
facticity which we call the Past. The Past then is a necessary structure of the 
For-itself; for the For-itself can exist only as a nihilating surpassing, and this 
surpassing implies something surpassed.263 
The Past of a For-itself is the Facticity of this very existent. As we know, the Past 
of us is something which we can never change. It is something which I can never 
abandon or choose. Yet I am always bound to face it in my being and choices. I cannot 
exist as a person or For-itself without my Past, and I can never choose and determine 
my possibles without "carrying about" my Past. It indicates that the Past of the 
For-itself is something which constitutes the factical situation where it is involved or 
261 厦，p. 166. 
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engaged in. We should now agree that the fundamental meaning of the temporal 
dimension of the Past lies in the being of the For-itself. To say that a For-itself “has 
its own Past" always means that the For-itself is, in its being, destined to get 
involved or engaged in the factical situation constituted (partly) by the consumed 
possibilities of its own - the For-itself is always an existent which was its own Past. 
If the Past of the For-itself is defined by and grounded in the consumed and 
determined possibilities of the being of the For-itself, then the Future of the For-itself 
would certainly be related to the unconsumed and undetermined possibilities of its 
being. As we can see, the For-itself is an existent which always projects and surpasses 
towards the non-being or absent part of itself. Unlike its own consumed possibles -
which is determined as closed facts with definite essences - the unconsumed possibles 
that are newly projected by the For-itself are undetermined and without definite 
essence. It signifies that these new possibles of the For-itself are open to the 
determination or choices of the For-itself. It is important to note that, first of all, these 
undetermined possibles projected by the For-itself are not merely the attributes or 
parts that are “possessed” by it as its “belongings”. These undetermined possibles of 
the For-itself are just representing the undetermined aspects of its own, and they are 
related to the present For-itself by the relation of becoming - i.e., the For-itself is 
going to become or exist as those possibles it chooses to be. We have already 
explicated this in the detailed discussions above, and I shall not repeat it in length here. 
Nevertheless, there is another characteristic of the Future of the For-itself which we 
must pay attention to. The projection and consumption of possibles of the For-itself is 
not a single process that can be finished once and for all. It is rather a continuous 
process: 
I project myself toward the Future in order to merge there with that which I 
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lack; that is, with that which if synthetically added to my Present would 
make me what I am. Thus what the For-itself has to be as presence to being 
beyond being is its own possibility.264 
As we can see, the being of the human reality or For-itself is a dynamic and 
successive process. It means that the particular Present of a For-itself always becomes 
it Past, and its particular Future becomes a "former" Future. Perhaps we can further 
elaborate this with our example of stealing. Originally, I am a person or a For-itself 
who has "never stolen anything" in the Past, and at the same time I project a number 
of my own possibles. Latter, I have chosen to “steal money from my neighbours". In 
this case, my own possibles of stealing will no longer exist as a Future of me; upon 
my choice and action, it has been determined and consumed, and become my Past. I 
will now exist as a person or For-itself who “has stolen money". However, my being 
towards the Future or my projection of possibles does not simply end here. I do not 
only consume and determine my former possibles, and I do not simply turn them into 
my Past. At the moment when I consume my possibles, I arrive at a new factical 
situation, and simultaneously projects and surpasses towards my new possibles again. 
I find that I can never deny that I have existed as a person who has stolen money, but I 
also find that I can determine and choose my new possibles — let say, to confess or, on 
the contrary, to steal again. The example here shows that the For-itself is an existent 
which continuously projects and surpasses towards the possibles and value of its own. 
I will perpetually exist "ahead of’ myself, and also try to restore the missing totality 
projected in my being. This is the reason why Sartre says that the Future of the 
For-itself would be the “continual possibilization of possibles". To put it differently, 
the Future of me is defined by and grounded in the continuous Transcendence of my 
being. It is this repeated projection (and consumption) of possibilities which makes 
2M BN 184. 
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the For-itself a dynamic existent, and it is from this process which the For-itself 
understands the continuity of time: the continuous flow of time is the same as the 
continuous projection and consumption of the possibilities of the For-itself. 
For the For-itself, “to project itself and exist toward the Future" is the same as to 
restore the missing totality of its own self or value. Therefore, to say that a For-itself 
"has its own Future" means that the For-itself is, in its being, destined to project 
and surpass towards its undetermined possibles and value continuously. 
4.4.6 The primary structure of time 
We should now be able to understand the primary structure of time. We first 
discovered that the three temporal dimensions always reveal themselves as the 
particular Past, Present and Future which "belong to" a certain existent. Our latter 
analysis shows that this existent can only be the For-itself. On the one hand, the 
For-itself is an existent which always discloses or reveals its own being to other 
existents; it always differentiates and separates the being of its own away from its 
object. This is how the For-itself is “present to " other existents within the world. 
On the other hand, the For-itself is an existent which always consumes its former 
possibilities, and simultaneously surpasses towards its new possibilities; it always 
transcends towards its unachieved value on the basis of its factical situation. This is 
how the For-itself "has existed as its own Past" and "will exist as its Future". The 
primary meaning of the temporal dimensions of Past and Future are understood as 
the way how the For-itself exists; it is the mode of being of the For-itself. Together 
with our previous analysis of the Present of the For-itself, we can conclude that the 
primary structure and meaning of time 一 i.e., the temporal dimensions of Past, 
Present and Future - is defined by and grounded in the being of the For-itself, 
Although these temporal dimensions are representing different aspects of the being (or 
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nihilation) of the For-itself, we must bear in mind that they are not something that are 
separated from each other: 
As Present, Past, Future — all at the same time - the For-itself dispersing its 
being in three dimensions is temporal due to the fact that it nihilates itself. 
No one of these dimensions has any ontological priority over the other; 
none of them can exist without the other two. 
The three temporal dimensions are just the different aspects of the being of one 
and the same For-itself. Thus, the temporal dimensions of Past, Present and Future 
always reveal themselves as a structural whole, and none of these three temporal 
dimensions can exist independently. The For-itself is an existent which, in its being, 
separates itself into aspects that are ‘‘present” or “absence，’, while unifies these 
aspects of its own by the relation of “becoming”. This mode of being of the 
For-itself is what Sartre calls Temporality, 
The lengthy analysis of this chapter should be able to show that the nihilation of 
the For-itself is proceeded in a number of aspects, and all of them are expressing 
themselves differently. These different aspects or expressions of the nihilation of the 
For-itself are what Sartre means by the ekstases. Firstly, when the For-itself nihilates 
the In-itself as transcendent objects, the overall givenness of these transcendent 
objects in turn constitute the pre-destined or determined aspects of the being of this 
For-itself. It means that the For-itself is an existent which is always involved or 
engaged in given situation — i.e., the indicative complex which is composed of 
different human tasks, projects, values, and instrumental things. This mode of being of 
the For-itself is its Facticity. Second, the For-itself does not just nihilate its object, but 
it also nihilates itself. It always projects its absent and undetermined part of 
266 BN 202. 
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For-itself-yet-to-become "ahead" of itself. At the same time, the For-itself projects or 
surpasses towards the unachievable totality of its own and complete self. It is through 
this process of Transcendence which the For-itself acquires the possibility of its being, 
and it is the way how the For-itself introduces value into its being and the world: the 
unachievable self of the For-itself is exactly its own value. Last but not least, we find 
that it is the Temporality of the For-itself which unifies these different and separated 
aspects of its nihilation. The temporal being of the For-itself indicates that it is an 
existent which consumes or becomes from its former possibles, and also that which 
projects and surpasses towards its unconsumed and new possibles. This continuous 
process of consumption (the "becoming") and projection (the "surpassing towards") 
of possibles is the Temporality of the For-itself. These observations should suffice to 
tell us the concrete ways which For-itself experiences or exists in its everyday being. 
The For-itself is an existent which surpasses towards its future possibles and 
projects value from its specific past and situation. It is through this mode of being 
which the For-itself introduces what we mean by value into its own being and the 
world. Here we can conclude that value is a part of the eidetic and ontological 
structure of the For-itself; it is how the For-itself exists. 
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Chapter 5 
The phenomenon of bad faith {mauvaise foi) 
§5.1 The existential psychoanalysis 
5.1.1 The necessity of an existential psychoanalysis 
The discussion in the last chapter has clearly shown the relation between value 
and the ekstases of the For-itself. As we can see, value is neither a transcendent object 
nor a substantial existent that is "outside" consciousness. It is also not something that 
is given and pre-destined to us by our situation. What we mean by value is a part of 
the eidetic and ontological structure of the For-itself. It is the unachievable totality of 
the own self of the For-itself, and this totality is always projected or surpassed towards 
by the For-itself in its Transcendence. This ekstasis of Transcendence or projection of 
value can never be performed without the other two human ekstases. Firstly, every 
projection or surpassing away of the For-itself begins "from" a given situation, and it 
reveals that the Transcendence of the For-itself is always intertwined with its Facticity: 
"to transcend" always means that the For-itself is escaping and surpassing away from 
the pre-destined indicative complex in which it is involved or engaged. Secondly, 
every projection or surpassing of the For-itself can be understood only within the 
holistic structure of time, and it signifies that the Transcendence of the For-itself 
always entails its Temporality: "to transcend" always means that the For-itself has 
become from its Past and is going to become its Future. These observations indicate 
that value is always introduced into the world through the being of the For-itself, and 
it will be incomprehensible or futile to mention value outside the being of For-itself. 
Shall we end up our analysis of the For-itself here? It is true that the lengthy 
discussions in Chapter 4 have sufficiently shown us the universal structure — including 
the basic meaning of nihilation, and the various aspects or expressions of this 
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process - of the experiences or being of the For-itself. Nevertheless, our readers may 
still wonder how and where these observations are derived from, if they are not the 
assertions of any speculative or dogmatic philosophies. Their doubts here have 
revealed the significant and necessary role of the existential psychoanalysis in Sartre's 
investigation. Our analysis in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.3) has shown that 
phenomenology is not sheerly an investigation which aims at showing us the universal 
structure or meaning of the being of human reality. As a study of "phenomenon", it 
always requires itself to begin and found its research upon a descriptive examination 
of the concrete and specific experiences of the being of human reality, and the 
existential psychoanalysis exactly provides the investigation of universal structure 
with the most substantial type of validity — the validity that comes from the concrete 
experiences of our everyday existence. If Sartre is really performing a 
phenomenological investigation about the experiences or being of human reality, then 
it will be impossible for him to omit the part of existential psychoanalysis. 
We should now agree that it is necessary for Sartre to include an existential 
psychoanalysis in his project. Nevertheless, not every type or instance of human 
experiences is "suitable" and "worthwhile" to become the subject matter of existential 
psychoanalysis. We know that the project of BN is a phenomenological examination 
that is driven by an anthropological-ethical motive or concern — i.e., it intends to show 
that "the origin and nature of value" is grounded in the being of human reality. The 
motive and concern of his examination implies that only those human experiences 
which can show how value is introduced and projected into the world through the 
being of human reality would be qualified to become the subject matter of the 
existential psychoanalysis. In other words, the phenomenon or human experience 
chosen for this analysis should be able to show that human reality always exists with 
the three human ekstases we have mentioned. Such a criterion does not imply that 
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there are human experiences which are “neutral，’ and not invested with any sort of 
267 • • • 
value. It only indicates that some phenomenon or human experiences can reveal 
“the origin and nature of value" in a way that is clearer and more apparent than other 
phenomena. 
5.1.2 A lie to oneself and a lie to the other 
So which specific phenomenon has Sartre chosen as his target of existential 
psychoanalysis? The first phenomenon chosen by Sartre is what he calls bad faith {la 
268 • 269 
mauvaise foi) or "a lie to oneself'. It seems that the meaning of this term and 
phenomenon is lucid in our daily language or living. For example, we always say that 
somebody is deceiving himself or herself, or is in a state of self-deception, when a 
person refuses to face directly, and hence flee from the difficulties or situations he or 
267 Our previous a nalysis has already shown that every existent in this world is either instruments or 
that which projects its own value. It signifies that every existent in this world is somehow "invested 
with" or "involved in" value, and thus all of them would be "qualified" as the subject matter of 
existential psychoanalysis. However, we should also agree that some phenomena or human experiences 
can reveal the structure of human reality in a clearer manner than other phenomena or human 
experiences. For example, the negatites or the phenomenon of absence can let us observe the nihilation 
of the For-itself more easily than other phenomena; the entity Dasein would takes a number of 
priorities over other possible candidates in the questioning of the Seinsfrage. And as we will show, the 
phenomenon of bad faith can provide us with more hint to observe the origin and nature of value — i.e., 
the way how human reality projects its value. Thus, the aforementioned criterion does not rule out the 
possibility for us to take other phenomena or human experiences as the subject matter of existential 
psychoanalysis. This criterion only expresses a practical or operative consideration of existential 
psychoanalysis — i.e., some phenomena or human experiences will provide us with an easier path to 
approach certain themes. 
268 In French, the word ''mauvais" is used in various ways. It can be used to signify something of "poor 
standard", "incorrect", "morally bad" or even "immoral". The word “/of’ has a relatively stable 
meaning, as it is used just to denote “a faith" or "intent". Here, we should pay special attention to the 
word “mauvais”. It is true that this word always expresses a certain degree of judgment or evaluation 
on the things it refers to. However, it is not necessarily for this judgment to be an ethical or moral one. 
For example, when the French says that a girl has got onto a wrong train (e.g., one which goes to 
somewhere else other than her original destination), they will say “elle a pris le mauvais train”. The 
daily usage of the term shows that it is not a must for us to understand mauvaise foi as a phenomenon 
or practice that is "immoral" or "unethical"; it also refers to cases where we have a faith that is 
"inappropriate" or "wrong" — in the sense that this "faith" is one that does not correspond to some sort 
of "fact" or "reality". As we wil l see, mauvaise foi is referring to the phenomenon or practice where a 
For-itself has concealed and neglected certain aspects or ekstases of its own being. It is not necessary 
that this For-itself is doing something morally or ethically wrong; it only indicates that this For-itself is 
not able to apprehend its being or exist in an “appropriate，，way — e.g., this For-itself has considered 
itself as a passive In-itself. 
269 BN, pp. 86-116. 
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she encounters. However, our attentive readers will soon discover that this brief and 
common sensical understanding of bad faith is far from providing us with any 
substantial information about this phenomenon. What exactly does it mean for 
someone "to lie to himself or herself'? To answer the question, we must resort to the 
comparison which Sartre has made between bad faith and falsehood - a lie to 
somebody other than oneself. Sartre says: 
Lying is a negative attitude, we will agree to that. But this negation does not 
bear on consciousness itself; it aims only at the transcendent. The essence of 
the lie implies in fact that the liar actually is in complete possession of the 
truth which he is hiding. 
It is sufficient that an over-all opacity hide his intentions from the Other; it 
is sufficient that the Other can take the lie for truth. By the lie consciousness 
affirms that it exists by nature as hidden from the Other, it utilizes for its 
own profit the ontological duality of myself and myself in the eyes of the 
Other.271 
There are two essential characteristics which we can find from every particular 
instance of falsehood. Firstly, in every case of falsehood, the liar is directing his or her 
negative attitude onto some state of affairs or events. For example, the weather is 
good and sunny outside, but I lie to my daughter that it is raining heavily and we are 
not going to the playground today. What I am hiding from my daughter — and 
negated - is a state of affair or event which is currently happening. The state of affair 
or event I am hiding up is obviously made up of the existents (e.g., the sun, the 
playground) and referential relation (e.g., the pleasant weather which is suitable for 
outdoor activities, the games being played by the children) that are within the world. It 
implies that every case of falsehood is imposing or expressing its negative attitude 
210 BN, p. 87. 
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about the presence or absence of the In-itself or transcendent object. Second, every 
case of falsehood is an activity that is directed towards somebody. A liar is always a 
person who is hiding up the truth from the other, and a lie is always a truth that is 
altered or distorted in order to deceive somebody other than the liar. It is the radical 
difference or separation between this conscious existent and that conscious existent -
or this stream of consciousness and that stream of consciousness — which makes this 
concealment and alteration of truth possible. It shows that every case of lying must 
presuppose a duality of the liar and somebody other than the liar; or else it will 
become a lie to oneself and collapse into the phenomenon of bad faith. This 
characteristic of falsehood signifies that it is always founded upon the eidetic and 
ontological structure of / — no matter in a thetic or non-thetic sense 一 and the Other. 
The structure of bad faith is very different from that of falsehood. In opposition 
to a lie to somebody other than oneself, the phenomenon of bad faith is showing the 
following two characteristics. These characteristics have made it a suitable 
phenomenon to demonstrate the eidetic and ontological structure of the For-itself: 
But there exist more subtle behaviors, the description of which will lead us 
further into the inwardness of consciousness. ... It is best to choose and to 
examine one determined attitude which is essential to human reality and 
which is such that consciousness instead of directing its negation outward 
turns it toward itself. This attitude, it seems to me, is bad faith (mauvaise 
r •�272 
foi)-
Bad faith then has in appearance the structure of falsehood. Only what 
changes everything is the fact that in bad faith it is from myself that I am 
hiding the truth. Thus the duality of the deceiver and the deceived does not 
exist here. Bad faith on the contrary implies in essence the unity of a single 
‘ 273 
consciousness. 
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First of all, the negative attitude of the liar (or more precisely, the self-deceiver) 
is not directed onto the state of affairs or events within the world. In the case of bad 
faith, what the liar tries to hide or negate is the way how he or she exists. For example, 
a man had acted as an indifferent spectator and did nothing to save a drowning girl 
whom he met some days ago. Latter, he starts to feel guilty about this, and he then 
tries to relieve this guilty feeling by deceiving himself. He keeps telling himself that 
he did not save the girl not because he is a coward, but out of some forgivable reason 
(e.g., he is not so good at swimming and life-saving techniques, or he thinks that the 
girl is playing in the river, or he believes that someone who is more capable than him 
will save the girl). Here we can see that what the man denies is not a state of affair or 
event that is within the world. From the very beginning, he admitted that he had not 
saved the girl. What he denies is that he was involved in this incident, and was capable 
to do something in order to change the outcome; he just considers himself as an inert 
or passive spectator that is uninvolved in the situation or restricted from any acts. 
Thus, what he negates or denies is that he is an existent which, in its being, nihil at es — 
e.g., as an existent which nihilates in the aspects of Transcendence, Facticity and 
Temporality. Put it differently，the person who is in bad faith always (in a certain 
way) denies that he or she is a For-itself who projects and surpasses towards valuef 
and considers himself or herself as an existent which exists like an In-itself. 
Moreover, the phenomenon of bad faith does not presuppose the duality of liar and 
somebody other than the liar. In the case of bad faith, the liar and the one who is 
deceived are always one and the same person. It indicates that a person in bad faith is, 
at the same time, hiding up the truth and aware of the truth. In the previous example, 
we can see that the man who did not save the girl is hiding the truth from himself. He 
tries to tell himself that he is not so good at swimming or life-saving technique, or he 
thinks that the girl is playing in the river, etc. The excuses he made up exactly show 
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that he knows the truth, and they are all persuasions that are "tailor-made" to disprove 
or conceal that "he is a coward". Only when he knows the unbearable truth that he 
himself is a coward, can he compose or choose those appropriate and corresponding 
excuses which can perfectly hide up the truth he wants to deny. Hence, the 
phenomenon of bad faith always requires a unity between the liar and the one who is 
deceived; every case of self-deception is founded upon the unity of a single 
consciousness or conscious existent. This unique structure of bad faith makes it highly 
suitable to be the subject matter of existential psychoanalysis. As we can see, it is a 
process which the For-itself attempts to negate its own mode of being or its nihilation. 
The For-itself is the one who negates or nihilates (to lie), and it is also the one who is 
being negated or nihilated. This structure indicates that the phenomenon of bad 
faith is a matter about how the For-itself relates to or nihilates itself，and it implies 
that every characteristic we observe from this phenomenon will necessarily be the 
eidetic and ontological structure the For-itself, These circumstances imply that the 
phenomenon of bad faith possesses a priority or advantage in demonstrating the 
eidetic and ontological structure of the For-itself or human reality. 
5.1.3 The ‘‘anti-ethical’’ character of bad faith 
It is important to note that this demonstrative consideration is not the only reason 
that induces Sartre to examine this phenomenon. The phenomenon of bad faith or 
self-deception is also closely related to the underlying anthropological-ethical 
concern of the project in BN. As Sartre says: 
Even though the existence of bad faith is very precarious, and though it 
belongs to the kind of psychic structures which we might call metastable, it 
presents nonetheless an autonomous and durable form. It can even be the 
normal aspect of life for a very great number of people. A person can live in 
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bad faith, which does not mean that he does not have abrupt awakenings to 
cynicism or to good faith, but which implies a constant and particular style 
of life.274 
If bad faith is possible, it is because it is an immediate, permanent threat to 
every project of the human being; it is because consciousness conceals in its 
being a permanent risk of bad faith.275 
It is reasonable to believe that the bad faith is a phenomenon which most of us (if 
not all), as a For-itself or human reality, should have experienced or even practiced. 
The phenomenon is so familiar to us that it can even be taken for granted and 
considered as the "normal aspect" and "a constant and particular style" of life by a 
large number of us. The generality of this phenomenon, together with its priorities in 
demonstrating the eidetic and ontological structure of our being, makes it a suitable 
subject matter for existential psychoanalysis: any observations we obtain from such a 
descriptive examination (and the corresponding ontology of human reality or 
For-itself) will be valid for all those who admit and recognize that they have ever 
practiced and lived in bad faith. Thus, the existential psychoanalysis of this 
phenomenon would satisfy the anthropological concern of Sartre's project — i.e., to 
explicate the essential characteristics or the Wesen of human reality. Nevertheless, it is 
the ethical implication of this phenomenon which makes it truly important and 
appropriate to be examined in existential psychoanalysis. Our discussion in Chapter 2 
has revealed that BN is a project which aims to disclose "the origin and the nature of 
value”216. It eventually shows that human reality or the For-itself is an existent which, 
in its being, projects and surpasses towards its own value, and it is through the being 
of this existent that value is introduced into the world. It indicates that "the origin and 
274 BN,p. 90. 
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the nature of value" lies in the being of human reality or the For-itself, and it is in this 
sense we say that the project of 餅 is a phenomenological anthropology that carries 
ethical implication. What is the relation between the ethical meaning of BN and the 
phenomenon of bad faith? As we can see, a person is deceiving oneself when he or 
she tries to (in different ways) deny that he or she is a For-itself, and considers his or 
herself as an In-itself. It means that the one who is in bad faith denies that he or she is 
an existent that projects and surpasses towards its own value. This characteristic of 
bad faith discloses that it is a very common phenomenon, attitude or practice that 
intends to conceal "the origin and the nature of value it is “a constant and 
particular style of life “ which prevents most of us from understanding that value is a 
part of the eidetic and ontological structure of ourselves, and it is through our own 
being — the being of the For-itself or human reality — which "value " is introduced into 
the world. Thus, bad faith will certainly be a phenomenon that is contrary to the 
ethical implication and concern of BN. It will be impossible for Sartre to reveal ‘‘the 
origin and the nature" of value without examining this phenomenon, and exhibiting 
the "anti-ethical" 一 in the sense that it prevents us to understand “the origin and the 
nature “ of value, and conceals the ethical implication of Sartre s project 一 
characteristics of this general attitude of human reality. 
§5.2 The descriptive examination on concrete instances of bad faith 
We should now be more familiar with the meaning and role of the descriptive 
examination of bad faith. On the one hand, the phenomenon or practice of bad faith is 
a process which the For-itself negates or nihilates itself. It implies that every 
characteristic we observe from this phenomenon will necessarily be the eidetic and 
ontological structure of the For-itself. On the other hand, bad faith is a common 
attitude, “a constant and particular style of life" which prevents us from understanding 
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“the origin and the nature of value". It has concealed the fact that value is introduced 
into the world through our being - i.e., the being of human reality or the For-itself. 
This indicates that bad faith is a kind of prejudicial attitude which the 
anthropological-ethical project in BN must cope with. 
Perhaps we should stop discussing the phenomenon of bad faith in a formal and 
abstract way. As an existential psychoanalysis, the analysis of bad faith should be 
founded upon a qualitative and detailed study of concrete instances. The situation here 
suggests that we should move on and look at the concrete examples of this 
phenomenon in a detailed manner. It is fortunate that Sartre has provided us with a 
number of typical examples of bad faith in BN. It is for sure that we can use any 
example or experience of bad faith that are found in our everyday being to be the 
subject matter of this descriptive examination; these concrete examples or experiences 
of us are equally valid when compare to the instances provided by Sartre. However, 
for the convenience of discussions, we should better restrict our upcoming analysis 
within the limits of the examples that we found in BN. 
5.2.1 The dating woman (1): the confinement of human Transcendence and 
Temporality 
In BN, the phenomenon of bad faith is elaborated mainly in two examples. The 
first example is about a woman who is having a date with a man whom she likes, and 
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in this case she attempts to deceive herself in two different ways. Let us look at 
these two cases one by one. 
(a) Example a nalysis 
It is the first time when this woman hangs out with a particular man, and she 
277 BN, pp. 96-99. 
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knows very well that this man is trying to seduce her and to have sex with her. On the 
one hand, she welcomes the actions of the man; she enjoys quite a lot the flirts and 
sexual seductions from the man. On the other hand, she thinks that it will be too 
humiliating for her to admit that she is welcoming and enjoying these seductions. So 
instead of recognizing the intentions of the man and her own desire of being seduced, 
the woman tries to persuade herself that the actions of the man are not flirts and 
seductions. She tells herself that they are just pure admirations and respects — 
obviously some non-sexual ones — originated from a sincere and respectable man, and 
are addressed wholly to her admirable personality. Through this process of 
self-persuasion and re-interpretation, she can eliminate any erotic or sexual 
implications of their interactions, and can continue to enjoy the flirts and seductions 
of the man any longer. How is it possible for this woman to eliminate the sexual 
connotations implied in their interactions, and ascribe their actions to the "innocent" 
personalities of herself and the man? Sartre says: 
She... does not want to see possibilities of temporal development which his 
conduct presents. She restricts this behavior to what is in the present; she 
does not wish to read in the phrases which he addresses to her anything 
other than their explicit meaning. If he says to her, ‘‘I find you so 
attractive!" she disarms this phrase of its sexual background; she attaches to 
the conversation and to the behavior of the speaker, the immediate meanings, 
which she imagines as objective qualities. The man who is speaking to her 
appears to her sincere and respectful as the table is round or square, as the 
wall coloring is blue or gray. The qualities thus attached to the person she is 
listening to are in this way fixed in a permanence like that of things, which 
is no other than the projection of the strict present of the qualities into the 
temporal flux. 
Her self-deception here is composed of the following two procedures. First of all, 
278 BN,pp. 96-97. 
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the woman tries to confine the meaning of human actions (in this case, it refers to the 
actions of her and the man) to the instantaneous moment when they are performed. 
This understanding of action implies that she is treating time simply as an infinite 
series of discrete "now，，moments. According to this understanding of time, human 
actions are considered as an aggregation of discrete and unrelated acts that are 
performed at different instants, and are longer apprehended as a totalized series of 
actions with specific and consistent meaning — in this case, a series of related and 
consistent actions which aim to seduce this woman. It is in this way that the woman 
can successfully hide any sexual implications from the interactions between herself 
and the man. She does so by “gluing” every individual acts to the moment when they 
are done. Moreover, the aforementioned understanding of time (as an infinite series of 
“now” moments) implies that the woman treats herself and the man as existents which 
only exist in their Present aspect or dimension. In the eyes of the woman, they are 
u inert" or static existents which neither come from their Pasts nor become their 
Futures. They are just like those existents which have determined essences or 
"objective qualities", and their actions (either the seductive actions from the man or 
the tacit consent of the woman) are similar to the different adumbrations or profiles 
that are shown by a thing or a dead object. In this way, she can ascribe those “clean” 
and "innocent" actions of them to their respective personalities. 
(b) Structural analysis 
What does this instance of bad faith show us? As we can see, the self-deception 
of this woman is founded on her understanding of time. She can consider human 
actions as discrete and unrelated, and human realities as objects with “objective 
qualities’’，only because she is capable of understanding the meaning of time — even 
though she understands it as an infinite series of discrete "now “ moments. The 
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situation here implies that, in order to deceive herself, this woman must be an existent 
which is (more or less) conscious of or understands the meaning of time. In other 
words, this woman must be a For-itself which exists in its Temporality. 
We have discovered that the first bad faith of the dating woman has presupposed 
that she is a For-itself - i.e., an existent which understands the meaning of time, and 
exists in its Temporality. However, why is it necessary for her bad faith here to 
presuppose her own Temporality? What is the relation between her practice of bad 
faith and the Temporality of her being? At this point, we should refer back to our 
previous analysis of Temporality. The analysis in the last chapter has revealed that 
time is primarily a separation which is done on the basis of a continuous or successive 
dimension, and this continuity and succession of time is grounded in the Temporality 
of the For-itself. As we know, the For-itself is an existent which projects, surpasses or 
transcends towards its own possibilities. This projection or Transcendence is not a 
process which is done once and for all, but is a process which is conducted repeatedly 
or continuously. This is what Sartre means when he says that the For-itself always 
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exists in its "continual possibilization of possibles" . It is exactly this repeated 
projection (and consumption) of possibilities which makes the For-itself a dynamic 
existent, and it is from this mode of being which the For-itself understands the 
continuity of time. But what will happen if a For-itself neglects or conceals this 
repeated Transcendence of its being, and attempts to consider himself or herself 
as an existent which does not transcend at alll This would exactly result in the 
problematic understanding of time that is found in the self-deception of the 
woman here. First of all, when this woman overlooks the repeated Transcendence of 
her own being, she will fail to recognize the continuity of time. She will only notice 
that the experiences or meanings of her being are separated from each other; some of 
279 厦，p. 186. 
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these experiences or happenings are absent as no longer, some others are absent as 
not yet, while some of them are present here. However, these experiences or meanings 
do not possess any temporal relatedness — e.g., they are not linked together by the 
relation of becoming. What remains in between them is absolute separation, and they 
are nothing more than an aggregation of discrete and unrelated experiences or 
meanings. This is the way how she generates a distorted understanding of time as an 
infinite series of discrete “now” moments. 
This distorted understanding of time further allows her to neglect other aspects of 
her being or phenomenon. Sartre says: 
But she arrests this transcendence, she glues it down with all the facticity of 
the present; respect is nothing other than respect, it is an arrested surpassing 
• • • 2 8 0 which no longer surpasses itself toward anything. 
We have seen also the use which our young lady made of our 
being-in-the-midst-of-the-world——i. e., of our inert presence as a passive 
object among other objects—in order to relieve herself suddenly from the 
functions of her being-in-the-world——that is, from the being which causes 
there to be a world by projecting itself beyond the world toward its own 
possibilities.281 
First of all, as long as she sticks to this distorted understanding of time, she will 
never be able to notice the temporal relatedness or unity between the momentary acts. 
It means that by considering time as an infinite series of “now “ moments, she can 
neglect the trans-temporal unity — or the value, or meaning — that runs through or 
synthesizes the momentary acts of herself and other For-itself. Under this 
circumstance, she can gladly eliminate the sexual or erotic implications that are 
observed in the interactions between herself and the man. From now on, their 
2S0BN,p. 99. 
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interactions will no longer appear as a totalized series of actions that are subsumed 
under a specific ideal unity, and it means that these actions will never be considered as 
those that carry consistent meaning. In this circumstance, their interactions are rather 
reduced to an aggregation of discrete and unrelated acts, and their meanings will be 
confined or "glued" merely to the instantaneous moments and particular factical 
situation they are performed. The flirts and the flattering from the man are interpreted 
literally and momentarily, and they are treated as pure admirations and respects 
towards the woman - for example, the sentence “you are so attractive!" is simply 
considered as an ordinary appraisal towards any young lady, and there is not any 
surplus meaning in this sentence other than its literal one. The body gestures of the 
man are also read instantaneously, and are seen as no more than the polite behavior of 
a gentleman — as in this case, the seductive touches or hugs are merely thought as the 
common greeting from a well-cultivated man. From this perspective, every action of 
the woman and the man seems to be acts that are absolutely “clean ” and “innocent’’ 
by themselves', all of their acts possess nothing more than their literal meanings, and 
appear as objective qualities which hold in every particular situation. 
Besides eliminating the meanings or values of actions, she can also hide herself 
from the dynamic characteristic of the being of For-itself. It means that the woman 
can treat herself and the man as inert or static existents, and ascribe to themselves the 
‘‘innocent，’personalities. As we can see, the woman has neglected the repeated 
Transcendence or Temporality of her being, and has apprehended time as an infinite 
series of “now” moments. By doing so, she can conceal the fact that she is an existent 
which continuously projects and consumes her own possibilities. It implies that she 
will understand herself and other For-itselfs — let say, the man who hangs out with 
her — as existents which exist without their Past and Future aspects. In her perspective, 
all existents are that which solely exist in its Present aspect. What does it mean by "to 
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exist without Transcendence" and “solely exist in its Present"? It simply means that 
this existent does not project or surpass towards its own undetermined part, and the 
totality - no matter the content, meaning or being - of this existent is always 
determined or pre-destined. In this case, it exists as an "inert" existent which 
possesses factual attributes, definite essences or "objective qualities"; and the totality 
or essences of it are always shown alongside every of its momentary manifestation. 
The characteristics of the existent we describe here is exactly the mode of being which 
belongs to the In-itself. Only an In-itself exists in its complete determinedness, and is 
understood as having its factual attributes and essences. Thus, by neglecting the 
repeated Transcendence or Temporality of the For-itself, the woman can successfully 
confine every For-itself to its Present aspect, and reduce it to a kind of definable 
things that exists in the mode of the In-itself. 
In this situation, the woman can further ascribe different "essences" — or in her 
eyes, "personalities" - to herself and to the man. As we know, the woman has already 
restricted the being of herself and the man to their Present aspects. It is in this way 
that she eliminates the sexual implications in their interactions, and considers each of 
their momentary acts as objectively “innocent” and uclean Under this circumstance, 
the woman can easily ascribe these "objective" qualities (or "personalities") of 
"innocent" and ‘‘clean’’ to herself and to the man, as if we attach or relate certain 
objective qualities to some definable dead objects or In-itselfs. In her eyes, both 
herself and the man are persons with noble personalities or essences; all of their 
actions are objectively innocent and clean, and these actions are done just in order to 
address the admirable personalities of the other. Here, we can conclude that the 
dating woman achieves her first bad faith by neglecting the repeated 
Transcendence of her Temporality. It eventually leads to the illusive 
understandings - in the sense that such an understanding has concealed the 
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ekstases of the being of her own and other For-itself - that all human acts are 
instantaneous, discrete and unrelated, and human realities or For-itselfs are 
existents which are deflnable with essences. 
5.2.2 The dating woman (2): the disintegration of human Transcendence and 
Facticity 
The analysis of the first example has provided us with two significant 
observations. First of all, it reveals that the first bad faith of the dating woman has 
presupposed the human ekstasis of Temporality (and also Transcendence). Second, 
this instance of self-deception is resulted when she tries to distort or conceal the 
Temporality of her being. However, is the phenomenon of bad faith only related to the 
human ekstasis of Temporality? What is the relation between this phenomenon and 
the rest of the two human ekstases — i.e., Facticity and Transcendence? And most 
important of all, what is the general structure or mechanism behind every instance of 
bad faith? 
(a) Example analysis 
To answer these questions, we must continue to analyze the example of the 
dating woman. As stated above, the woman is having a date with a particular man, and 
she is enjoying a lot. Latter, this man takes her hand, but she pretends that nothing has 
happened, and keeps on leaving her hands there. She just tells herself that this is 
merely a neutral or particular incident, and she should carry on the “intellectual” 
discussions about her own life and personality. At this moment, she treats her body as 
a dead object which does not belong to her, and separates her "soul" or "mind" 
away from her “body ". It is through this practice that the woman can delay any 
consent or resistance to the action of the man, and enjoy the flirts of the man without 
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any “ethical” burden. So how this woman can separate her “soul” from her “body”？ 
How can she pretend that the action of the man is something neutral? Below is 
Sartre's comment: 
But we see immediately that she uses various procedures in order to 
maintain herself in bad faith. She has disarmed the actions of her companion 
by reducing them to being only what they are; that is, to existing in the 
mode of the in-itself. But she permits herself to enjoy her desire, to the 
extent that she will apprehend it as not being what it is, will recognize its 
transcendence. Finally while sensing profoundly the presence of her own 
body——to the point of being aroused, perhaps—she realizes herself as not 
being her own body, and she contemplates it as though from above as a 
passive object to which events can happen but which can neither provoke 
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them nor avoid them because all its possibilities are outside of it. 
The beginning part of this quote points out that the first bad faith of the woman is 
resulted when she attempts to "disarmed the actions of her companion by reducing 
them to... existing in the mode of the in-itself." We have already gone through the 
mechanism and structure of this instance of bad faith, and I shall not repeat it here. 
But the other parts of this paragraph also tell us the underlying structure of the second 
bad faith of this woman. The bad faith here - i.e., to separate one's "soul" away 
from his or her "body" - is possible only if this woman is an existent which 
simultaneously exists in her Transcendence and Facticity. How does Sartre 
discover that these two ekstases are necessary to constitute her bad faith here? 
Originally, there is no such separation between the ‘‘soul” and “body” of this woman. 
As a For-itself, she is just absorbed in or living through her experiences of everyday 
being. In this fundamental and primary mode of being, she is just an existent which 
exists in the way of an animated body or an incarnated soul. This indicates that, at 
this level, there is no such separation of u soul" and "body" at all, and she is always 
2S2BN,pp. 97-98. 
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an existent which is simultaneously (and partly) spontaneous and passive. She can 
always freely imagine or anticipate anything she likes, to perform any actions she 
desires or chooses. However, all these must be done within the limitation of her 
situation or reality - for example, she is subjected to the limitation of her body of 
flesh, the corporeal barriers of her surroundings, the pre-destined indicative complex 
of human tasks and projects, etc. The separation of "soul" and "body" emerges only 
when she starts to consider the spontaneity and passivity of her being not in unity, but 
in separation and disintegration. By emphasizing the duality or separatedness of her 
spontaneity and passivity, and neglecting the unity between them, she can consider 
herself as an existent which seems to be composed of two independent and different 
parts. On the one hand, she thinks that she possesses an independent part, namely the 
"soul". She conceives her being as a pure spontaneity without any limitation - just 
like the God. On the other hand, she thinks that she possesses a discrete part of "her 
body". She apprehends her being as a pure passivity without any undeterminedness, 
and identical to a thing or dead object. It is by this separation of her spontaneity and 
passivity that she can split herself into two parts, and bring forth the duality (or a 
dualism in her eyes) of "soul" and "body". 
(b) S tructural analysis 
As we can see, every such bad faith — which tries to separate oneself into "soul" 
and "body" — must presuppose that the self-deceiver is an existent which is, in its 
being, simultaneously spontaneous and passive. What does it mean to say that an 
existent, in its being, spontaneously imagines, anticipates, chooses and projects? And 
what does it mean to say that an existent is, in its being, passively bound to and 
involved in its situation in a determined way? It is no more than saying that this 
existent is one which exists simultaneously in its own Transcendence and Facticity. 
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Our analysis here demonstrates that, similar to the first bad faith of this woman, her 
second bad faith is also grounded upon the human ekstases of her being. Why is it 
necessary for every case of bad faith to presuppose these three human ekstases? 
What is the general relation between the phenomenon of bad faith and our human 
ekstases? Sartre tells us the following observations on the relation between them: 
The basic concept which is thus engendered utilizes the double property of 
the human being, who is at once a facticity and a transcendence. These two 
aspects of human reality are and ought to be capable of a valid coordination. 
But bad faith does not wish either to coordinate them or to surmount them 
in a synthesis. Bad faith seeks to affirm their identity while preserving their 
differences. It must affirm facticity as being transcendence and 
transcendence as being facticity, in such a way that at the instant when a 
person apprehends the one，he can find himself abruptly faced with the 
other.283 
What counts here is that the formulae do not constitute new, solid structured 
ideas; on the contrary, they are formed so as to remain in perpetual 
disintegration and so that we may slide at any time from naturalistic present 
to transcendence and vice versa2M 
The paragraphs here have lucidly revealed the underlying mechanism and 
structure of bad faith. Our analysis in the last chapter has shown that the human 
ekstases of Facticity and Transcendence ought to be considered in a unified and 
holistic way. It means that these ekstases are intertwining or interdependent with one 
another, and they have to be lived through and apprehended as co-presence. On the 
one hand, a factical situation is always the ground or starting point where a For-itself 
transcends or surpasses towards its undetermined possibilities. It indicates that even 
though a For-itself is always bound to or involved in a pre-destined situation, it is still 
liable to become and exist as the possibilities it chooses (e.g., to choose those 
283 BN,p. 98. 
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available possibles that it can find in its situation). Thus, the Facticity of the For-itself 
does not signify that it is an existent which is totally determined, and it does not rule 
out the fact that this existent can become its For-itself-yet-to-become. On the other 
hand, every Transcendence of a For-itself has to be done within the boundary of its 
factical situation. It means that although a For-itself can project and become its 
undetermined possibilities, it is still subjected to the pre-destined orderings (e.g., the 
corporeal limitations，the exigencies of well-established human tasks and projects) of 
the reality. Hence, the Transcendence of the For-itself does not imply that it is an 
existent which is free from any limitations, and it does not exclude the fact that this 
existent is one which is always bound to the givenness of the world. 
The woman here in the example is trying to deceive herself by utilizing the 
unique relation between her Facticity and Transcendence. She does so by emphasizing 
that the Facticity and Transcendence are two human ekstases, while ignoring the fact 
that they should also be considered and existed in a co-present or in a unified way. 
Once she has disintegrated these ekstases and apprehending them as two discrete 
and separable aspects, she could emphasize anyone of them and neglect the other 
one - this is what Sartre calls the “slide，，between these ekstases. What results is 
that she can understand herself (or any other For-itself) from a naturalistic point 
of view. What would happen if a For-itself apprehends itself as an existent which 
solely transcends, and is not bounded to any factical situation? In this case, this 
For-itself would appear as if it is enjoying a "liberty of indifference" which is 
detached from the reality. In its own eyes, it becomes an existent which no longer 
exists in the reality; it is unaffected or unrelated to any incidents and happenings in 
the world, just like a transcendent object or In-itself - probably like a phantasm or 
God - which is absolutely isolated from all happenings of the “fleshy” and “secular” 
world. From this point of view, the For-itself can easily conceal the limitation or 
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givenness of its own being, and blindfold itself from anything that happens in the 
reality. This is exactly the case of the dating woman: she emphasizes her own 
Transcendence in an independent manner, and apprehends herself as a ‘‘purely 
intellectual soul" which stands away and aloof from its "fleshy and secular body". 
That is why this woman can overlook anything that happens to "her body" - e.g., that 
the man is now holding her hand. And what will happen if a For-itself considers itself 
as an existent which solely exists in a pre-destined situation without Transcendence — 
i.e., an existent without any projection or surpassing towards its possibilities? In this 
circumstance, this For-itself will appear to itself as if\i is something which is bound 
to a deterministic world, and completely subjected to the effects of mechanical 
causality. In its own eyes, it will exist as if it was an existent which no longer 
possesses any possibilities of its own; it is just like an In-itself which is passively and 
completely determined by factors other than its own self. From this perspective, the 
For-itself has successfully concealed the possibilities of its own being, and it can shirk 
any responsibilities that are related to its own choices. This is exactly the case of the 
man who did not save the drowning girl (the example we constructed at the beginning 
of this chapter): he emphasizes his own Facticity in an isolated manner, and considers 
himself as a "powerless witness" who is passively determined by the "objective 
causes and reasons" (his poor swimming skills or misjudgment, etc.) he enumerates. It 
is in this way that the man can excuse himself from not saving the girl. 
5.2.3 The homosexual : the manipulation and disintegration of human Temporality 
The example of the dating woman reveals that the phenomenon of bad faith is 
grounded upon the human ekstases of the For-itself. As we can see, bad faith is 
resulted when a For-itself tries to separate its own ekstases — which are supposed to be 
understood and existed in a co-present or holistic way - and apprehend them in 
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perpetual disintegration. During this process, the For-itself can slide towards a 
particular ekstasis (or ekstases) of its own, and away from the others. We should note 
that this disintegration of human ekstases is not just limited to our own Transcendence 
and Facticity; a self-deception can also result by separating or manipulating the 
relations between our temporal aspects — or Temporality - as well.285 This can be 
demonstrated in the second example of bad faith: the self-deception of the 
homosexual.286 
In this final example, a man is denying that he is a homosexual. He keeps 
denying so, because his friend is criticizing him for his homosexual inclination, and 
he is shameful and has guilty feeling about this. He tries to avoid the accusations and 
relieve his bad feelings by "re-interpreting" his own sexual identity. On the one hand, 
he frankly admits that he has really committed all those "misdeeds" which he is 
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accused of. But on the other hand, he keeps on denying that he is a homosexual. 
He tells himself that even though his choice of becoming a homosexual is a wrong one, 
it is something which has already passed away and no longer exists. In this case, he 
can safely assign every of these accusations, guilt, and the identity of "homosexual" to 
his Past. It is in this way that he can continue to exist as a new-born person who is 
"clean" and "guiltless", and thus immune to all shameful feelings and accusations. It 
is obvious that he can say of his Past, Present and Future only if he is an existent 
which exists in its Temporality. But how is it possible for him to separate a part of his 
temporal aspects, and abandon it as if it is the Past which belongs to another person? 
Let us look at how he disintegrates and manipulates the Temporality of his being: 
2S5 BN, pp. 99-100. 
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287 In fact, it is highly problematic to consider "homosexual inclination" as a misdeed or as something 
which comes from the free choices of a person. However, for the sake of exploring the mechanism of 
bad faith through examining the example raised by Sartre, let us hold up our criticism towards the 
prejudicial understanding towards homosexual, and consider the "choice" of becoming a homosexual 
as a "misdeed". 
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It seems to him that he has escaped from each mistake as soon as he has 
posited it and recognized it; he even feels that the psychic duration by itself 
cleanses him from each misdeed, constitutes for him an undetermined future, 
causes him to be born anew.288 
He understands "not being" in the sense of "not-being-in-itself." He lays 
claim to "not being a paederast" in the sense in which this table is not an 
inkwell. He is in bad faith.289 
Let us note finally the confusing syntheses which play on the nihilating 
ambiguity of these temporal ekstases, affirming at once that I am what I 
have been (the man who deliberately arrests himself at one period in his life 
and refuses to take into consideration the latter changes) and that I am not 
what I have been (the man who in the face of reproaches or rancor 
dissociates himself from his past by insisting on his freedom and on his 
perpetual re-creation).290 
Here, the man tries to isolate and abandon his Past aspects by utilizing the 
dual nature - i.e., the separatedness and unity - of his Temporality. It is true that 
the Past and Future aspects of this man are separated from his Present aspect, as his 
Past and Future are really something which either “no longer exists" or is "yet to 
exist". Nevertheless, it is equally true that his Past and Future are not absolutely 
separated from his Present. We should agree that the Present being of this man is 
always that which came from his Past - i.e., his history - , and his Present being is 
always going to become his Future - i.e., his undetermined possibilities. It shows that 
all the three temporal aspects are linked together by the relation of becoming or 
turning into. In other words, every For-itself must exist simultaneously in all three 
temporal aspects of its own — i.e., to be an existent which exists at its Present, came 
from its Past and will become its Future. This is what the man has presupposed when 
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he admits that he was the one who has committed those misdeeds, and will be the one 
who is going to have a clean, new life. The self-deception of this man is resulted when 
he emphasizes only the separatedness of his temporal aspects, and neglects the fact 
that these three temporal aspects are always unified together (by the relation of 
becoming) as a structural whole. Upon disintegration, the Past and Future aspects of 
his being will appear as //something that is radically separated from and unrelated to 
his Present being; and under this circumstance he can “discard，，or abandon the 
temporal aspect which he does not want to face. 
In the exampl e here, the man has emphasized the separatedness of his Past 
aspects from his Present and Future, and neglected the fact that his Present and 
Future are always those which come from his Past. From now on, he could consider 
his Past as an aspect which is totally absent and irrelevant to his Present and Future, 
and apprehend himself as an existent which merely exists in his Present and Future 
aspects. What does this illusive understanding imply? It means that he can treat 
himself as / /he was an existent which is completely free or detached from the 
determinedness of his own history, and as one which just repeatedly surpasses towards 
its undetermined possibilities. However, by the same token, he has reduced himself to 
an In-itself. As we can see, his abandonment of the Past is no more than an attempt of 
"re-defining" himself. Through insisting the separatedness of his Past, this man tries 
to re-definite himself as an existent which has absolutely nothing to do with the 
essence of "being a homosexual". This is just like the case when we make a negation 
or negative definition to a dead object -e.g., “this table is not an inkwell" because this 
In-itself (which is a table) does not have the essence of “being an inkwell". By 
emphasizing the separatedness of his Past aspect, the man successfully abandons his 
Past and history, together with the responsibility for his past misdeeds. Similarly, a 
For-itself can emphasize the separatedness of its Future aspects from its Past and 
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Present, and neglect the fact that its Past and Present being are always those which 
become its Future. This type of self-deception often occurs when someone is feeling 
uneasy and desperate about the undeterminedness of his or her Future, and tries to 
confine his or her gaze on some particular periods in the Past. Let us consider the case 
when an old veteran, who is disparaged by his family, tries to console himself with his 
glorious experiences during the war. The old man here is deceiving himself in the way 
we have just mentioned. As long as his self-deception carries on, he could consider his 
Future as an aspect which is absent and unrelated to his Past and Present. In this way 
he can understand himself as an existent which exists only in his Past and Present 
aspects. It means that he will treat himself as z/he was an existent which does not 
projects its undetermined possibilities at all, but as one which simply exists in its total 
determinedness. It indicates that this old man is understanding himself as an existent 
which is totally determined by his Past happenings, choices or history, just as we 
definite an In-itself as an determined existent which has a certain and absolute 
essence — e.g., when we definite and affirm that a pen has the essence of “being a 
pen”. By emphasizing the separatedness of his Future aspect, the old veteran can close 
up his Future and undetermined possibilities, and eliminates the uneasy or desperate 
feeling about them. 
We have gone through the major examples of bad faith in BN. The lengthy 
examination above has shown us the essential characteristics of bad faith. As we can 
see, bad faith is resulted by disintegrating and sliding in between the human 
ekstases of Facticity, Transcendence, and Temporality. The phenomenon of bad 
faith begins when a For-itself tries to apprehend these ekstases of its being in a 
discrete and isolated manner (the process of disintegration). It can then construct the 
illusive understanding it wants by emphasizing any of these ekstases in an 
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independent manner, while neglecting the rest of them (the slide). This is the universal 
structure or mechanism that can be found in every particular instance of bad faith. 
During the aforementioned processes, the For-itself is able to consider the 
experiences of its everyday being from a naturalistic point of view, and further 
apprehends itself as an In-itself. By considering itself as an inert In-itself, it can 
disregard the fact - without any difficulties - that it is a For-itself which projects 
its own value, and introduces value into the world. It is in this way that a 
self-deceiving For-itself can keep itself away from those experiences or situations 
which it does not want to admit or face, and to detach himself from any 
responsibilities or undeterminedness of its being. These structures of bad faith are 
adequate to explain why Sartre has chosen this phenomenon as his primal example of 
existential psychoanalysis: it is a phenomenon which can only be found in the being 
of the For-itself, and it is an attitude which is in direct opposition to the 
anthropological-ethical concern of the project in BN. 
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Table 2: human ekstases when considered in valid coordination and disintegration 
The human ekstases Valid coordination; 
Disintegration (bad faith) 
are considered in: holistic way 
The For-itself would 
For-itself In-itself, from a naturalistic point of view 
consider itself as: 
Attitudes towards the Exist in or live through as 
Emphasized Neglected 
ekstases: a holistic structure 
- I am an "intellectual - I am an static existent 
- I can always project 
soul"; I am not my which does not project 
and choose to become 
"body" any possibilities of my 
the possibles that are 
Transcendence - I can stand away and own 
available within my 
aloof from the reality, - I am solely defined by 
factical situation 
and exist as a my factical situation 
transcendent spectator and my present being 
- I am engaged in a 
— I am a "passive body"; - I can neglect and 
pre-destined situation 
I am not my "soul" become unaffected by 
(or the reality) which 
Facticity - I am completely anything that happens 
I can make choices 
subjected to mechanical in my factical situation 
and introduce 
causality or in reality. 
changes 
- I am an existent which 
- I exist solely in my Past 
is irrelevant to my Past 
aspect 
- I can abandon the 
- I am absolutely defined 
- I am simultaneously responsibilities for 
by my past deeds 
disengaging and what I have done 
unifying myself in the - I am an existent which 
Temporality 
temporal aspects of - I exist solely in my is irrelevant to my 
Past, Present and Future aspect Future 
Future - I am absolutely defined - I can keep myself 
by something other away from the 
than my past deeds undeterminedness of 
my Future 
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§5.3 The “ideal” mode of being: on sincerity and authenticity 
5.3.1 Sincerit y as the opposite of bad faith? 
The above examination has revealed us the meaning and structure of bad faith. 
As we can see, bad faith is a phenomenon which prevents us, the For-itselfs, from 
recognizing that value is introduced into the world through our being. This 
phenomenon is generated when a For-itself disintegrates and slides between its 
human ekstases. In this circumstance, the self-deceiver freely constructs the illusive 
understandings he or she desires, and conceals the fact that he or she is a For-itself 
who exists simultaneously in its Facticity, Transcendence and Temporality. It follows 
that the self-deceiver will apprehend himself or herself as an In-itself, and blindfold 
himself or herself from the meaning or "fact of existence" which he or she wants to 
deny. As long as this For-itself is existing in bad faith, he or she can excuse himself or 
herself from being responsible for his or her own deeds or choices, and cover up all 
the undeterminedness of his or her own being. 
Our attentive readers will soon notice that the above examination of bad faith has 
carried a very important implication. If bad faith is the phenomenon which conceals 
us from understanding the “the origin and the nature of value ”，than there should 
exist, correspondingly, an “ideal，，mode of being which is opposite to that of bad faith. 
This mode of being can be understood as “ideal” in the following two senses. Firstly, 
the For-itself who exists in this mode of being is able to apprehend his or her being 
without any neglect, concealment or illusion. In means that the For-itself existing in 
this u ideal" mode of being is able to recognize that value is grounded in its being, and 
take up the values and responsibilities which belongs to its own. Secondly, it coincides 
with the anthropological-ethical concern of BN - i.e., to show that value is a part of 
the eidetic and ontological structure of human reality. To put in a different way, what 
Sartre aims to show in BN is that we are always possible to understand and exist in 
188 
this “ideal” mode of being. To conclude, this “ideal” mode of being is exactly the 
central theme of BN, and we will never truly understand the project of BN if we 
cannot sort out what this “ideal” mode of being is. 
We should now understand the importance and necessity of examining this 
“ideal” mode of being. Nevertheless, what exactly is this mode of being or attitude 
which is opposite to bad faith? Are there any concrete examples of this "ideal" mode 
of being in the experiences of our everyday being? At the first glance, these questions 
seem to be simple or even trivial. As we know, a self-deceiver is a person who denies 
that his or her actions are filled with meaning and value, and refuses to take up any 
responsibilities for his or her deeds. If this is the case, then a person who “does not 
deceive himself or herself' must be one who admits that our actions are filled with 
meaning and value, and admits that he or she is always having certain obligations to 
fulfill. This attitude is what we commonly called "sincerity". It seems that we can 
easily solve the problem here by adopting our common sensical thinking. However, 
the case is not as simple as we think. Sartre gives an unexpected and astonishing 
answer to the questions we pose here: 
If candor or sincerity is a universal value, it is evident that the maxim ‘‘one 
must be what one is" does not serve solely as a regulating principle for 
judgments and concepts by which I express what I am... But what are we 
then if we have the constant obligation to make ourselves what we are, if 
291 
our mode of being is having the obligation to be what we are? 
Thus the essential structure of sincerity does not differ from that of bad faith 
since the sincere man constitutes himself as what he is in order not to be 
it... Total, constant sincerity as a constant effort to adhere to oneself is by 
nature a constant effort to dissociate oneself from oneself. A person frees 
himself from himself by the very act by which he makes himself an object 
291 BN, p. 101. 
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for himself.292 
To our great surprise, Sartre does not consider "sincerity" as an attitude or mode 
of being that is opposite to self-deception. He even tells us that what we commonly 
know as "sincerity" is in fact a phenomenon which shares a similar mechanism and 
ontological structure with self-deception. It implies that "sincerity" is also a 
phenomenon which conceals "the origin and the nature of value", and prevents us 
from recognizing that value is introduced into the world through our being. So what 
exactly does he mean by "sincerity"? What makes sincerity a phenomenon that is 
identical to bad faith? And what would be the opposing attitude of bad faith? 
5.3.2 Descriptive analysis on concrete instances of sincerity 
To find out the answer, we must look at the examples of sincerity that is found in 
BN. The first example is about a waiter in the cafe.293 This waiter is always working 
with sincerity and full devotion. He always tries his best to fulfill his obligation or 
‘‘function，，294 of being a waiter, and hopes that he can accomplish his work in 
accordance with the ideal or value of a waiter. He thinks he must attune every of his 
actions or gestures to their precisions and efficiencies, so that he can serve the 
customers in a perfect way. He also thinks that he has to return to the restaurant earlier, 
and set up everything in a well-prepared fashion, because all these are the obligations 
of "working in a cafe" or "being a waiter". It is in this way that he considers himself 
as fulfilling the value or responsibility of being a waiter. The second example is the 
• • 295 • 
critical friend of the homosexual that we have mentioned earlier. ^ This man, whom 
292 BN, p. 109. 
293 BN, pp. 101-103. 
294 BN,p. 103. 
295 BN,pp. 107-109. 
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Sartre describes as “the champion of sincerity" , always believes in the saying that 
“A sin confessed is half pardoned" . It is upon this consideration that he always 
criticizes his homosexual friend. He thinks that once his friend confesses, he is 
exempted from the guilt that comes from his past misdeeds. And as a sinner who is 
forgiven - either by God, by this "champion of sincerity”，or the homosexual 
himself- , the homosexual man can enjoy his clean, new life again. These examples 
are very common cases of sincerity, and it is reasonable to believe that most of us will 
consider them as instances of being sincere. The waiter and the critic has neither 
blindfolded themselves from their responsibilities, nor to avoid facing any guilty or 
shameful feelings which they may have (we can reasonably suppose that the 
“champion of sincerity" will also confess / /he is a homosexual). Why does Sartre 
consider these cases of “sincerity” as a phenomenon or attitude that are structurally 
identical to bad faith then? 
(a) The example of the “perfect” waiter 
We must be aware of the following thing: the phenomenon of bad faith is not 
decided by whether the For-itself involved is taking up any responsibilities or values. 
As we have emphasized, the phenomenon of bad faith is characterized by a 
disintegration and slide that occurs between the human ekstases of a For-itself, and 
an illusive understanding of himself or herself treating human reality as an In-itself. 
Thus, someone is still existing in bad faith if he or she is taking up any responsibilities 
or values by disintegrating and sliding between human ekstases, and by treating 
himself or herself as an In-itself. As we can see, the waiter and the homosexual's 
critical friend are existing in this mode of being when they take up their 
296 BN, p. 107，108. 
297 BN,p. 108. 
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responsibilities or values. Let us look at these examples one by one. As Sartre says, 
the waiter has generated different illusive understandings in his sincerity: 
In a parallel situation, from within, the waiter in the cafe can not be 
immediately a cafe waiter in the sense that this inkwell is an inkwell, or the 
glass is a glass.298 
What I attempt to realize is a being-in-itself of the cafe waiter, as if it were 
not just in my power to confer their value and their urgency upon my duties 
and the rights of my position, as if it were not my free choice to get up each 
morning at five o'clock or to remain in bed, even though it meant getting 
fired.299 
The above paragraphs show that the waiter apprehends his own being and value 
in a way identical to bad faith. As we can see, the waiter treats the ideal case or 
obligation of “being a waiter” as something which he must follow and could not resist. 
He thinks that he “must” attune his gestures to precisions (so to serve his customers 
perfectly) and “has to" get up and return to the cafe early (so to prepare for cafe), just 
as we say that the fire “must” be brought about by heat, or an inkwell "has to” serve 
the function of holding ink. In other words, he has completely subjected himself to 
this value or obligation in the same way as a thing is mechanically subjected to natural 
law. In this situation, he does not consider himself as an existent which is capable of 
existing in a way "otherwise". All these evidences show that this waiter has concealed 
the Transcendence of his being, and bound himself completely to his Facticity. On 
the one hand, he considers himself as an inert and passive In-itself which is incapable 
of changing or deciding a situation. It indicates that, in his sincerity, he has 
overlooked the fact that he is a For-itself which always projects, chooses and becomes 
its own possibilities. He understands himself as an existent which can only follows the 
298 BN, p. 102. 
299 BN,p. 103. 
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value of “being a waiter" without otherwise, and fails to realize that there is always 
other options or possibilities that are available to him. Perhaps these options are 
highly undesirable ones (e.g., to quit his job), but the existence of these options 
always reveals that he is not destined or restricted by his obligation in the way like a 
dead object is determined by some objective laws: it is this very particular human 
reality who has chosen to exist as a waiter. On the other hand, this waiter treats value 
as a transcendent object that is found in and determined by the factical situation 
where he is in. It shows that, in his sincerity, he has forgotten that value is a part of the 
eidetic and ontological structure of its own being. He just focuses on the fact that he is 
now existing in a particular situation (e.g., the cafe; the society), and it is a must for 
him to follow the "value" that is determined by this situation (e.g., to be a perfect 
waiter, to be a good employee; to be a good citizen). In this case, he fails to recognize 
that value is the undetermined totality of himself which is projected and chosen in his 
own being, but not something which is determined with essences and given to us 一 
like a transcendent object. As we can see, the man is fulfilling the objective “value” or 
“obligation” of “being a waiter" by considering himself as an In-itself, and subjects 
himself completely to the determination of something which is transcendent. 
Therefore, the sincerity of this man is achieved by a disintegration and slide between 
human ekstases, and it eventually make him considers himself and his value as an 
In-itself. 
(b) The example of the critic 
The critic or "champion of sincerity" is treating his homosexual friend in a 
similar way. Let us look at the way how he apprehends the being of his friend and the 
practice of confession: 
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What does this mean if not that the man who will acknowledge himself as a 
homosexual will no longer be the same as the homosexual whom he 
acknowledges being and that he will escape into the region of freedom and 
of good will? The critic asks the man then to be what he is in order no 
longer to be what he is... The critic demands of the guilty one that he 
constitute himself as a thing, precisely in order no longer to treat him as a 
thing. And this contradiction is constitutive of the demand of sincerity.300 
The man who confesses that he is evil has exchanged his disturbing 
“freedom-for-evil” for an inanimate character of evil; he is evil, he clings to 
himself, he is what he is. But by the same stroke, he escapes from that thing, 
since it is he who contemplates it... He derives a merit from his sincerity, 
and the deserving man is not the evil man as he is evil but as he is beyond 
• , # 301 
evilness... [M]y future is virgin; everything is allowed to me. 
The critic always thinks that the guilt of his homosexual friend will be forgiven 
once he has confessed - i.e., he admits that he is the person who has committed 
something wrong. He thinks that, by doing so, his friend will be able to receive again 
a clean and new life. This is how he understands the sayings of “A sin confessed is 
half pardoned.”302 The thoughts of the critic have revealed that he is understanding 
his friend — who is a For-itself - in a highly problematic way. On the one hand, the 
critic is requiring his friend to apprehend himself - through the process of sincere 
confession — as a passive In-itself which is determined with the essence of “being 
sinfulAs we can see, a human reality can apprehend himself or herself as an existent 
who possesses definite and determined essence only if he or she apprehends himself 
or herself as an In-itself. In this case, this human reality is solely emphasizing its 
Facticity and neglecting the Transcendence of its own. It indicates that, in his sincerity, 
the critic is demanding his homosexual friend to understand himself as an existent 
which is totally determined and defined by his Past (e.g., choices, deeds and 
300 BN, p. 108. 
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happenings). He has forgotten that his friend is a For-itself who is capable to project 
and choose the undetermined possibilities of his own, and he overlooks the fact that 
he is asking his friend to consider himself as an In-itself. On the other hand, the critic 
has considered the Transcendence (or the Future aspect) of human reality as a factual 
attribute or transcendent object which is separable from the being of the same human 
reality. As we can see, he thinks that his friend can recover his “new，’ and "clean" 
Future upon confession. It implies that the critic is treating his friend as an existent 
which is "originally" without Transcendence, but could latter gain it back (if he is 
willing to apprehend himself as an In-itself - e.g., an existent which possesses a 
definite essence of “being homosexual"). The understanding here exhibits that the 
critic has considered the Transcendence or Future aspect of human reality as 
transcendent objects which are "outside" the being of human reality. It is in this way 
that he can treat them as transcendent objects which are given to us, or factual 
attributes which are separable from our being. All these demonstrate that this 
“champion of sincerity “ has disintegrated the human Transcendence from the rest of 
the two ekstases, and apprehended his friend solely in his Facticity. In his state of 
sincerity, the critic has failed to notice that the Transcendence or the Future aspect is 
always part of the eidetic and ontological structure of human reality. He fails to 
recognize that every human reality is necessarily an existent which projects and 
surpasses towards its own undetermined possibilities, and hence perpetually exists as 
one which is going to become its Future. At this point, we should notice the 
“champion of sincerity" is making a contradictory and even absurd request to his 
friend. He thinks that his friend should confess his misdeeds, so that he can regain his 
new life and future. It is the same as to require his homosexual friend to, first of all, 
apprehend himself as an In-itself which possesses definite essence and without 
Transcendence, so that he could, latter on，acquire and recover his Transcendence 
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again. Thus, this sincere demand of confession that comes from the critic is one that 
is generated upon a disintegration and slide between human ekstases; it is a 
perspective which aims to consider his friend (and his friend's Future) as an In-itself. 
The analyses of these examples show that the common conception of sincerity is 
sharing a similar structure with bad faith. Both of these phenomena are generated by 
disintegrating the unified human ekstases into discrete and separable aspects, and 
sliding in between these human ekstases in an invalid way. Moreover, both bad faith 
and sincerity will bring about a naturalistic perspective in the For-itself involved, and 
allow the self-deceiving For-itself to understand human reality as pure In-itself. That 
is why Sartre tries to summarize the phenomenon of sincerity as follows: 
Under these conditions what can be the significance of the ideal of sincerity 
except as a task impossible to achieve, of which the very meaning is in 
contradiction with the structure of my consciousness. To be sincere, we said, 
• • • • ini is to be what one is. That supposes that I am not originally what I am. 
Sincerity will be a phenomenon or attitude which neglects the undeterminedness 
of human reality, and considers human reality as "things" which possesses determined 
or definite essences. It implies that both the phenomenon of sincerity and bad faith are 
illusive understandings which conceal “the origin and the nature of value ” 一 i.e., 
value is a part of the eidetic and ontological structure of human reality, and is 
introduced into the world in the very being of human reality. 
5.3.3 An examination unfinished: authenticity as the “ideal” mode of being 
We have now fallen into a huge dilemma. At the beginning, we think that 
sincerity will certainly be the opposite of bad faith. But Sartre's examination of 
sincerity has shown the reverse: bad faith and sincerity are sharing an identical 
303 BN,pp. 105-106. 
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structure and "anti-ethical" meaning. We cannot help but ask ourselves the following 
questions: is human reality destined to exist in the concealment of "the origin and the 
nature of value" forever? What would be the attitude that is opposite to that of bad 
faith and sincerity, so that we can truly understand that value is introduced into the 
world in our being? And is it possible for us to recover ourselves from bad faith, and 
to exist in an appropriate understanding of the being of ourselves? 
Let us recall again the results of our preceding analyses. As we have seen, the 
phenomenon of bad faith and sincerity is "anti-ethical" and problematic, because they 
have overlooked the primary relation between value and the being of human reality. 
Both of these phenomena lead us to the understandings that, first, human reality is an 
existent which exist as an In-itself, and second, value or responsibilities are 
transcendent objects which can either be completely exempted from our being (as in 
the case of bad faith) or be given to us as something already determined (as in the case 
of sincerity). As Sartre says, his existential psychoanalysis is exactly performed in 
order to eliminate these kinds of misunderstandings: 
But the principal result of existential psychoanalysis must be to make us 
repudiate the spirit of seriousness. The spirit of seriousness has two 
characteristics: it considers values as transcendent givens independent of 
human subjectivity, and it transfers the quality of "desirable" from the 
ontological structure of things to their simple material constitution... Thus 
we are already on the moral plane but concurrently on that of bad faith, for 
it is an ethic which is ashamed of itself and does not dare speak its name... 
Man pursues being blindly by hiding from himself the free project which is 
this pursuit. He makes himself such that he is waited for by all the tasks 
placed along his way. Objects are mute demands，and he is nothing in 
himself but the passive obedience to these demands.304 
This conclusive criticism is formulated in against to the common conception of 
304 BN,p. 796. 
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sincerity or the "spirit of seriousness". As the paragraph says, this common 
conception of sincerity should be repudiated, as it has considered value as 
‘‘transcendent givens independent of human subjectivity", and turned man into an 
inert existent which is solely waiting for and obeying to these transcendent given. 
This is what we have shown in our preceding analysis: in the attitude of sincerity, one 
considers value as a transcendent object (or In-itself) given to us rather than a part of 
our eidetic and ontological structure, and apprehends human reality as an In-itself 
instead of di For-itself. If this is the case, then the problem of bad faith is not a matter 
of recognizing the existence of value or not; it is a matter of in what way or attitude 
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do we recognize value. This explains the reason why Sartre criticizes sincerity, as it 
is obviously an inappropriate and illusive understanding of value. But still, what 
exactly is the ideal mode of being or attitude which we can understand ourselves 
without any concealment or illusion? 
Perhaps it is a bit disappointing for us to know that Sartre has never given us the 
answer. After he has finished his existential psychoanalysis of bad faith, Sartre tells us, 
in a footnote, about the following thing: 
It is indifferent whether one is in good or in bad faith, because bad faith 
reapprehends good faith and slides to the very origin of the project of good 
faith, that does not mean that we can not radically escape bad faith. But this 
supposes a self-recovery of being which was previously corrupted. This 
305 O ur claim here can find its support from the researches on the Sartrean conception of bad faith by 
Joseph Catalano. He clearly points out, in "Good and Bad Faith: Weak and Strong Notions", that "[t]he 
intentional structure of a bad-faith belief is fundamentally different from the intentional structure of a 
good-faith belief; that is, persons in bad faith are distinguished not only by what they believe but by the 
way they belief.”(p. 121). Similarly, in the article "On the Possibility of Good Faith", he says, "[m]y 
interpretation of this passage is that good and bad faith are the two ways we have of facing our 
freedom.... Thus good and bad faith confront freedom differently: Good faith uses freedom to create its 
essence by tending in the direction of its freely chosen self; bad faith uses freedom to escape the very 
essence and self that it has chosen for itself.’’(p. 87). See Catalano, Joseph S., "Good and Bad Faith: 
Weak and Strong Notions", in Existentialist Ethics, edited by William L. McBride (New York: Garland, 
1997), pp. 117-128, and also Catalano, Joseph S., "On the Possibility of Good Faith", in Good Faith 
and Other Essays: Perspectives on a Sartrean Ethics (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), pp. 
77-97. 
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self-recovery we shall call authenticity, the description of which has no 
place here.306 
It appears that Sartre has evaded the question. In this footnote, we can clearly see 
that Sartre affirms the possibility of the “ideal” mode of being - which he calls 
authenticity — that is beyond the opposition of bad faith and sincerity. But we can 
never find any substantial discussion about this “ideal” mode of being other than the 
purely formal affirmation quoted. At this point, we can only figure out the meaning of 
authenticity from the very few hints that we can find. In fact, Sartre has expressed a 
little bit on this ‘‘ideal” mode of being when he discusses about the waiter and 
homosexual: 
Yet there is not doubt that I aw in a sense a cafe waiter — otherwise could I 
not just as well call myself a diplomat or a reporter? But if I am one, this 
can not be in the mode of being in-itself. I am a waiter in the mode of being 
what I am not. 
He would be right actually if he understood the phrase “I am not a 
paederast" in the sense of “I am not what I am." That is, if he declared to 
himself, ‘‘To the extent that a pattern of conduct is defined as the conduct of 
a paederast and to the extent that I have adopted this conduct, I am a 
paederast. But to the extent that human reality can not be finally defined by 
patterns of conduct, I am not one." But instead he slides surreptitiously 
toward a different connotation of the word "being." He understands “not 
being" in the sense of "not-being-in-itself." He lays claim to “not being a 
paederast" in the sense in which this table is not an inkwell. He is in bad 
faith.308 
These two paragraphs shed light on the problem we are now facing. Here, Sartre 
has shown us how the waiter or the homosexual would apprehend themselves if they 
306 BN, p. \ \6.ftn. 
307 BN, p. 103. 
308 BN, p. 108. 
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are not in an attitude of bad faith or sincerity, and they can reasonably serve as the 
examples or “model” cases of authenticity. As we can see, this mode of being or 
understanding is grounded upon a holistic understanding of human ekstases. It means 
that, in this mode of being, we exist simultaneously in our Facticity, Transcendence 
and Temporality; none of these ekstases are reducible to the others, and none of them 
are apprehensible independent from the others. Under these conditions, we can never 
truly definite a human reality as a thing, instrument or In-itself. The man is a waiter, 
not in the sense that he is an In-itself which possesses the determined essence of 
“being a waiter". We can say that “he is a waiter" only in the sense that he is an 
undetermined For-itself which projects and chooses to become a particular possibility 
and value - in this case, the possibility and value of "being a waiter" - that is 
available to him in his situation. And the case is identical for the homosexual. We can 
say that "he is a homosexual" not in the way as we definite a static In-itself, but only 
in the sense that he is a dynamic For-itself who has chosen to become a homosexual in 
the Past — i.e., his determined aspect — and has not yet chosen to become anything for 
his Future — i.e., his undetermined aspect. At this point, we have figured out a 
plausible understanding of authenticity. A human reality who exists in his or her 
authenticity would consider the human ekstases of his or her being in a holistic 
way or “valid coordination y\ This would prevent himself or herself from falling into 
a naturalistic understanding of human reality and value. From this perspective, value 
will no longer appear to this human reality as transcendent objects or In-itself that is 
given. This "authentic" For-itself will be able to notice that value is indeed the 
undetermined totality of his or her own self that is projected in his or her being. He 
or she will also be able to apprehend human reality not as an In-itself with essence, 
but as a For-itself who always repeatedly projects and chooses his or her own value 
(and possibilities) within the factical situation where he or she is in. Can we say 
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that what Sartre means by authenticity is referring to the 
anth ropol ogical-eth ical-ph en omen o logic a I perspective that runs through and 
constitutes the project in BN? The answer to this question is “yes and no". It is true 
that the holistic structure of ekstases, the undeterminedness of For-itself and “the 
origin and the nature of value" are discovered and apprehensible only from the 
anthropological-ethical-phenomenological perspective; we will not be able to ask 
about the eidetic and ontological structure of an existent if we are not being 
phenomenological, and we will not be interested in problems like the Wesen of human 
being or “the origin and the nature of value" if we are not driven by such an 
anthropological-ethical concern. It shows that there is a high degree of coincidence 
between authenticity and the anthropological-ethical-phenomenological perspective, 
because both of them have a similar "understanding" towards these aspects of human 
reality. But it is equally true that the meaning of "understanding" is totally different in 
these cases. The anthropological-ethical-phenomenological perspective is a 
theoretical perspective, and it implies that it is an "understanding" which is done in a 
the tic or reflective way. Authenticity, on the other hand, is a mode of being or attitude 
which we live through in our everyday being. It implies that this is an "understanding" 
which is done in a non-thetic or pre-reflective manner, and is not restricted merely to 
philosophical activities. Therefore, authenticity should not be equated simply to the 
anthropological-ethical-phenomenological perspective that is found in BN. It is rather 
a mode of being that is possible to be found in the everyday being of each of us - i.e., 
the human reality or the For-itself. 
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Conclusion 
§ 1 The phenomenological and anthropological-ethical contribution of 
Being and Nothingness 
We have finally gone through the relevant themes of BN according to our 
original proposal. Our preceding analyses should be sufficient to support the very 
assertion that is pronounced in the introduction of this thesis: we can never understand 
the full picture and true meaning of Sartre's philosophy if we do not take his 
phenomenological position into consideration. It is sure that the project in BN\s> 
founded on the phenomenological investigations of Husserl and Heidegger; and it will 
be quite impossible for Sartre to explicate his themes without the help of their 
phenomenological methods or perspectives. But it is also true that such an adoption of 
methods has never decreased the remarkable value of his original and comprehensive 
project. Let us summarize the contributions of Sartre's investigation in BN. 
First of all, the project in BN has demonstrated the possibility of examining the 
u essence " or Wesen of human being from a phenomenological perspective. As we can 
see, Sartre has assimilated the phenomenological method or perspective from Husserl 
and Heidegger. He has adopted from them the method of intentional and eidetic 
analysis and the ontological inquiry, and these two have jointly guided the 
eidetic-ontological investigation of Sartre. But besides such an adoption, we can also 
notice that there are significant differences between Sartre and his two German 
predecessors. As we know, Husserl is driven to his investigation by a search for a 
foundational science, while Heidegger is motivated by a quest in the direction of 
fundamental ontology. Correspondingly, Sartre is prompted by an 
anthropological-ethical concern. His project in BN is dedicated to find out, from an 
eidetic-ontological perspective, the essential structure that characterizes and 
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constitutes human reality, and this "phenomenological anthropology" eventually 
discloses that value is grounded in and introduced into the world through the being of 
human reality. All these evidences show that Sartre's phenomenological anthropology 
in BN\idiS supplemented the projects of his predecessors in an important way: his 
phenomenological anthropology has understood human reality primarily and 
fundamentally not as an existent who is conscious of its objects, not as an existent 
who averagely understands the meaning of Being or being, but as an existent who 
projects value. To put it differently, the project in 5iVhas considered human reality 
primarily and fundamentally as an existent of value. Of course, it would be too hasty 
(or even incorrect) to assert that Husserl and Heidegger have never paid any attention 
to this aspect of human being309; but at least we can be sure that the two German 
phenomenologists have not put the same degree of thematization on this aspect of 
human being as Sartre did in BN. By re-emphasizing the relation between value and 
the being of human reality, Sartre has substantially enriched the phenomenological 
conception of human being. 
Secondly, Sartre has retrieved the ontological importance of nothingness and 
absence. We can see that he begins his investigation of human reality by analyzing the 
common phenomenon of absence or negatites. In addition, the important distinction 
between For-itself and In-itself is also drawn with reference to the concept of 
nothingness. On the one hand, the For-itself is characterized by its nihilation; it is an 
309 The term "value" has appeared occasionally in BT. However, the term is used by Heidegger to refer 
to the instrumental or practical utility which an entity shows. For example, he has called entities that 
exist in the world as ‘‘Things ‘invested with value ["wertbehaftet" Dinge]" (BT63). In fact, Heidegger 
has also tried to ask about the ontological structure or implication of "value". As he says, in BT 68, 
"[w]hen one designates Things as the entities that are 'proximally given', one goes ontologically astray, 
even though ontically one has something else in mind... But suppose one characterizes these Things' 
as Things 'invested with value'? What does "value" mean ontologically? How are we to categorize this 
'investing' and Being-invested? Disregarding the obscurity of this structure of investiture with value, 
have we thus met the phenomenal characteristic of Being which belongs to what we encounter in our 
concernful dealing?" However, Heidegger has never provided us with any further reply or inquiry upon 
the questions he raised. It shows that, in comparison to the project in BN, the theme of "value" has 
received a relatively low degree of thematization in BT. 
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existent which always, in its being, differentiates and separates the being of its own 
from that of its object. On the other hand, the In-itself is characterized as that which is 
nihilated; it is always an existent which is, in its being, being differentiated and 
separated as the object of For-itself. The conception of nothingness has vividly 
depicted the spontaneity of the For-itself as it classifies and distinguishes - eidetically 
and ontologically — the being of existents. It also provides us with a new perspective 
to understand the phenomenological themes like consciousness or being: they are not 
substantial or object-like existents, but are rather the non-substantial and 
non-material is tic relatedness that is found between us and our objects. 
Thirdly, the analysis of human ekstases has provided us with an in-depth and 
substantial understanding of the essential constitution of the phenomenon of value. At 
first glance, it seems that Sartre is simply repeating the analyses of human ekstases 
which are already conducted and finished by Heidegger in BT. But soon we find that 
Sartre is handling his subject matters with a different emphasis. We see that the three 
human ekstases are understood and explicated with reference to his concern of "the 
origin and the nature of value". For example, Facticity is always considered by him 
as the given ground or pre-destined starting point of our choices. And it is obvious 
that the discussion of human Transcendence is fundamentally an explication of the 
structure of value, as it has clearly demonstrated how value is introduced or projected 
into the world as a part of the being of human reality. The ekstasis of Temporality is 
receiving a similar treatment; it is mainly revealed as the underlying horizon that 
makes the projection and choices of value (and also possibilities) possible. All these 
evidences tell us that Sartre has advanced on a set of themes which Heidegger 
hesitates to explore: Sartre wants to show that these three ekstases are the essential 
constitution for the being of human reality as an existent of value. 
Finally, the existential psychoanalysis has shown us the possibility of grounding 
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a phenomenological investigation on the qualitative analysis of concrete examples. As 
we can see, this descriptive examination of examples is performed in order to support 
and elaborate the structural analysis of human reality. We should agree that the 
existential psychoanalysis has demonstrated the structure of the phenomenon of bad 
faith. We discover that bad faith is generated when a For-itself tries to exist and 
understand its ekstases in an invalid coordination. The For-itself who deceives 
himself or herself disintegrates and slides between different human ekstases, and 
results in different illusive understandings and concealment of its being. But we 
should also take note of the universal validity of the existential psychoanalysis of bad 
faith. The generality of this phenomenon implies that any existent which has ever 
existed in bad faith is necessarily a For-itself - e.g., it is an existent which exists in 
the aforementioned human ekstases. It is undeniable that the existential 
psychoanalysis of Sartre is founded on the analysis of Dasein of Heidegger, as the 
latter has demonstrated and opened up the possibility of describing the experiences of 
the everyday existence of human being. However, Sartre's method of analysis has also 
furnished Heidegger's analysis of Dasein with bone and flesh. As we find, Sartre has 
grounded his ontology of human reality on a comprehensive and vivid elucidation of 
the everyday experience which none of us can avoid or deny. Through the existential 
psychoanalysis, Sartre has provided his phenomenological project — and perhaps all 
other phenomenological studies — with an unshakeable phenomenal foundation, 
§2 The limitation of this thesis, and possible directions for further 
investigation 
We have listed out the significances and contributions of Sartre's project in BN. 
We must be careful that all these significances and contributions can only be 
discovered upon a phenomenological reading of BN or by considering Sartre as a 
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phenomenologist. Does it imply that the examination in this thesis has already 
exhausted all the phenomenological elements of the project in BN7 The answer is 
obviously "no". In fact, there are a number of crucial themes we have not yet 
examined. Let us give a brief sketch on two important themes which we have not 
gone through in this thesis. 
First of all, we have not yet analyzed the fourth human ekstasis — i.e., the 
structure of being-for-others. In fact, this fourth ekstasis has already been implied in 
the human ekstasis of Facticity. As we know, the For-itself is always an existent that 
exists in an indicative complex made up of human tasks and projects. These tasks and 
projects are not totally originated from or projected in my being; on the contrary we 
will always find that most of these tasks and projects are projected or established by 
existents other than me. The circumstance here shows that there exists other 
For-itselfs who project their own values in the world where I am in. It further 
indicates that the being-in-the-world or Facticity of every For-itself has necessarily 
implied the structure or ekstases of being-for-others. The examination of 
being-for-others is important to us (or at least related to the analyses in this thesis) in 
the following two ways. This is how Sartre says: 
But although this metastable concept of "transcendence-facticity" is one of 
the most basic instruments of bad faith, it is not the only one of its kind. We 
can equally well use another kind of duplicity derived from human reality 
which we will express roughly by saying that its being-for-itself implies 
complementarily a being-for-others. Upon any one of my conducts it is 
always possible to coverage two looks, mine and that of the Other... The 
equal dignity of being, possessed by my being-for-others and by my 
being-for-myself, permits a perpetually disintegrating synthesis and a 
perpetual game of escape from the for-itself to the for-others and from the 
11 0 
for-others to the for-itself. 
310 BN, p. 100. 
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The above paragraph clearly shows that bad faith can also happen on the 
ekstasis of being-for-others. What sort of illusive understanding or concealment will 
result in this self-deceiver? According to our previous analysis, the result would 
probably be: it will neglect the fact that it always exists in a world that is jointly 
constituted by this For-itself (who deceives itself) and other For-itselfs, and will 
consider the world as an indicative complex that is solely filled with different In-itselfs 
or instruments. The illusive understanding here implies that, the self-deceiver will 
consider other For-itselfs as passive In-itselfs or like instrumental-things. Our 
readers may immediately find that the result of such a bad faith looks very similar to 
the case that is rejected in the Kantian maxim: 
Now I say that man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in 
himself, not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will: he must 
in all his actions, whether they are directed to himself or to other rational 
1 • • 111 
beings, always be viewed at the same time as an end. 
Just as Kant did, Sartre wanted to remind us that we, as human reality, are not 
just instruments; we are also an end-in-itself. It does not imply that we have already 
found the interchanging point to bridge Sartre's project with that of Kant, or even the 
critical breakthrough to turn Sartre's “phenomenological description of value" into a 
normative ethical theory. But at least if we agree that Sartre is conducting an 
anthropological-ethical project, and if we admit that he is trying to exhibit the relation 
between value and the being of human reality, then it will be necessary for us to 
include the ekstasis of being-for-others in the examination of this thesis. 
Secondly, we have not yet examined the concept of freedom. In fact, this is a 
concept which we have already presupposed in our discussion of Transcendence, 
311 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, translated by H. J. Paton (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1964), p. 95; pagination 4:428 
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possibilities and value. As we can see, human reality or the For-itself always projects 
and surpasses towards its ¥ov-itsQ\{-yet-to-become. This ¥or-itsdf-yet-to-become is a 
part which is undetermined, and it will be determined by the For-itself in its own 
choice. The case here shows that the process of Transcendence is necessarily founded 
upon freedom: we are free to project and choose our possibilities and value. 
Although this process of projection and choice must always be done on the ground of 
our Facticity (e.g., in a certain factical situation), we are still able to choose and 
determine ourselves among the possibilities that are available or offered. It indicates 
that the full meaning of Transcendence, possibilities and value can be thoroughly 
revealed only if we can explicate the meaning of freedom. However, it is important to 
note that the analysis in this thesis is still not ready for an examination of the concept 
of freedom. This is how Sartre formulates the dilemma between freedom and the 
existence of Others: 
In short, by the fact of the Other's existence, I exist in a situation which has 
an outside and which due to this very fact has a dimension of alienation 
which I can in no way remove from the situation any more than I can act 
directly upon it. This limit to my freedom is, as we see, posited by the 
Other's pure and simple existence that is, by the fact that my 
transcendence exists for a transcendence. Thus we grasp a truth of great 
importance: we saw earlier, keeping ourselves within the compass of 
existence-for-itself, that only my freedom can limit my freedom; we see 
now, when we include the Other's existence in our considerations, that my 
freedom on this new level finds its limits also in the existence of the Other's 
freedom 
The paragraph here shows that the discussion on the concept of freedom would 
• • 313 
in turn require an analysis of being-for-others that we have just mentioned. The 
312 BN 673. 
313 This is a point which both Matthew Eshleman and Joseph Catalano emphasized. The whole passage 
of Eshleman's "Two Dogmas of Sartrean Existentialism" is dedicated to show the following thing: it is 
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freedom of For-itself is not something absolute or infinite, and we are not enjoying a 
sort of libertas indifferentiae; quite the reverse, our freedom is always a limited one. 
The limitation of our freedom is not just originated in the givenness of the world or 
the Facticity of our being; it is also constituted by the being of other For-itselfs that 
we meet in our being. It indicates that the freedom or choices of one For-itself is 
always limited by that of another For-itself. This limitation becomes noticeable when 
we take into consideration the role of our body: when we occupy a place, this at the 
time prevents other persons from occupying that same place. This is the reason why 
Sartre has paid much attention to the phenomenon of Body in his discussion of 
being-for-others.314 In our current situation, we lack the perspective and conceptual 
tools to explicate the meaning of freedom in a complete way. And in this way we are 
forced to give up this topic in our current thesis. 
impossible for us to apprehend our own existential freedom without taking into account the communal 
or social aspects of our being. As Eshleman concludes, "[w]hile it may be that in some theoretical sense 
existence precedes essence, Sartre recognizes... that the social world precedes existence and conditions 
both social identity and freedom.”(p. 72). Catalano also expresses, in “On the Possibility of Good 
Faith", his doubt towards "the advisability of beginning a description of freedom abstracted from its 
relation to others.”(p. 92). For the passage of Eshleman, see Eshleman, Matthew, "Two Dogmas of 
Sartrean Existentialism", in Philosophy Today, Vol. 46 (2002), pp. 68-74; for the passage of Catalano, 
see Catalano, Joseph S., "On the Possibility of Good Faith", in Good Faith and Other Essays: 
Perspectives on a Sartrean Ethics (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), pp. 77-97. 
3 1 4 ^ , p p . 401-470 
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